



**NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL**

MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

**SWISS NEUTRALITY AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY:
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE UNITED NATIONS**

by

Urs Loeffel

March 2010

Thesis Co-Advisors:

David S. Yost
Donald Abenheim

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.			
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE March 2010	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE Swiss Neutrality and Collective Security: The League of Nations and the United Nations		5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Urs Loeffel		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A		11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.	
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited		12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) This thesis explains Swiss accession to collective security organizations by analyzing key domestic and international factors relating to Switzerland's permanent neutrality. The study provides historical and theoretical background regarding the concepts of neutrality and collective security before examining the positive vote in the referendum for accession to the League of Nations in 1920, the consequent adoption of differential neutrality, and the return to traditional neutrality in 1938. The study then considers Switzerland's refusal to join the United Nations (UN) in 1945, Swiss neutrality during the Cold War, the failed UN referendum in 1986, and Swiss accession to the UN after the successful referendum in 2002. The thesis concludes that international solidarity is an inherent part of Swiss neutrality in addition to its security function. These elements together constitute a flexible neutrality conception that is capable of contributing to collective security while enjoying the safety of traditional neutrality. Changes in the international system and the institutional character of Swiss politics have significantly influenced Swiss relations with collective security organizations. Neutrality will continue to be a major factor as long as the concept is linked to national identity and the idea of a Swiss "special role."			
14. SUBJECT TERMS Switzerland, Neutrality, Collective Security, League of Nations, United Nations		15. NUMBER OF PAGES 131	
		16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UU

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

**SWISS NEUTRALITY AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY:
THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE UNITED NATIONS**

Urs Loeffel
Lieutenant Colonel, Swiss Army
B.A., Swiss Federal Institute of Technology, 1997

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

**MASTER OF ARTS IN SECURITY STUDIES
(EUROPE AND EURASIA)**

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
March 2010**

Author: Urs Loeffel

Approved by: David S. Yost
Co-Advisor

Donald Abenheim
Co-Advisor

Harold A. Trinkunas, PhD
Chairman, Department of National Security Affairs

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

This thesis explains Swiss accession to collective security organizations by analyzing key domestic and international factors relating to Switzerland's permanent neutrality. The study provides historical and theoretical background regarding the concepts of neutrality and collective security before examining the positive vote in the referendum for accession to the League of Nations in 1920, the consequent adoption of differential neutrality, and the return to traditional neutrality in 1938. The study then considers Switzerland's refusal to join the United Nations (UN) in 1945, Swiss neutrality during the Cold War, the failed UN referendum in 1986, and Swiss accession to the UN after the successful referendum in 2002. The thesis concludes that international solidarity is an inherent part of Swiss neutrality in addition to its security function. These elements together constitute a flexible neutrality conception that is capable of contributing to collective security while enjoying the safety of traditional neutrality. Changes in the international system and the institutional character of Swiss politics have significantly influenced Swiss relations with collective security organizations. Neutrality will continue to be a major factor as long as the concept is linked to national identity and the idea of a Swiss "special role."

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	RESEARCH QUESTION	1
B.	IMPORTANCE.....	2
C.	HYPOTHESES	3
D.	LITERATURE REVIEW	4
E.	METHODOLOGY	9
F.	THESIS ORGANIZATION.....	10
II.	NEUTRALITY AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY.....	13
A.	ORIGINS AND DEFINITIONS	13
	1. Neutrality	13
	2. Collective Security	18
	3. Neutrality and Collective Security	20
B.	SWISS NEUTRALITY.....	22
	1. History.....	22
	2. Functions.....	24
C.	THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS.....	26
	1. Theories of Neutrality.....	26
	2. Neutrality and Domestic and Foreign Policy.....	29
III.	SWISS NEUTRALITY AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.....	33
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	33
B.	THE 1920 REFERENDUM AND ACCESSION TO THE LEAGUE	34
	1. Introduction.....	34
	2. External Factors.....	40
	3. Internal Factors.....	43
	4. The “Yes” Campaign.....	45
	5. The “No” Campaign	48
	6. Summary.....	51
C.	DIFFERENTIAL NEUTRALITY FROM 1920 TO 1938.....	52
	1. Introduction.....	52
	2. The League of Nations	53
	3. Switzerland’s Role in the League of Nations.....	54
	4. Switzerland’s Differential Neutrality	55
D.	THE RETURN TO TRADITIONAL NEUTRALITY IN 1938.....	56
	1. Introduction.....	56
	2. External Factors.....	59
	3. Internal Factors.....	60
	4. Domestic Debate.....	61
	5. Summary.....	62
E.	CONCLUSION	64
IV.	SWISS NEUTRALITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS.....	67
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	67

B.	SWISS NEUTRALITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS, 1945–1948.....	68
C.	SWISS NEUTRALITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS, 1948–1965.....	72
D.	THE 1986 UNITED NATIONS REFERENDUM.....	75
1.	Introduction.....	75
2.	External Factors.....	78
3.	Internal Factors.....	79
4.	The “Yes” Campaign.....	81
5.	The “No” Campaign	83
6.	Summary.....	84
E.	THE 2002 INITIATIVE AND ACCESSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS	85
1.	Introduction.....	85
2.	External Factors.....	87
3.	Internal Factors.....	89
4.	The “Yes” Campaign.....	91
5.	The “No” Campaign	93
6.	Summary.....	94
F.	CONCLUSION	95
V.	CONCLUSION	99
A.	DISCONTINUITIES AND CONTINUITIES FROM 1920 TO 2002	99
B.	SWISS NEUTRALITY, TODAY AND TOMORROW	106
	LIST OF REFERENCES.....	111
	INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	119

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The faculty and staff of the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School provided the challenging academic environment in which the ideas for this thesis could grow. This work would not have been possible without the outstanding support of the two thesis advisors Professors David Yost and Donald Abenheim, whom I would like to thank warmly. Furthermore, I would like to express my gratitude to the Swiss Army, which gave me the opportunity to study in Monterey. The camaraderie of the fellow students from many nations and their armed services was a major motivation during this time. Finally, I am grateful for the love and patience of my family. Their support and understanding enabled me to write this study with much pleasure.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I. INTRODUCTION

A. RESEARCH QUESTION

This thesis compares two turning points in the history of Swiss neutrality and puts them into an analytical perspective. In 1920, Switzerland joined a collective security system, the League of Nations, and in 2002, another type of collective security arrangement, the United Nations (UN). In theory, collective security is incompatible with neutrality because aggressive war is illegal, and all members of the collective security system should take action against the aggressor. From this perspective, neutrality is obsolete, impossible and immoral. In practice, however, neutrality and collective security have coexisted. Some states, including Switzerland, have maintained a status that might be called “differential” neutrality.

This leads to the major research question: Which domestic and international factors help to explain Swiss accession to collective security organizations such as the League of Nations and the UN, and how have these factors influenced the theory and practice of Switzerland’s permanent neutrality?

Five subquestions focus and structure the comparison of the case studies, Swiss neutrality in the interwar League and in the post-Cold War UN. To what extent was the neutrality debate a decisive factor in the outcome of the referendums on membership in these organizations?¹ How were the three functions of neutrality—security, solidarity and identity—addressed in the referendum campaigns? Which international developments, such as external threats and growing political and economic interdependence, led to the referendums? How were those external factors addressed in the referendum discussions? How was “differential” neutrality officially defined and how was it put into practice during crises?

¹ The Swiss political system of “direct democracy” requires a public referendum before the federation can join a supranational organization or an organization of collective security (mandatory since 1977). A dual majority of people votes and cantons is required. For a good introduction to the Swiss political system see Laurent Goetschel, Magdalena Bernath and Daniel Schwarz, *Swiss Foreign Policy : Foundations and Possibilities* (New York: Routledge, 2005).

B. IMPORTANCE

For more than ninety years, foreign political leaders and the academic literature have repeatedly declared the death of neutrality in Switzerland for multiple reasons. It is striking how similar the arguments of 1919 are to those of today.²

In contrast, the Swiss people have firmly supported the concept of permanent neutrality since the country formally adopted this policy in 1815.³ Switzerland is, therefore, an ideal case to test the continuing relevance of a neutrality policy in long-term historical perspective. A comparison of its behavior in the interwar period and the post-Cold War period can put historical analogies and differences in sharp perspective.

Swiss neutrality is often seen as an inflexible and backward-oriented paradigm. It is reduced to its rigid security function and its military core. This thesis challenges this view. It investigates the hypothesis that international solidarity is an equally important part of the neutrality concept that should not be treated separately from its national security function for Switzerland. Both elements together constitute a flexible neutrality conception, capable of contributing to collective security while enjoying the safety of traditional neutrality.

The comparison of the referendum campaigns in 1920 and 2002 clarifies why it is impossible to explain Switzerland's decision making exclusively in terms of changes in the balance of power system, the influence of governmental elites, or traditional identity norms of the population. In this sense, the thesis aims to contribute to a broader understanding of Swiss neutrality.

² See, for example, in 1919, R. F. Roxburgh, "Changes in the Conception of Neutrality," *Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law* 1, no. 1 (1919): 17–24, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/752715> (accessed April 16, 2009); in 1936, Elbert D. Thomas, "Theory of Neutrality," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 186 (July 1936): 163–168, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1020622> (accessed January 23, 2009); in 2006, James D. Carafano, "The Death of Neutrality: U.S. and European Convergence in Fighting the War on Terrorism," *Heritage Lectures*, no. 956 (2006), http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/upload/hl_956.pdf (accessed May 25, 2009).

³ Although Switzerland has been neutral since the sixteenth century, its formal neutrality was recognized at the Congress of Vienna in 1815.

C. HYPOTHESES

The study investigates the hypothesis that Switzerland joined the League and the UN to strengthen the solidarity pillar of its neutrality in conjunction with the decline of the security function of its neutral status, at a time when an external threat seemed remote and a functioning collective security organization appeared to be in prospect. However, neutrality has remained the most important tool to protect Swiss sovereignty and identity. “Differential” neutrality therefore does not represent a fundamental shift in public opinion or a renunciation of neutrality, but an institutionalization of a pragmatic and autonomous à la carte security and solidarity policy, which may survive as long as the sovereign state system often attributed to the 1648 Peace of Westphalia exists.⁴

The hypotheses imply four main arguments and problems. First, Swiss neutrality is an instrument for participation in collective security and maintaining national security in relation to the European and world balance of power. The Swiss are well aware of the theoretical incompatibilities between neutrality and collective security. But, they have learned from history that neither academically remote theories nor the precepts of international law can guarantee their survival. This is the reason why the Swiss population does not see a contradiction between international solidarity and armed neutrality. The referendum campaigns and the character of the “differential” neutrality practiced by Switzerland in the League and the UN provide evidence for this.

Second, Switzerland joined the League and the UN at times when the security function of neutrality appeared to be in relative decline. This work investigates the hypothesis that the absence of an external threat was the main trigger for the decline of the security function of neutrality and led, therefore, to the positive outcomes of the referendums.

Third, Switzerland joined the League and the UN to express solidarity and thereby strengthen its neutrality and position in the international system. In other words, when the

⁴ For the à la carte terminology, see David S. Brackett, “International Relations à La Carte: A New Swiss Neutrality in Europe,” Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, *WCFIA Working Paper 4* (1997), italics in the original, http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/WCFIA_97-04.pdf (accessed January 23, 2009).

national security function of neutrality declines, the solidarity function increases. The analysis of the history of Switzerland's differential neutrality in the League and UN reveals this mechanism.

Fourth, Swiss neutrality is an expression of national identity and consequently, national sovereignty. The identity function of neutrality has gained importance over time. It is a fundamental part of national identity in addition to independence, federalism and direct democracy. This is why neutrality plays such an important role in national referendums on questions of statecraft and policy.

There are two problems that remain challenging. First, why did Switzerland join the UN in 2002 and not earlier or later? Second, how exactly do the causal relations among international factors, elite behavior and interest groups influence the outcomes of public referendums?

D. LITERATURE REVIEW

Neutrality has not been a "hot topic" of international relations research since the United States dropped the idea in World War II. The amount of scholarly work reflects the historical "ups and down" of the concept. For the purpose of this research, four strands of neutrality literature that address different elements and levels of the research question have been identified.

First, most of the neutrality literature has been written by specialists in international law. They have focused on legal aspects of neutrality and have usually considered to what extent the law of neutrality, dating back to The Hague Conventions of 1907, is valid or compatible with more recent international legal conventions, such as the League's Covenant, the UN Charter and the EU treaties.

For the League⁵ and even more for the UN,⁶ there is agreement that neutrality is not compatible with collective security. However, most authors acknowledge that, if the

⁵ Malbone Watson Graham Jr., "The Effect of the League of Nations Covenant on the Theory and Practice of Neutrality," *California Law Review* 15, no. 5 (July 1927): 357–377, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3475072> (accessed February 6, 2009).

⁶ T. Komarnicki, "The Problem of Neutrality Under the United Nations Charter," *Transactions of the Grotius Society* 38 (1952): 77–91, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/743159> (accessed February 06, 2009); Alfred Verdross, "Austria's Permanent Neutrality and the United Nations Organization," *The American Journal of International Law* 50, no. 1 (January 1956): 61–68, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2194585> (accessed February 6, 2009).

collective security system does not work as intended, there is still room for the law of neutrality. There is disagreement as to whether “differential” neutrality is legally possible. In addition, there is a general concern about the decline of international law since 2001.⁷

A purely legalistic approach does not answer the research question. However, the international law literature shows two things. In the first place, neutrality has evolved from a legal problem to an element of strategic and political culture in Switzerland. Furthermore, Switzerland has significantly influenced international law to back up its flexible neutrality policy.

Second, the findings of authors who take a theoretical or political approach towards neutrality are more useful for this study than the works of legal specialists. There is a huge amount of literature about international relations, collective security and small states. However, few authors have devoted considerable attention to neutrality.⁸ Unfortunately, no “theory of neutrality” exists, and few authors have created a well structured explanatory framework for the malleable concept of neutrality. Most useful is the approach of Efraim Karsh, who makes some important observations supporting the main argument of this thesis.⁹

Traditional neutrality implies a realist worldview, which is used in the classic literature.¹⁰ However, Gregory Raymond’s work shows how limited the practical value of realism can be. He makes the narrow and reductionist argument that only the distribution

⁷ Dimitrios Argirakos, *Neutralität und Europäische Union im 21. Jahrhundert*, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005), 331.

⁸ A good example is Martin Wight, “The Idea of Neutrality,” *London Calling*, October 11, 1956.

⁹ Efraim Karsh, “International Co-Operation and Neutrality,” *Journal of Peace Research* 25, no. 1 (March 1988): 57–67, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/423981> (accessed April 16, 2009); Efraim Karsh, *Neutrality and Small States* (New York: Routledge, 1988), 225.

¹⁰ Hans J. Morgenthau, “International Affairs: The Resurrection of Neutrality in Europe,” *The American Political Science Review* 33, no. 3 (June 1939): 473–486, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1948801> (accessed April 16, 2009). For a comparison of different schools in international relations and their view of neutrality see Joseph Kruzell and Michael H. Haltzel, *Between the Blocs: Problems and Prospects for Europe’s Neutral and Nonaligned States* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Cambridge University Press, 1989), 298ff.

of military capabilities has an impact on neutrality.¹¹ A growing group of authors sees important moral values and ideals in neutrality. The concept is presented as a kind of state pacifism and an alternative peaceful concept of security policy.¹² Laurent Goetschel makes a detailed argument about how the international environment led to an idealistic neutrality policy based on solidarity.¹³ Karen Devine stands for the constructivist school and makes an important argument about how domestic norms influence foreign policy.¹⁴ The boundaries between the idealist and constructivist approaches are blurred. However, both schools find reasons why neutrality should continue to exist.

Third, other scholars have approached the subject from a country perspective. Although of minor value for this study, the question of EU membership and neutrality has been examined extensively in the scholarly literature. The main argument is that EU membership is not compatible with neutrality.¹⁵ However, analysis of the Irish case has offered some useful insights into how public opinion regarding neutrality may influence the outcome of a referendum.¹⁶ Another useful study has analyzed the Austrian EU

¹¹ Gregory A. Raymond, "Neutrality Norms and the Balance of Power," *Cooperation and Conflict* 32, no. 2 (June 1997): 123–146 (accessed April 20, 2009).

¹² For an example, see Thomas Roithner, "Neutralität und europäische Sicherheitspolitik. Die Militarisierung der Union, die Verfassung und die Chancen für eine europäische Zivilmacht," *Politik und Zeitgeschehen* 17 (2007): 36, <http://www.voegb.at/bildungsangebote/skripten/pzg/PZG-17.pdf> (accessed February 10, 2009).

¹³ Laurent Goetschel, "Neutrality, a really Dead Concept?" *Cooperation and Conflict* 34, no. 2 (June 1999): 115–139, <http://cac.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/34/2/115> (accessed February 6, 2009).

¹⁴ Karen Devine, "The Myth of 'the Myth of Irish Neutrality': Deconstructing Concepts of Irish Neutrality using International Relations Theories," *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 17 (2006): 115–139, <http://www.ria.ie/cgi-bin/ria/papers/100572.pdf> (accessed January 23, 2009).

¹⁵ Stephan Nonhoff, *In der Neutralität verhungern?* (Münster: Agenda Verlag, 1995), 246; Surya P. Subedi, "Neutrality in a Changing World: European Neutral States and the European Community," *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 42, no. 2 (April 1993): 238–268, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/761099> (accessed February 6, 2009).

¹⁶ Roisin Doherty, *Ireland, Neutrality and European Security Integration* (Burlington: Ashgate Pub Ltd, 2002), 283.

referendums with a two-level game theory.¹⁷ In general, comparative studies of neutral countries are less helpful than analyses of specific cases, because Switzerland is often treated as a special case.¹⁸

The literature about Switzerland reflects perfectly the general dilemma. Some recent works have declared neutrality dead, but at the same time they have not recommended abandoning the concept.¹⁹ An exception is Jürg Gabriel, who has collected many arguments for why Switzerland should radically change its foreign policy.²⁰ He argues that UN membership is the first sign of a “changing political identity” and that a change at the system level has occurred.²¹ Jean-Marc Rickli provides a useful definition of neutrality and explains how the national security function has declined.²² Finally,

¹⁷ Although this approach may not serve for Switzerland, see Jeffrey S. Lantis and Matthew F. Queen, “Negotiating Neutrality: The Double-Edged Diplomacy of Austrian Accession to the European Union,” *Cooperation and Conflict* 33, no. 2 (June 1998): 152–182 (accessed April 16, 2009).

¹⁸ Examples are Hanspeter Neuhold, *The European Neutrals in the 1990s: New Challenges and Opportunities*, Austrian Institute for International Affairs Series (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 279; Emily Munro, ed., *Challenges to Neutral & Non-Aligned Countries in Europe and Beyond*, (Geneva: Geneva Center for Security Policy, 2005), http://www.gcsp.ch/e/publications/Issues_Institutions/Europe/Con_Proceedings/Neutrality%20Report.pdf (accessed February 07, 2009); Hanna Ojanen, ed., *Neutrality and Non-Alignment in Europe Today*, (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2003), http://www.upi-fia.fi/assets/publications/UPI_Report_06_2003.pdf (accessed February 07, 2009).

¹⁹ Alois Riklin, “Neutralität am Ende? 500 Jahre Neutralität der Schweiz,” *Humboldt-Nachrichten*, no. 30 (2008): 13–22, http://www.humboldt.hu/HN30/HN30-13-22-Neutralitaet_am_ende_500_Jahre_Neutralitaet_der_Schweiz.pdf (accessed October 17, 2009).

²⁰ Jürg Martin Gabriel, *Swiss Neutrality and the “American Century”: Two Conflicting Worldviews*, Beiträge 14 (Zürich: ETH, Forschungsstelle für Internationale Beziehungen, 1998), <http://e-collection.ethbib.ethz.ch/view/eth:22581> (accessed February 6, 2009).

²¹ Jürg Martin Gabriel, *Die Gegenläufigkeit von Neutralität und Humanitären Interventionen*, Beiträge 26 (Zürich: ETH, Forschungsstelle für Internationale Beziehungen, 1999), <http://e-collection.ethbib.ethz.ch/view/eth:23457> (accessed February 6, 2009); Jürg Martin Gabriel and Jon A. Fanzun, *The Asymmetries of Swiss Foreign Policy*, Beiträge 42 (Zürich: ETH, Forschungsstelle für Internationale Beziehungen, 2003), <http://e-collection.ethbib.ethz.ch/view/eth:26298> (accessed February 6, 2009).

²² Jean-Marc Rickli, “Neutrality: From a Small State's Power Instrument to a Powerful Identity Provider” (*unpublished Article*, Oxford, 2008). Copy directly from the author. Quoted with the author's permission.

Edgar Bonjour, Georg Kreis, and Daniel Möckli wrote influential historical studies about Swiss neutrality and the Swiss neutrality discourse.²³

Fourth, there is only a little literature directly analyzing the research question. The League period is often briefly cited to introduce the Swiss post-Cold War neutrality. Only Robert Brooks has evaluated the 1920 referendum.²⁴ For the UN, more literature is available. William Rappard and Howard Taubenfeld have discussed some basic problems of UN membership and neutrality.²⁵ Michael Gunter has pointed to the main problem of Swiss membership in the UN and the legacy of the League in an excellent article. In his view, set forth in 1976, if neutrality was compromised enough by collective security and the Federal Council was committed enough, then the population would probably join the UN.²⁶ Ernst Enzelsberger also analyzed the situation in Switzerland before the UN referendum.²⁷

Carlo Moos has prepared the only structured comparison between the League and the UN referendums available.²⁸

²³ Edgar Bonjour, *Geschichte der Schweizerischen Neutralität: Kurzfassung* (Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1978); Georg Kreis, *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart: Ein Inventar zum neutralitätspolitischen Diskurs in der Schweiz seit 1943* (Bern: Haupt, 2004); Daniel Möckli, *Neutralität, Solidarität, Sonderfall: Die Konzeptionierung der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik der Nachkriegszeit, 1943–1947*, Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung 55 (Zürich: FSK ETH Zürich, 2000), 336.

²⁴ Robert C. Brooks, "Swiss Referendum on the League of Nations," *The American Political Science Review* 14, no. 3 (1920), 477–480, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1946268> (accessed April 16, 2009).

²⁵ Howard J. Taubenfeld, "International Actions and Neutrality," *The American Journal of International Law* 47, no. 3 (1953): 377–396, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2194679> (accessed April 16, 2009); William E. Rappard, "The United Nations and Switzerland," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 246, (1946): 64–71, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1025133> (accessed April 20, 2009).

²⁶ Michael M. Gunter, "Switzerland and the United Nations," *International Organization* 30, no. 1 (Winter 1976): 129–152, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706251> (accessed February 6, 2009).

²⁷ Ernst F. Enzelsberger, "Die Schweiz und die UNO," in *Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2001*, ed. Erich Reiter (Hamburg: Mittler & Sohn, 2001), 25–37, http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/03_jb01_50_enz.pdf (accessed April 25, 2009).

²⁸ Carlo Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO: Die Volksabstimmungen von 1920 und 1986 in der Schweiz* (Zürich: Chronos, 2001), 231.

An important source for this thesis is the yearly Swiss “security” study that analyzes Swiss public opinion in detail. It also provides the analytical framework for the three neutrality functions mentioned—that is, national security, international solidarity and national identity.²⁹

E. METHODOLOGY

The method used in this thesis is a focused and structured comparison.³⁰ This method requires a well formulated analytical theory, and such a theory unfortunately does not exist for neutrality. However, the analysis is structured along specific issues concerning the independent variables outlined in the research questions. It is focused on four important events within two historical timeframes.

The observed timeframes are the interwar League and the post-Cold War UN. The relevant events for Switzerland for the League were the successful referendum in 1920, when Switzerland joined the League and adopted a “differential” neutrality, and the return to traditional neutrality in 1938, when Switzerland ceased supporting League’s economic sanctions. For the UN, the important dates are the 1986 negative referendum result and the 2002 positive referendum outcome about accession to the organization. Furthermore, the thesis briefly investigates the practice of “differential” neutrality from 1920 to 1938 and the reasons for Switzerland’s refusal to join the UN in 1946.

This thesis does not rely on a single specific international relations theory, because Swiss neutrality may be interpreted in light of various theories. Realism illuminates the external security function of neutrality. Idealism is expressed in the belief that solidarity and cooperation improve the credibility of neutrality and compensate for abstention during conflicts. Finally, constructivism suggests how neutrality has become a

²⁹ Tibor S. Tresch and others, *Sicherheit 2009: Aussen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitische Meinungsbildung im Trend* (Zürich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik der ETH Zürich und Militärakademie an der ETH Zürich, 2009), http://www.css.ethz.ch/Sicherheit_2009.pdf (accessed January 30, 2010).

³⁰ Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*, BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005), 67.

major pillar of national identity. Each function of neutrality seems to have had a decisive impact on Swiss foreign policy at specific times.

In order to maintain focus, this thesis does not address several aspects of Swiss neutrality or considers them only tangentially. Switzerland's neutrality in the two World Wars is not discussed in detail. There is no room for a detailed discussion of the literature on the international relations of small states.³¹ There is also no comparison with the experiences of other permanently neutral states. Finally, the EU is addressed only in the conclusion.

In addition to the sources mentioned in the literature review, the thesis relies on Swiss governmental documents, especially the Federal Council messages regarding the referendums, various expert reports about Swiss neutrality policy, the transcripts of the parliamentary discussions, and the archive of Swiss diplomatic documents.³² Post-referendum analyses and articles in selected Swiss newspapers supplement those documents.

F. THESIS ORGANIZATION

The thesis is organized in five chapters. After the introduction, Chapter II defines the historical and analytical framework. The case studies follow in Chapters III and IV and reflect the five research questions. The final chapter offers conclusions.

The structure of the thesis reflects a historical chronology. This format was preferred for practical reasons instead of an organization by topics of comparison. However, the case studies are organized in a similar style to allow the reader to make a direct comparison across the two cases.

³¹ For a comprehensive literature review about small state studies see Iver B. Neumann and Sieglinde Gstöhl, *Lilliputians in Gulliver's World? Small States in International Relations* (Reykjavik: Center for Small State Studies, 2004), 1–26, <http://stofnanir.hi.is/ams/sites/files/ams/Lilliputians%20Endanlegt%202004.pdf> (accessed February 6, 2009).

³² Swiss Confederation, "The Swiss Federal Archives: Online-Documents," <http://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/showHome.do> (accessed April 24, 2009); Swiss Parliament, "Curia Vista - Database of Parliamentary Proceedings," <http://www.parlament.ch/e/dokumentation/curia-vista/pages/default.aspx> (accessed April 24, 2009); Institut für Politikwissenschaft der Universität Bern, "Swissvotes: Abstimmungsverzeichnis," *Universität Bern*, <http://www.swissvotes.ch/> (accessed April 24, 2009).

The following introductory chapter presents a short overview of historical and theoretical analyses of neutrality and collective security. It defines some key terms and provides an overview of the analytical framework concerning neutrality that is used in this thesis. Furthermore, the chapter discusses the specific functions of neutrality for Swiss identity and security.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

II. NEUTRALITY AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

A. ORIGINS AND DEFINITIONS

1. Neutrality

The Latin word *neuter* means *of neither side*, and this is the most basic common agreed definition of neutrality in international relations.³³ In this simple form, neutrality is as old as the history of conflicts among individuals, groups, and states. Therefore, in the international system, neutrality is a function of war, and its content is influenced by the definition and the character of war and by the way war among states is perceived and regulated.³⁴ If there were no more war, there would be no more neutrality.

In addition, neutrality cannot stand alone. Neutrality needs a minimum of three actors and two different standpoints. It is always defined as a relationship of a neutral country with at least two potential belligerents, often great powers. Thus, neutrality is declared *against* something and *between* two external powers. Therefore, no neutrality is possible in the presence of a universal collective, a hegemony, or a worldwide norm.

The third characteristic of neutrality is its non-belligerent approach.³⁵ The aim of neutrality is peace through abstinence from war. But neutrality is not altruistic. The refusal to use force is absolute, even in the name of peace, and the only exception is self-defense. If force is not an option, neutrality relies on perceptions, beliefs, norms, and international guarantees in the form of international law and organizations.³⁶ In sum,

³³ Kruzal and Haltzel, *Between the Blocs*, xvii.

³⁴ Argirakos, *Neutralität und Europäische Union*, 37ff.

³⁵ This is even true for armed neutrality because, in the case of an attack, the neutral country would defend itself and thereby abandon its neutrality. The country might nonetheless still refuse to join the other side in a coalition and fight to achieve a “separate peace” detached from the larger conflict. The view that neutrality supports peace is, however, contested. James Lorimer stated in 1884: “To identify a policy of neutrality with the interests of international peace is one of the strangest hallucinations that ever took possession of clear-headed men.” Quoted in Quincy Wright, “The Present Status of Neutrality,” *The American Journal of International Law* 34, no. 3 (1940): 400, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2192922> (accessed April 16, 2009).

³⁶ Jean-Marc Rickli, “European Small States’ Military Policies After the Cold War: From Territorial to Niche Strategies,” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 21, no. 3 (2008): 311.

neutrality is the fusion of the reality of war with the idealistic belief in the feasibility of remaining at peace while other states engage in combat; it is the fusion of a self-interested autonomy with an intense international exchange. It involves elements of cooperation as well as competition.

Modern neutrality is a European concept and closely mirrors European history. It is a historic offspring of state sovereignty and great power war in the era 1618-1918. Neutrality was discussed at some length by Hugo Grotius in his treatise on the law of war and peace in 1646.³⁷ Neutrality originated in the concept of *jus in bello*, regulating the conduct of war. Neutrality reflects the growing idea after the Congress of Vienna in 1815 that war was a natural tool for states to adjust the equilibrium of the international system. Each time two or more states fought a war, those who did not participate in the war were neutral. Neutrality was important because it limited the geographical scope of wars.³⁸ The status of *simple neutrality* is unilaterally declared on case-by-case base by a state that does not wish to participate in a war.³⁹ This idea of simple neutrality has survived until the present day. In 1907 the relationship between belligerents and neutral states was codified as the *law of neutrality* in The Hague Conventions. Even though the laws of neutrality could not keep up with the developments of modern warfare, its core regulations are still binding for countries that declare their neutrality during a conflict.

In the nineteenth century, the European great powers developed a balance of power system. There was a mutual interest in clarifying the status of small states that created buffer zones, occupied key strategic territories, or were at the periphery of the

³⁷ Hugo Grotius, *De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres; Volume Two, The Translation*, trans. Francis W. Kelsey (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925), Book III, Chapter XVII, 783-787. Hugo Grotius established the *jus ad bellum* theory. However, he also prescribed some principles for neutral states. John Ross has summarized two of these principles as follows: "(1) The neutral must not aid an 'unjust cause' in a war, nor hinder a 'just' one; and (2) when there is doubt as to which party's cause is the more just, the neutral must treat both parties equally." John F. L. Ross, *Neutrality and International Sanctions : Sweden, Switzerland, and Collective Security* (New York: Praeger, 1989), 4.

³⁸ For a detailed historical summary, see Karsh, *Neutrality and Small States*, 13ff.

³⁹ Even if neutrality is not declared, there is a basic assumption in international law that all parties that do not participate in a conflict are perceived as neutral. For a detailed analysis of simple neutrality, see Argirakos, *Neutralität und Europäische Union*, 43-92.

continent.⁴⁰ To add stability and predictability to the system, the great powers granted several states a status of *permanent neutrality*.⁴¹ This meant that these states would be neutral in peacetime and in *any* conflict as long as they were not attacked. In return, they had to organize an autonomous and credible defense of their territory, and this justified their status of *armed neutrality*.⁴² Armed neutrality is evidence for the realist assumption that the concept of neutrality could fail. It led to a specific type of defense. Its main goal was to dissuade possible neutrality violators. In contrast to deterrence, “dissuasion ... is not based on threats of retaliation but on increasing the costs of invasion.” The consequence was “a strategic culture that considers the use of force only for defense purposes,” a concept that often evolved into “total defense.”⁴³ As an example, the Swiss militia system, “unlike conscription ... is not aimed at winning a war or defeating the enemy’s army but at preserving the country’s independence; therefore, the neutrals’ concept of a soldier was closer to the idea of ‘citizen in uniform than the one of warriors.’”⁴⁴ Switzerland is the classic case of a country with an internationally recognized status of permanent, armed neutrality.

The introduction of permanent neutrality led to a distinction between the law of neutrality and neutrality policy. The *law of neutrality* refers to The Hague Conventions, which regulate the behavior of neutral countries in war. *Neutrality policy* “includes each of the measures a state takes—voluntarily, independent of neutrality law—in order to guarantee the efficiency and credibility of its neutrality.”⁴⁵ Furthermore, permanently neutral countries avoid any policy that could drag them into a conflict or affect their ability to remain neutral during wartime. Neutrality policy, therefore, is a flexible concept, which adjusts to the international environment. Efraim Karsh explained the

⁴⁰ Karsh, *Neutrality and Small States*, 81.

⁴¹ For a typology of neutral states see Argirakos, *Neutralität und Europäische Union*, 117ff.

⁴² Further obligations are nonparticipation in a military alliance, enforcing the law of neutrality during conflicts, and not hosting foreign military bases on the neutral state’s territory. To reinforce the credibility of their neutrality, permanently neutral states often take additional measures. For a detailed comparison of permanently neutral states, see Subedi, *Neutrality in a Changing World*, 241–249.

⁴³ Rickli, *Neutrality: From a Small State’s Power Instrument to a Powerful Identity Provider*, 2,4.

⁴⁴ Rickli, *European Small States’ Military Policies*, 312.

⁴⁵ Goetschel, Bernath and Schwarz, *Swiss Foreign Policy*, 15.

relationship between the two terms: “The raison d’être of neutrality is political, while its institutionalization in international law is merely an instrumental act.”⁴⁶

The century prior to World War I was the heyday of neutrality. The long peace after 1815 supported the positive international perception of neutrality. In 1919, R.F. Roxburgh wrote: “Thus neutrality as a maxim of state policy seemed to possess high ethical quality when contrasted with the horrors of war, and to embody a sound national policy in regard to commerce and finance.”⁴⁷ The First World War, however, marked the end of an era in which a moral justification for being neutral was not needed.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, three developments led to the decline of the balance of power system and as a consequence to the erosion of neutrality. First, the further industrialization of war made it difficult to limit combat geographically. Second, the rise of nationalism and totalitarian ideologies transformed the nature of warfare beyond the pure distribution of power function. It added a layer of moral conviction to war. Ideology, like religion, goes beyond national sovereignty and leads theoretically to total, unrestricted war, which excludes neutrality. Finally, the terrifying experience of World War I revived the idea of collective security in the form of the League of Nations. The response was *differential neutrality*. According to this concept, it is the policy of a neutral state to support the economic and political sanctions of a collective security system, while abstaining from active support of military measures.⁴⁸

The Second World War discredited not only the idea of collective security (at least as formulated in the Covenant of the League of Nations), but also neutrality as a practical survival strategy for small countries.⁴⁹ Even though Switzerland avoided a German invasion, other neutral nations did not. The creation of the United Nations (UN)

⁴⁶ Karsh, *Neutrality and Small States*, 3–4.

⁴⁷ Roxburgh, *Changes in the Conception of Neutrality*, 20. It can be argued that for historical reasons, most of the Swiss would still embrace this statement.

⁴⁸ The terminology “differential neutrality” was only used in the League of Nations. However, in this paper it is also used for neutrality in the UN. Furthermore, there is no standard opinion to which degree the neutrality of a state should “differ” between traditional conflicts and collective actions.

⁴⁹ The lucky exceptions—above all, Switzerland and Sweden—nonetheless were more convinced than ever that neutrality would protect them.

could hardly conceal the fact that the world was still dominated by power politics. In the Cold War, the bipolarity of the world system allowed traditional neutrality between the blocs. Because of the ideological nature of the conflict, the neutral countries reemphasized that they were not obliged to be ideologically neutral.⁵⁰ In the 1990s, neutrality faded away together with communism. In the euphoria of a functioning UN Security Council and in the absence of a visible enemy, neutrality had a hard time. Again, the European neutral countries reacted quickly and declared membership in the European Union (EU), the UN, and the NATO Partnership for Peace program (PfP) as compatible with their neutrality.⁵¹ Today, neutrality is under pressure from four sides: the revival of collective security, the increased supranational integration of the EU, the rise of a potentially hegemonic power (namely, the United States), and the technical difficulties of implementing a neutrality policy in a globalized, networked world.

Because there is no recognized definition of neutrality, two additional views should be offered. Karsh provides a simple definition by stating that “[N]eutrality is nothing but an attempt ... to find a solution to one of the most fundamental problems of a state: maintaining its independence and sovereignty in wartime.”⁵² Jean-Marc Rickli provided a more sophisticated explanation by stating that neutrality is a “foreign policy principle whose purpose is the preservation of the independence and sovereignty of small states through non-participation and impartiality in international conflict.”⁵³

In sum, neutrality is difficult to define and encompasses several concepts that are related to the historical context. Its definition has been influenced by legal, theoretical, and political considerations.

⁵⁰ Kruzal and Haltzel, *Between the Blocs*, 37. Ideological neutrality was repeatedly requested, first by Nazi Germany and later, to some extent, by the Soviet Union. Verdross, *Austria's Permanent Neutrality*, 64.

⁵¹ The Federal Council declared in 1993 that future membership in the EU and the UN would be compatible with neutrality. Moreover, it said that participation in a NATO forum such as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, which would not involve actual membership in the Alliance, would be acceptable. See Schweizer Bundesrat, *Bericht zur Neutralität* (Bern: EDA, 1993), <http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/doc/publi.Par.0005.File.tmp/Bericht%20zur%20Neutralitaet%201993.pdf> (accessed February 7, 2009).

⁵² Karsh, *Neutrality and Small States*, 5.

⁵³ Rickli, *Neutrality: From a Small State's Power Instrument to a Powerful Identity Provider*, 3.

2. Collective Security

In contrast to neutrality, which is rooted in *jus in bello*, law regulating the conduct of wars, collective security is based in *jus ad bellum*, law regulating the right for wars. Immanuel Kant, one of the most famous thinkers about collective security, provided a theoretical foundation for “the reign of law” in the international realm.⁵⁴ The Kantian worldview was prominently promoted by Woodrow Wilson, one of the leading champions of the League of Nations. According to Martin Wight, collective security is “a system in which any breach of the peace is declared to be of concern to all the participating states, and an attack on one is taken as an attack on all.”⁵⁵ Collective security, therefore, “involves a pact against war; the threat is aggression by a currently unidentified party to the pact, which should ideally include all the states in the state system.”⁵⁶

The very idea that “security is indivisible” has some logical consequences for the members of collective security organizations.⁵⁷ First, participants in a collective security system tend to see war, the use of force, as a way of solving international disputes that can be legal only under certain circumstances. Second, if the use of force is legal only under certain conditions, other means of conflict resolution gain importance. Collective security systems focus on preventive measures, short of war, to find a peaceful solution to disputes. Third, all member states of a collective security system are required to support these measures in some form. Fourth, maximum effectiveness is achieved if the collective security system is universal. Fifth, if collective security is to work, an enforcing mechanism and a decision-making mechanism to activate it must be in place. Kant and Wilson promoted two additional characteristics, the legal equality of the member states

⁵⁴ For a discussion of the history of collective security and the influence of Immanuel Kant and Woodrow Wilson, see David S. Yost, *NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Roles in International Security* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998), 5–20. See also Immanuel Kant, *Zum ewigen Frieden* (Königsberg: Institut für Kommunikationsforschung und Phonetik, Universität Bonn, 1795), <http://www.ikp.uni-bonn.de/kant/aa08/341.html> (accessed February 22, 2009).

⁵⁵ Wight quoted in Yost, *NATO Transformed*, 9.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 6.

and the democratic nature of the collective security organization and its members. Although these aspects may support the sustainability of the system, they are not necessarily indispensable requirements for a successful collective security arrangement.

These characteristics of a collective security system are similar to the organization of the monopoly of legitimate violence within a sovereign state. Security is seen as a public good provided by a higher authority. In return, the citizen has to obey the law, refrain from taking the law into his own hands, and support in person and/or through taxes the police and the military. At the international level, this logic leads to the most important characteristic of collective security, which is the principle that “the unconditional and unbridled national sovereignty of each state is ... incompatible with the security of all.”⁵⁸ Indeed, in theory, this transfer of authority in a collective security system could take the form of a loose cooperative association of states, a weak confederation, a global democracy, or a global authoritarian hegemony.

Collective security should not be confused with collective defense. David Yost stated that “a collective defense pact binds together an alliance of states to deter and, if necessary, defend against one or more identifiable external threats, a state or group of states outside the alliance.”⁵⁹ An alliance does not deny the risk of war. Indeed, it believes in an external threat and its purpose is to accumulate strength in the tradition of the balance of power idea.

To what degree was the League of Nations a collective security system?⁶⁰ Based on the above mentioned criteria, the League was far from perfect. The League’s strength resided in the fact that all member states, aside from Switzerland, had equal rights and duties under the collective security system of the Covenant.⁶¹ On the other hand, the

⁵⁸ Rappard, *The United Nations and Switzerland*, 70.

⁵⁹ Yost, *NATO Transformed*, 7.

⁶⁰ The next paragraphs about the League of Nations and the United Nations provide only a short overview. For further details see Chapters III and IV.

⁶¹ The League exempted Switzerland from supporting military sanctions. See Chapter III.

League lacked universality, did not completely ban war, and accepted totalitarian member states. Most important, the organization had a weak decision-making system and no enforcement capabilities.

The United Nations is not dramatically different.⁶² In contrast to the League, the UN reached universality, legally banned aggressive war, and established, in theory, an effective sanction and enforcement system, although the idea of a UN military force was never implemented. The major weakness of the UN is the fact that the five permanent members of the Security Council are, by their right of veto, in practice not subject to the collective security system. They have no duties, and even worse, they could, if they were united, rather easily acquire a majority in the Security Council and dominate the world at will. Whether this is still a collective security system seems questionable.⁶³

3. Neutrality and Collective Security

A wise man avoids other people's quarrels—this is the argument, at its simplest, of the neutral. You cannot be neutral between right and wrong—this is the argument, at its simplest, of the critic of neutrality. The history of neutrality, as a legal and political institution, has swung between the two arguments.⁶⁴

—Martin Wight

Collective security, by definition, adds the notion of right and wrong to war. Aggressive war is illegal, and therefore wrong. Military action taken, or legitimized, by the collective security organization is right. There is no neutrality between the collective security organization and the aggressor. Furthermore, each state that chooses not to participate in the system is undermining the universality of the organization and weakening its sanctions. “The closer the international organization approaches to universality, the greater will be the pressure to prevent interference with its decisions and the less possible will it be to maintain the traditional position of neutral or even non-

⁶² For a concise comparison of League and UN, see Ross, *Neutrality and International Sanctions*, 14–15.

⁶³ See also Yost, *NATO Transformed*, 17.

⁶⁴ Wight, *The Idea of Neutrality*.

participant.”⁶⁵ In addition, neutrality is inapplicable because the theory of collective security holds that no state can refuse to support military or nonmilitary sanctions against an aggressor. In sum, from a theoretical standpoint, neutrality is a threat to the Kantian peace and incompatible with collective security.⁶⁶

In theory and in practice, however, there are three reasons why neutrality remains possible. First, the lack of universality can lead to traditional wars that are out of the reach of the organization. Second, if the system of collective security is unable to act, neutrality remains an option. Third, and most important, it is difficult to ignore the fact that the ideas of neutrality and collective security both have the same aim, peace. This peace-oriented aspect of neutrality is why the League of Nations granted Switzerland a limited neutral status as a member state.

What is the impact of collective arrangements on state sovereignty? The collective nature of alliances and of collective security systems limits the sovereignty of member states. In a collective security system, members are obliged to act against any state that resorts to war. In a collective defense system, members are obliged to share the burden for defending an attacked member state. In contrast, a neutral country, in theory, is not obliged to express solidarity or to support defensive (or offensive) operations. Its sovereignty is only constricted by the obligation *not* to support any belligerent party. In this sense, “neutrality is an expression of sovereignty.”⁶⁷ As the next section shows, sovereignty and independence are important in the case of Switzerland.

⁶⁵ Taubenfeld, *International Actions and Neutrality*, 396.

⁶⁶ See Gabriel, *Die Gegenläufigkeit von Neutralität*, 9. See also Graham, *The Effect of the League of Nations Covenant*, 360.

⁶⁷ Goetschel, *Neutrality, a really Dead Concept?*, 119.

B. SWISS NEUTRALITY

1. History

This section gives a short introduction to the long and complex history of Swiss neutrality.⁶⁸ The country has practiced neutrality since it gained formal independence in the Treaty of Münster in 1648.⁶⁹ At the Congress of Vienna in 1815, the great powers recognized and guaranteed Switzerland's "*neutralité perpétuelle*."⁷⁰ Edgar Bonjour proposed six historic origins of Swiss neutrality. After the Swiss abandoned their great power aspirations in the early sixteenth century, a foreign policy of neutrality allowed them to focus on inner cohesion and the strengthening of the loose federation. Later, neutrality prevented the religious wars in Europe from sweeping over the multi-confessional country.⁷¹ Geography, especially the strategic passes over the Alps, was instrumental for the sustainability of Swiss neutrality. Furthermore, the Swiss learned to perfection the instrument of neutrality because of the long domestic experience with neutral cantons in the old confederation. The fact that the Swiss got accustomed to balancing off in practice the incompatible written provisions of the European powers, in order to keep the middle ground between the big rivals, was another factor. Finally, the balance of power system of the eighteenth century was the most fertile ground for Swiss neutrality.⁷²

Since 1815, Switzerland's foreign policy has defended the institution of neutrality by strengthening international law. Furthermore, it has tried repeatedly to renew international recognition of its neutral status. In many respects, the country has set its own historic standard for permanent neutrality. John Ross stated: "The Swiss have in fact

⁶⁸ For a detailed history of Swiss neutrality until the end of World War II, see Bonjour, *Geschichte der Schweizerischen Neutralität*. For a follow up, see Kreis, *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart*.

⁶⁹ Argirakos, *Neutralität und Europäische Union*, 133.

⁷⁰ The fact that the great powers guaranteed Switzerland's neutrality was an indirect security guarantee. *Ibid.*, 149.

⁷¹ It is important to mention that Switzerland has cross cutting religious and linguistic cleavages. These are overlapped by a traditional urban-rural split. The centrifugal forces of language and culture were at their height in World War I and World War II. One should also not forget that Switzerland was for decades a liberal, republican island in the middle of European kingdoms, dynasties and empires.

⁷² Bonjour, *Geschichte der Schweizerischen Neutralität*, 7–14.

demonstrated a remarkable ability to induce special recognition of their neutrality on the basis of its tradition and presumed benefits for the general ‘cause of peace.’”⁷³ Despite the high standing of Swiss neutrality, there was only a minor reference to the concept in the first federal constitution of 1848. This is clear evidence that, at least until World War I, neutrality was perceived as a simple foreign policy instrument.

The next two chapters show in detail how Swiss neutrality changed and adapted in response to the international environment after 1914. The concept received a boost during both world wars, when the country managed to protect its independence. In 1920, in a historic decision, the Swiss joined the League of Nations and adopted a policy of differential neutrality. In 1938, it returned to its previous policy of *integral neutrality*.⁷⁴ This policy was cemented after World War II, when the government refused to join the UN, and neutrality became a doctrine and a foreign policy aim. In 1965, as Chapter IV shows, there were initial signs of a possible return to differential neutrality. It was not until 1993, however, that the governmental neutrality report stated that “the restrictive understanding of neutrality during the Cold War was replaced in favor of an increased freedom of action.”⁷⁵ After 1991, the country followed a de facto differential neutrality policy. In 2005, another governmental report summarized the current Swiss position: “Permanent neutrality as a guiding principle of Swiss foreign and security policy is well-proven. The Federal Council sees no necessity to redefine Swiss neutrality.”⁷⁶

The Swiss at no point seriously questioned the core idea of neutrality by opting for membership in an alliance or by conducting an aggressive security policy. The reasons for this continuity are found in the different functions of Swiss neutrality.

⁷³ Ross, *Neutrality and International Sanctions*, 212.

⁷⁴ The term *integral neutrality* was used to show the difference from *differential neutrality*.

⁷⁵ Interdepartementale Arbeitsgruppe, *Neutralitätspraxis der Schweiz - Aktuelle Aspekte* (Bern: EDA, 2000), 1, <http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/doc/publi.Par.0009.File.tmp/Neutralitaetspraxis%20der%20Schweiz%20-%20aktuelle%20Aspekte.pdf> (accessed February 7, 2009). Translation by the author.

⁷⁶ Schweizer Bundesrat, *Die Neutralität auf dem Prüfstand im Irak-Konflikt* (Bern: EDA, 2005), 6999, <http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2005/6997.pdf> (accessed February 7, 2009). Translation by the author.

2. Functions

Up to this point, the chapter has discussed neutrality primarily as a function of international security and law. According to Karl Haltiner, however, the security provider role is only one of three functions of Swiss neutrality.

First, the security function “ensures that a state is not drawn into an international conflict; it contributes to stability in Europe and it gives military protection.”⁷⁷ This function has a dual role by supporting internal integration and external independence.⁷⁸ The internal dimension of neutrality, to avoid civil war because of religious, ideological, or nationalistic wars among neighboring states, has lost its meaning since the end of World War II. Since the end of the Cold War, in the absence of a major threat, the external function has lost most of its practical value. This change, however, is only partially reflected in public opinion and in Swiss foreign policy.⁷⁹ Moreover, the current absence of a major threat—and of religious, ideological, or nationalistic conflicts among neighboring states—does not constitute a guarantee that such threats and conflicts could not arise in the future.

Second, the international solidarity function includes “the good offices as a mediator during conflict.”⁸⁰ Switzerland has a long tradition of offering *good offices* such as taking over diplomatic mandates of belligerent states, negotiating peace agreements, and offering its territory for peace conferences. The Swiss population increasingly

⁷⁷ Neutrality functions as described in Karl W. Haltiner and others, *Sicherheit 2007: Aussen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitische Meinungsbildung im Trend* (Zürich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik der ETH Zürich und Militärakademie an der ETH Zürich, 2007), 115, <http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=47&fileid=A0903CF1-2FE2-5538-A2E3-3820E4F046A5&lng=de> (accessed May 8, 2009). Translation by the author.

⁷⁸ Riklin, *Neutralität am Ende?*, 13.

⁷⁹ In 2009, 65 percent of the Swiss stated that neutrality prevents Switzerland from being drawn into an international conflict, and 57 percent said that Swiss neutrality increases security and stability in Europe. There is, however, an assumption that neutrality cannot be protected by military means (46 percent) and that it does not protect Switzerland from terrorism (65 percent). Tresch and others, *Sicherheit 2009*, 124.

⁸⁰ Haltiner and others, *Sicherheit 2007*, 115. Translation by the author.

supports the solidarity function at a remarkably high level.⁸¹ The fact that the people support neutrality (93 percent) and its solidarity function (92 percent) at an equally high level is evidence that solidarity is an integral part of neutrality in Swiss assessments.⁸² This might support a broader public interpretation of the solidarity function beyond the traditional good offices.

Third, the national identity function includes “the effects of the model character of Swiss neutrality and the symbolic link between neutrality and Swiss nationhood.”⁸³ Modern Swiss national identity is a product of nationalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In contrast to many neighboring states, the multilingual and multiconfessional country could not base its identity on a single ethnicity, language or culture. Instead, political values and institutions, shared historical experiences, geography, and an “artificial” Swiss culture were used to construct a distinct identity based on “civic exceptionalism.”⁸⁴ The national identity function of neutrality massively increased in importance in response to the threat of World War II and due to the strict neutrality policy after 1946. In 2009, 83 percent of the Swiss believed that “neutrality is inseparably linked with national identity.”⁸⁵

It is evident from the description of the three functions that any analysis of Swiss neutrality from a purely foreign policy perspective must fail. Jürg Gabriel rightly stated: “The Swiss ‘special case’ (*Sonderfall*) cannot be explained through neutrality alone. The

⁸¹ A detailed study shows that Switzerland’s good offices and mediation efforts have sharply declined, especially since the end of the Cold War. This decline, however, was to some extent compensated for by increased activities in multilateral fora. Daniel Trachsler, “Gute Dienste - Mythen, Fakten, Perspektiven,” *Bulletin 2004 zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik* 11 (2004): 61–64, http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/topics/peasec/peac.Par.0035.File.tmp/rp_Gute%20DiensteETH_de.pdf (accessed April 16, 2009).

⁸² Tresch and others, *Sicherheit 2009*, 122, 125.

⁸³ Haltiner and others, *Sicherheit 2007*, 115. Translation by the author.

⁸⁴ Defining elements of Swiss identity include the struggle for independence, direct democracy, the militia system, the consensual political system, federalism, “alpine rural culture,” neutrality, and a strong belief in the long tradition and history of the country. See Oliver Zimmer, “Boundary Mechanisms and Symbolic Resources: Towards a Process-Oriented Approach to National Identity,” *Nations and Nationalism* 9, no. 2 (April 2003): 173–193, <http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118851163/PDFSTART> (accessed April 20, 2009).

⁸⁵ Tresch and others, *Sicherheit 2009*, 125. Translation by the author.

decisive factors are more fundamental and domestic in nature; it is the constitutive elements of its political system that prevent Switzerland from reacting appropriately to changes in its external environment.” These elements are the other building blocks of Swiss identity, namely direct democracy, the consensual political system, a collegial executive, federalism, and the militia system.⁸⁶

The next section offers an overview of theoretical and analytical approaches to neutrality in general and Swiss neutrality in particular.

C. THEORETICAL AND ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

1. Theories of Neutrality

As mentioned in the introduction, no theory of neutrality exists. One reason may be that, “Wherever moral or religious thought has been the basis for political theory, neutrality could not be accepted.”⁸⁷ Another reason is that there are “as many kinds of neutrality as there are neutral states.”⁸⁸ Several authors, however, have used existing theories in different academic fields to explain the general behavior of neutral states.

Based on realism and the balance of power theory, “the traditional security dilemma for small states is ... between protecting autonomy or maximizing influence.” Their options for influence are either balancing or band-wagoning.⁸⁹ The option for autonomy is neutrality.⁹⁰ Gregory Raymond has shown, however, that “realism has only modest explanatory power in accounting for the salience of neutrality norms.” Furthermore, the assumption that “the less the concentration of military capabilities, the greater the salience of neutrality” is only true during times of peace.⁹¹ One can conclude

⁸⁶ The word “appropriately” is debatable. Gabriel and Fanzun, *The Asymmetries of Swiss Foreign Policy*, 4, 8–14.

⁸⁷ Thomas, *Theory of Neutrality*, 165.

⁸⁸ Andr en quoted in Raymond, *Neutrality Norms and the Balance of Power*, 126.

⁸⁹ Rickli, *European Small States' Military Policies*, 310.

⁹⁰ There is a debate if, from a realist perspective, neutrality is supported by the system. See Rickli, *Neutrality: From a Small State's Power Instrument to a Powerful Identity Provider*, 2.

⁹¹ Raymond, *Neutrality Norms and the Balance of Power*, 135–136. Karsh even takes the position that a balance of power system that is in equilibrium is an imminent threat to neutrality. Karsh, *Neutrality and Small States*, 98–101.

that, first, the security function of neutrality increases in response to wars; and second, as long as the system remains multi-polar, changes in the distribution of power in the international system do not influence neutrality.⁹² This supports the hypothesis of this study that Switzerland joined the League and the UN at times when the security function of neutrality was in relative decline due to the absence of an external threat. A different explanation would be that “the benevolent unipolar strategic environment” after the end of the Cold War led to a situation in which “cooperative strategies become the only realistic strategic option” for small states.⁹³ Furthermore, Hans Mouritzen concluded in a study that “a ‘successful’ foreign policy tradition sedimented in the political culture” can override balancing concerns.⁹⁴

This leads to another level of analysis, the role of norms and domestic institutions in foreign policy. There is evidence, according to the constructivist school of thought, that the role perceptions of states dominate their behavior in the international system.⁹⁵ In the Swiss case, neutrality is “a principled belief whose political core consists of interest-based, normative ideas on foreign and security-policy orientation.”⁹⁶ The strong identity and solidarity functions of Swiss neutrality are evidence that neutrality is indeed not only a security concept, but a belief, a norm, and a part of the shared understanding of Switzerland’s “special case” in the international system.

Finally, Efraim Karsh provides a useful analytical framework for neutrality. In a first step, he liberates neutrality from its ideological, legal, and theoretical baggage by

⁹² See Raymond, *Neutrality Norms and the Balance of Power*, 137. This view is also supported by Tresch, who observes that the security function of neutrality stands out in relation to external threats, in theory and in public opinion. To define the external threat, or the perception of an external threat, however, is difficult. Tresch and others, *Sicherheit 2009*, 124–125.

⁹³ Rickli, *European Small States' Military Policies*, 314.

⁹⁴ This positive attachment to the past is well observed in the case of Switzerland. Hans Mouritzen, “Choosing Sides in the European Iraq Conflict: A Test of New Geopolitical Theory,” *European Security* 15, no. 2 (2006): 152, <http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/09662830600903686> (accessed January 31, 2010).

⁹⁵ For a detailed discussion, see Karen Devine, “Stretching the IR Theoretical Spectrum on Irish Neutrality: A Critical Social Constructivist Framework,” *International Political Science Review* 29, no. 4 (September 2008): 461–488 (accessed January 23, 2009); See also Devine, *Deconstructing Concepts of Irish Neutrality*, 115–139.

⁹⁶ Goetschel, *Neutrality, a really Dead Concept?*, 117.

stating that “there is not necessarily a direct correlation between the worth, status and innate impact of neutrality as a legal institution or a moral idea, and its status as a political instrument.”⁹⁷ This is the basis for another argument of this thesis—the incompatibilities of neutrality and collective security are to a large extent theoretical and not relevant in practice. Second, Karsh vehemently rejects the conventional wisdom that neutrality is a passive and reactive concept.⁹⁸ Finally, he offers a model of the “operative dimensions of neutrality”:

The positive component of neutral policy involves persuading the belligerents [or in peacetime potential belligerents] of the advantages they might derive from the continued existence of the neutrality in question. The negative component, on the other hand, implies deterrence of the belligerents from violating the neutrality as a result of their conviction of the disproportionate cost of such a step.⁹⁹

Karsh shows then that both components “might present a trade off relationship.”¹⁰⁰ This supports the remaining argument of this thesis that the decline of military neutrality has been compensated by international solidarity. Karsh mentioned that “Switzerland’s attitude towards international co-operation has further reinforced the universal image of Swiss neutrality.”¹⁰¹

This section reviewed some general observations about the behavior and motivations of neutral states. It did not, however, explain the possible mechanisms that lead to specific decisions in Swiss foreign policy. The next section describes the interaction of neutrality with domestic and foreign policy.

⁹⁷ Karsh, *Neutrality and Small States*, 5.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 32.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 33.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, 33.

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, 165.

2. Neutrality and Domestic and Foreign Policy

“Swiss foreign policy is strongly influenced by federalist, non-centralist, and parliament-oriented components.” Since 1848, parliamentary involvement in foreign policy has increased steadily. In addition, “the federal constitution grants the people ultimate power when making and legitimising foreign policy.”¹⁰² This institution of direct democracy allows the Swiss people and the cantons to take key foreign policy decisions at the ballot box, for example, about membership in international organizations.

The consequences are manifold. First, foreign policy in Switzerland is to a large degree influenced by domestic policy. Second, referendums can be influenced by short term domestic issues. Third, because of the consensus system in the executive, the part time parliamentary system, and the rather independent bureaucracy, foreign policy decisions “occur in seclusion.”¹⁰³ Fourth, Swiss foreign policy is constrained by national identity and role concepts; and this leads to a time lag between external events and internal reactions. “Analysis of Swiss foreign policy shows that although certain national role concepts no longer corresponded to outside expectations and so became irrelevant in the international setting, they remain central to Swiss national identity.”¹⁰⁴ These factors make it a daunting task to analyze cause and effect in Swiss foreign policy.

Swiss foreign policy is characterized by many dualisms—openness and isolation, cooperation and autonomy, neutrality and solidarity, independence and collective security.¹⁰⁵ Moos showed that in the past these poles were expressed in the form of liberal, radical Protestant ideas and traditional, conservative Catholic values.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, this chapter showed that these contradictions are inherently embedded in neutrality, in theory and in practice.

¹⁰² For details, see Goetschel, Bernath and Schwarz, *Swiss Foreign Policy*, 44.

¹⁰³ *Ibid.*, 58.

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, 149.

¹⁰⁵ For one aspect of this dualism, economic integration versus political isolation, see Gabriel and Fanzun, *The Asymmetries of Swiss Foreign Policy*.

¹⁰⁶ Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 17ff.

Another serious analytical problem resides in the gaps separating the official neutrality discourse, the practical application of neutrality in foreign policy, and the perception of neutrality in the general population. Georg Kreis showed in his extensive study of Switzerland's neutrality discourse since 1943 that the neutrality discussions of the political elite were essentially a "process of continuous self-reassurance," and not a real debate about actual foreign policy.¹⁰⁷ Second, the relative success of neutrality in the Cold War reinforced the existing perception of neutrality and the idea of Switzerland's special role in the international system. Finally, Kreis showed abundant evidence, especially in the language used, that neutrality had a sacral connotation.¹⁰⁸ One has to conclude that Swiss debates about neutrality have had to a large extent a ritual function of supporting national identity, instead of discussing real world issues. The same is true for the population. Peter Moser argued that there are "some reasons to believe that an automatism" takes over when people respond to the question of neutrality. This would also explain the suspiciously high rates of support for the concept.¹⁰⁹ Karsh shows, however, that permanently neutral countries, in order to overcome the credibility problem of neutrality, tend to declare neutrality as their "raison d'être."¹¹⁰

Related to this problem, and important for this thesis, is the conclusion of Carlo Moos. His comparison of the referendum debates showed that the arguments and aims of opponents and supporters of Swiss participation in a collective security organization have been remarkably similar. Consequently Moos could not explain the different outcomes at the argumentative level. Instead, the specific result of a referendum about participation in a collective security organization had to be explained by the particular historical context and political environment and, finally, by the differences between the League and the UN.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ Kreis, *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart*, 14.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 339, 350.

¹⁰⁹ Moser quoted in *Ibid.*, 15. Translation by the author. There are not many questions one can ask a democratic people and obtain a 93 percent support rate.

¹¹⁰ Karsh, *Neutrality and Small States*, 36–37.

¹¹¹ Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 10.

Tibor Tresch also took note of these irrational aspects of Swiss policy. He saw a “cognitive dissonance” in the fact that a large majority of the Swiss supported neutrality, while at the same time the positive effects and the practical value of neutrality were questioned.¹¹² Hans-Peter Brunner mentioned the “irrational national consensus” that most Swiss saw “independence and neutrality” as “indivisibly intertwined.”¹¹³ In this sense, the humorous comment that “whatever the Swiss do, it’s neutral” has its significance in analyzing Swiss neutrality.

In sum, this thesis is not designed to support, or to challenge, any theories of international relations or neutrality. It does not focus on any one of the three levels of analysis, namely the systemic, domestic or individual level.¹¹⁴ Instead, this chapter is intended to promote a better understanding of the two historical case studies in Chapter III (Switzerland’s neutrality and the League of Nations) and Chapter IV (its relationship with the United Nations).

¹¹² Tresch and others, *Sicherheit 2009*, 127–128.

¹¹³ Brunner cited in Goetschel, Bernath and Schwarz, *Swiss Foreign Policy*, 16.

¹¹⁴ For a discussion of foreign policy analysis in the case of Switzerland, see *Ibid.*, 10–12.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

III. SWISS NEUTRALITY AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

This chapter analyzes the relationship between Switzerland and the League of Nations in the era 1919-1945. It is the first of two case studies of collective security systems. Efraim Karsh states why studying the League is essential, and appropriate for the subject of this thesis:

The establishment of the League of Nations represented the first operative attempt to found a “better world” on the basis of collective security. At the same time, it brought to surface the constant tension between the ideas of neutrality and universal cooperation and threatened ... to banish the political and legal phenomenon of neutrality from the international scene.¹¹⁵

The chapter investigates which international and domestic factors led to Switzerland’s accession to the League, and how this affected the theory and practice of Swiss neutrality.

The main argument of this chapter is that the debate over League membership provided the intellectual rationale for the compatibility of collective security and neutrality. The rationale is the source of an original Swiss concept, the distinction between the laws of neutrality and neutrality policy, and the fusion of economic partiality and military impartiality in the form of differential neutrality. Differential neutrality is, despite its colossal failure in the 1930s, the origin of a lasting relationship between neutrality and solidarity. Furthermore, the political campaign in 1919–1920 set the basic arguments for domestic neutrality and the collective security debate for almost a century. Switzerland joined the League because the unique international environment after World War I opened a rare window of opportunity for redefining Swiss foreign policy. This, in conjunction with a united and pro-active government, allowed for a small majority over the traditionalistic, isolationistic German-speaking cantons. Finally, the League’s failure

¹¹⁵ Karsh, *International Co-Operation and Neutrality*, 57–58.

discredited the idea of collective security in the eyes of the Swiss population until the present day, and it paved the road for a narrow and inflexible neutrality conception during World War II and the Cold War.

The structure of this chapter mirrors two turning points in Switzerland's relationship with the League and in its century-old neutrality. The next section discusses the reasons why Switzerland joined the League in 1920 and how the necessary public support was acquired. A subsequent section describes how, from 1920 to 1938, the new policy of differential neutrality was implemented. Finally, the chapter analyzes the underlying reasons for Switzerland's dispute with the League in 1938 over the sanctions against Italy, and consequently, Switzerland's return to integral neutrality¹¹⁶ and the long-term effects of that decision.

B. THE 1920 REFERENDUM AND ACCESSION TO THE LEAGUE

1. Introduction

Neutrality is no longer feasible or desirable where the peace of the world is involved and the freedom of its people.

—Woodrow Wilson, April 2, 1917¹¹⁷

The Great War from 1914 to 1918 transformed greatly the foundations of the international system. Belligerents on both sides violated the neutral status of Belgium, Greece, and Luxembourg. At sea, the economic character of the war made it impossible to differentiate between the ships of neutral states and adversaries. The global, economic, and total character of warfare led to the practical, legal, and moral decline of neutrality. Thus, only Mexico, Persia, Spain, Switzerland and some smaller South American states were able to maintain their neutrality.¹¹⁸ The traditional European balance of power system of 1815 had definitely proved its inability to limit wars and to act as a useful tool to constrain the anarchy of the international system and it vanished in turn at war's end.

¹¹⁶ Integral neutrality, military neutrality and traditional neutrality are used as synonyms for a narrow neutrality conception based on the international laws of neutrality.

¹¹⁷ Wilson quoted in Wright, *The Present Status of Neutrality*, 391.

¹¹⁸ Argirakos, *Neutralität und Europäische Union*, 158–163.

In sum, after World War I, as an analyst wrote in 1927, neutrality was a “status without the means for effective extra-territorial enforcement of rights, a condition heavily fraught with thankless duties.... Its practical bearing had been definitely curtailed, its legal embodiments severely shaken.”¹¹⁹

In 1918, American President Woodrow Wilson, in his famous Fourteen Points, formulated a vision of a new world order, a Kantian league of nations. The Fourteenth Points said: “A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.”¹²⁰

The Swiss foreign policy elite¹²¹ and the Federal Council¹²² fully understood the impact on Switzerland and its neutrality of such a new collective security world order. In May 1918, a small committee of experts discussed the possible consequences of such a development, and drafted, in an optimistic and pro-active manner, a Swiss proposal for a League of Nations covenant.¹²³ That was the start of the recurring idea that Switzerland had a special historic international mission because of its centuries-old experience with collective security in the confederation.¹²⁴

¹¹⁹ Graham, *The Effect of the League of Nations Covenant*, 358.

¹²⁰ Francis Paul Walters, *A History of the League of Nations* (London: Oxford University Press, 1952), 20. See also Choices for the 21st Century Education Program, *Wilson's vision and the League of Nations debate*. (Providence: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute of International Studies, Brown University, 2004); Anique H. M. van Ginneken, *Historical dictionary of the League of Nations*. (Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2006).

¹²¹ There is a debate as to whether a foreign policy elite exists in Switzerland. See Chapter II for the particularities of the Swiss political system.

¹²² The Federal Council or *Bundesrat* is the Swiss executive power and consists of seven ministers, who traditionally represent the major political parties. The presidency rotates every year and has mainly symbolic functions. Governmental decisions are taken by consensus and supported by all members of the council.

¹²³ Swiss Federal Council, *Message from the Federal Council of Switzerland to the Federal Assembly of Switzerland Concerning the Question of the Accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations (4 August 1919) Together with the Annexes Thereto* (Cambridge: University Press, 1919), 4–5.

¹²⁴ For a slightly idealistic review of this historical experience, see William E. Rappard, *Collective Security in Swiss Experience, 1291–1948* (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1948), 150.

Swiss hopes for actively influencing the drafting of the covenant were dashed by the decision of the Entente Powers to integrate the Covenant into the World War I peace treaty, the Treaty of Versailles. The Federal Council was disappointed and stated: “This procedure, opposed as it is to the principles of democracy and of the equality of states, has furthermore infringed not only the rights of neutrals but also those of some of the belligerent states.”¹²⁵

Consequently, when Switzerland and other neutral states were invited to comment on the draft treaty in March 1919, the delegation insisted that the League should aim for universality by allowing the accession of all states, and that the League should respect the sovereignty and equality of its members. However, the reality of politics and the fragile compromise among the Great Powers did not allow any changes to the draft treaty.¹²⁶ On June 28, 1919, the Covenant of the League of Nations was signed as an integrated part of the Peace Treaties of Versailles.¹²⁷

The Federal Council clearly pointed to the weaknesses in the final design of the League. The League was “unmistakably a compromise,” and although it tried “to comprehend the whole of international life,” it did not solve “the capital problems of world-economics.”¹²⁸ Further, “war remains still recognized as a measure of international politics,” and “the League of Nations fails to secure a binding and equitable decision and solution of the [international] dispute by an impartial authority.”¹²⁹ In the message to parliament, the Federal Council analyzed in detail the basic tension between “state-sovereignty and state-independence” and “international solidarity.”¹³⁰ The compromise between these poles is reflected in the fact that the Great Powers were more influential than the small states, despite the formal status of equality of all states, and that there was

¹²⁵ Swiss Federal Council, *Message from the Federal Council*, 6.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, 8–9.

¹²⁷ Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 43–61.

¹²⁸ Swiss Federal Council, *Message from the Federal Council*, 9–10.

¹²⁹ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, 14.

a lack of democracy within the League itself. The Swiss government, however, praised the potential benefits that a worldwide collective security organization and world peace could bring.

Regarding neutrality, the Federal Council stated bluntly that neutrality and collective security were incompatible. “Neutrality imports the preservation of peace by means of non-intervention, while the League of Nations on the other hand aims at securing peace by means of solidary action of its member-states.”¹³¹ Two articles in the Covenant were the source of the problem. Article XX declared that the League’s Council had the competence to advise on collective action.¹³² Article XVI outlined the nature of this collective action in the form of sanctions.

Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants ... it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.¹³³

The Swiss government had no doubt that the Swiss people would choose neutrality if the question was formulated as “neutrality or the League?”¹³⁴ Thus, Switzerland chose a threefold strategy to circumvent the basic dilemma between neutrality and collective security. First, the Federal Council ensured a renewed legal recognition of Swiss neutrality. The United States provided the rationale in Article XXI: “Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe

¹³¹ Swiss Federal Council, *Message from the Federal Council*, 25.

¹³² Article XX: “The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.” See Walters, *A History of the League of Nations*, 48.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, 51.

¹³⁴ Swiss Federal Council, *Message from the Federal Council*, 27–28.

Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace.”¹³⁵ Then, the French-Swiss negotiation about the abrogation of the neutral zone of Savoy provided the opportunity to inject Swiss neutrality into the Peace Treaty. In Article 435 of the Paris Peace Treaty, the signatory states acknowledged, and reaffirmed, the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland:¹³⁶ “The High Contracting Parties, while they recognize the guaranties stipulated by the Treaties of 1815, and especially by the Act of November 20, 1815, in favor of Switzerland, the said guaranties constituting international obligations for the maintenance of peace.”¹³⁷ Therefore, the Federal Council argued with legalistic logic that Swiss neutrality, like the Monroe Doctrine, was consistent with Article XXI of the Covenant.

Second, in a masterpiece of rhetoric, a clear difference between neutrality policy and the laws of neutrality was established. While the laws of neutrality signified the core of Swiss neutrality and would be applicable in any case of war, a neutrality policy would define peacetime behavior and would leave room for political flexibility.¹³⁸ This set the stage for the logical next step.

Third, a differential neutrality was proposed to mean that Switzerland would support economic sanctions if decided on by the League while remaining militarily neutral. The Federal Council was well aware of the extent to which this stretched the concept of neutrality in order to square the circle:

Although we are of opinion that the obligations of neutrality are not so extensive as is often maintained, we cannot hide the fact that a rupture, fundamental, immediate and universal, of important relations in the economic and other areas would be a wholesale departure from the neutral policy hitherto followed by us. It would probably bring us to the extreme verge of what is compatible with the duties imposed by neutrality.¹³⁹

¹³⁵ Walter R. Zahler, “Switzerland and the League of Nations; A Chapter in Diplomatic History,” *The American Political Science Review* 30, no. 4 (August 1936): 755, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1947951> (accessed April 16, 2009).

¹³⁶ Swiss Federal Council, *Message from the Federal Council*, 30.

¹³⁷ World Peace Foundation, “A League of Nations,” *A League of Nations III* (1920): 55–56, <http://books.google.com/books?id=zNMBAAAAYAAJ> (accessed November 7, 2009).

¹³⁸ Swiss Federal Council, *Message from the Federal Council*, 36ff.

¹³⁹ *Ibid.*, 40.

This was the argument of the Federal Council's message to the Federal Assembly¹⁴⁰ on August 4, 1919, concerning the question of accession to the League. In the first reading, the parliament linked a possible Swiss accession to the membership in the League of the United States. That is, Switzerland would not join the League unless the United States did so.¹⁴¹ At the same time, the Entente Powers were not fully convinced by the Swiss logic and additional negotiations with the League Council took place in London.

A compromise was achieved thanks to the diplomatic skills of the Swiss delegation and the support of friendly states. The London Declaration of February 13, 1920, is a symbol of how politics outlaws logic and theory. Later, it became equally a symbol of how politics in practice cannot match nice rhetoric on paper. Therefore, it is worth quoting the declaration at some length:

The Council of the League of Nations, while affirming that the conception of neutrality of the members of the League is incompatible with the principle that all members will be obliged to co-operate in enforcing respect for their engagements, recognizes that Switzerland is in a unique situation, based on a tradition of several centuries which has been explicitly incorporated in the Law of Nations....

The members of the League of Nations are entitled to expect that the Swiss people will not stand aside when the high principles of the League have to be defended. It is in this sense that the Council of the League has taken note of the declaration made by the Swiss Government... and in accordance with which Switzerland recognizes and proclaims the duties of solidarity which membership of the League of Nations imposes upon her, including therein the duty of co-operating in such economic and financial measures as may be demanded by the League of Nations against a covenant-breaking State....

¹⁴⁰ The Federal Assembly consists of the two parliamentary chambers, the National Assembly or *Nationalrat*, representing the people, and the Council of States or *Ständerat*, representing the 26 cantons.

¹⁴¹ For further details, including parliamentary votes, see Sergio Stupan, *Comment la Suisse a adhéré au Pacte de la Société des Nations* (Lausanne: Université de Lausanne, 1943), 77ff.

In accepting these declarations the Council recognizes that the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland and the guaranty of the inviolability of her territory as incorporated in the Law of Nations, particularly in the Treaties and in the Act of 1815, are justified by the interests of general peace, and as such are compatible with the Covenant.¹⁴²

Satisfied with this outcome, and after a second reading, the two chambers of the Swiss parliament approved the accession of Switzerland to the League and dropped the United States membership clause.¹⁴³

In the May 16, 1920, referendum, Swiss men approved membership in the League with a majority of 56.3 percent. Only around one hundred additional “yes” votes in the canton of Appenzell Ausser-Rhoden led to the necessary majority of 11½ out of the 22 cantons.¹⁴⁴ The voter turnout was exceptionally high (77.5 percent).¹⁴⁵ This decision allowed the ratification of the Covenant, and Switzerland joined the League as a founding member. The next sections analyze how this historic decision came about.

2. External Factors

As mentioned, World War I was the single most important external factor that affected Switzerland’s role in the international system. The only question is the extent to which the Swiss response to the new environment in 1918 was externally enforced or deliberately chosen.

World War I caused or accelerated profound legal, economic, social, political, technological, and geopolitical changes throughout Europe. The war dealt the deathblow to the five-power system and led to the rise of the U.S. and the USSR as major forces in

¹⁴² World Peace Foundation, *A League of Nations*, 59–60.

¹⁴³ Schweizer Bundesrat, *Zusatzbotschaft des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung betreffend die Frage des Beitritts der Schweiz zum Völkerbund*, (Bern: Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv, 1920), 334–363, <http://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc.jsp?ID=10027441> (accessed October 31, 2009).

¹⁴⁴ Switzerland consisted in 1919 of 25 cantons (the canton of Jura was only created in 1979). Because of the historic division of three original cantons of the federation, six cantons are “half-cantons” and have only one-half of a vote. In sum, 25 cantons shared 22 total votes.

¹⁴⁵ Schweizer Bundesrat, *Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über das Ergebnis der Volksabstimmung vom 16. Mai 1920 betreffend den Beitritt der Schweiz zum Völkerbunde*, (Bern: Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv, 1920), 791–800, <http://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc.jsp?ID=10027597> (accessed October 31, 2009).

the international system of states. Most of these changes had a direct impact on the concept of neutrality and public opinion, and therefore, required an adjustment of Swiss foreign policy. R.F. Roxburgh wrote in 1919:

In twelve days, in the summer of 1914, the political and ethical trappings which had been thrown round the conception of neutrality during the nineteenth century were torn away from it throughout the greater part of Europe. ... Neutrality as a maxim of foreign policy has lost its former ascendancy. ... [M]odern war inflicts such hardships on neutrals as to make their condition hardly more tolerable than that of states at war, while the increased value of neutral support to belligerents, and the greater efforts which are made to obtain it, make a policy of neutrality difficult to sustain.¹⁴⁶

Besides this decline in the value of neutrality in international law, Switzerland faced a new geopolitical situation for several reasons. First, the European balance of power system was severely imbalanced in favor of France and Britain. This led to a domestic debate about whether Swiss neutrality would still make sense in the perceived absence of a balance of power system.¹⁴⁷ This development was accompanied by growing nationalism. After the breakup of the Habsburg Empire, Switzerland remained a multiethnic island in Europe and was exposed to German and Italian irredentism. Consequently, the tensions between the German- and French-speaking Swiss had become greatly accentuated during the war.

Second, the war ended Europe's ability to maintain its own balance of power. The main new actor, the United States, brought new views and rules to Europe. As a consequence, Switzerland's position in the world was no longer exclusively determined by the European powers but depended increasingly on the support and the understanding of the United States and other non-European states.

Third, it was the United States and, in particular, Woodrow Wilson, that proposed a world order based on solidarity. As noted previously, the concept of collective security challenged the foundations of Swiss foreign policy and Swiss identity. Furthermore, the

¹⁴⁶ Roxburgh, *Changes in the Conception of Neutrality*, 21–24.

¹⁴⁷ Viktor Vögeli, *Völkerbund und Neutralität: Grundzüge der Schweizerischen Auseinandersetzung von 1919/1920 (Teildruck)* (Zürich: Universität Zürich, 1949), 39–40.

U.S.-driven belief that it was possible to distinguish between the just and the unjust, victors and losers, and the good and the bad in international politics would create long-term conflicts with Switzerland, because it left little or no room for an unbiased type of neutrality.¹⁴⁸

The suffering and bloodshed of the war was an ideal seedbed for such a new, moral, idealistic approach to international relations. After the war, the maxims of *Realpolitik* temporarily vanished. The next section of this chapter shows that these pacifist and idealistic ideas directly affected Swiss public opinion and the Swiss government, and caused domestic pressure for a new foreign policy based on international solidarity. However, despite the pacifist mood, the Swiss kept their realistic feeling for the potential risk of a new war in the center of Europe, where Switzerland would again be at the crossroads of the frontlines.¹⁴⁹

Fourth, the Swiss economy was fundamentally transformed in the years preceding World War I. Industry and services replaced most of the traditional agrarian economy. In 1914 Switzerland's economy was massively dependent on international trade.¹⁵⁰ Consequently, Switzerland realized in World War I that the economic rights of the neutrals were impossible to maintain. International security and economic interactions were increasingly intertwined; economic sovereignty and independence, in the sense of economic autarky, had become a myth.¹⁵¹

Finally, a two-month deadline to become founding members of the League was issued to the countries. This put unusual time pressure on the consensual political system of Swiss direct democracy.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁸ See especially Gabriel, *Swiss Neutrality and the "American Century."*

¹⁴⁹ For an example, see Vögeli, *Völkerbund und Neutralität*, 70.

¹⁵⁰ For an overview, see Paul Bairoch, "La Suisse dans le contexte international aux XIXe et XXe siècles," in *La Suisse dans l'économie mondiale (15e–20e s.)*, eds. Paul Bairoch and Martin Körner, 102–140 (Zürich: Chronos Verlag, 1990).

¹⁵¹ Vögeli, *Völkerbund und Neutralität*, 19–29.

¹⁵² Swiss Federal Council, *Message from the Federal Council*, 83ff.

In sum, World War I triggered a new form of international cooperation, a collective security system in the form of the League of Nations. The Swiss government realized early on that this could severely impact Swiss neutrality. Collective security, combined with a new geopolitical situation, and time pressure to make a decision concerning League membership, allowed the government no other choice than to launch a broad debate about Switzerland's future international role. In contrast to 1945, when Swiss membership in the United Nations (UN) was denied by the Allies, in 1918, the Swiss were forced to take a position regarding the League.

3. Internal Factors

The last section showed that external factors mainly led to the League referendum. However, major Swiss foreign policy decisions are always decisively influenced and motivated by domestic factors. In 1918, the domestic situation could be described by two emotions, “euphoria” and “uncertainty.” There was much euphoria about the end of the war and the fact that Switzerland's territorial integrity was maintained. According to Carlo Moos, it was this “basic wave of hope for peace” that led to the “mental openness” that later resulted in a successful referendum.¹⁵³

Active pacifist movements were established during World War I. According to Sergio Stupan, these movements may be categorized into two groups. The first group, the Franco-Swiss Freemasons, the Swiss Peace Society, and the Socialists, had an “international character” and network. They advocated a leading role for the neutral states to end the war and to create a sustainable peace. Although the Socialists had an equal international mission and supported the peace activities, they operated within a different ideological background and with different long term objectives.¹⁵⁴ The second group consisted of movements with a patriotic background, such as the New Helvetic

¹⁵³ Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 17. Translation by the author.

¹⁵⁴ Stupan, *Comment la Suisse a adhéré au Pacte de la Société des Nations*, 21ff.

Association. They were concerned about maintaining the cohesion of multi-cultural Switzerland and recognized that the country's integrity depended to a significant extent on European stability.¹⁵⁵

This is why a broad spectrum of the civil society supported the creation of the League at an early stage. Their activities culminated in a petition of the Swiss Peace Society to the Federal Council on October 24, 1917, requesting that it “appoint without delay an extra-parliamentary commission ... to consider and report on the conditions in which Switzerland could enter such a federation [as the League of Nations],” that it declare its opinion about “the participation of neutral countries in a League of Nations,” and that it “summon an international Congress for the establishment of the principles of a future League of Nations.”¹⁵⁶

In addition to the euphoria of peace, the war brought uncertainty and political unrest. The country struggled to contain the centrifugal forces among the three major Swiss cultures. Each linguistic group had its traditional sympathy and bonds with the neighbors, France, Germany and Italy. Consequently, the “unfair” peace Treaty of Versailles was much criticized among the German-speaking Swiss.

From 1917 to 1920, the exceptionally stable Swiss political system trembled in reaction to the emerging forces of Bolshevism and Socialism. The continued use of the armed forces to break worker's strikes escalated during the “general strike” in 1918, when the army killed three workers. The “Landesstreik” was the most severe domestic social struggle in the modern history of the country. Only the integration of the Socialists into the political system could calm the situation. In the October 26, 1919, election, a “turning point in Swiss parliamentary history,” the major political party, the Independent Democratic (Radical) Party, lost its absolute majority because of the strengthened Socialists and the new Peasants and Artisans Party.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁵ Stupan, *Comment la Suisse a adhéré au Pacte de la Société des Nations*, 41ff.

¹⁵⁶ Letter from the Peace Society to the Federal Council. Annex 1 of Swiss Federal Council, *Message from the Federal Council*, 137–138.

¹⁵⁷ Stupan, *Comment la Suisse a adhéré au Pacte de la Société des Nations*, 84.

There was also continuity, however. In contrast to the international realm, in Switzerland, commitment to the concept of neutrality was reinforced by the outcome of the war. There was no intention to question the basic concept of Swiss neutrality. On the contrary, the domestic tensions buttressed the practical and symbolic role of Swiss neutrality for national identity.¹⁵⁸

In sum, the domestic factor played an important role in the League debate. It was an active civil society that preceded and championed governmental League policies. Furthermore, a severe internal crisis accompanied the League debate. However, the following analysis of the “yes“ and “no” campaigns shows that the League referendum was foremost a foreign policy debate and was not reduced to domestic political “turf” wars.

4. The “Yes” Campaign

The Swiss League membership supporters organized themselves on November 3, 1919. The association saw itself in a supportive role for the Federal Council.¹⁵⁹ The committee had broad support from major political parties,¹⁶⁰ with the exception of the Socialists, and from civil associations, such as the Grütliverein, the New Helvetic Association, the Swiss Peace Association, the Associations of Swiss Liberals, and maybe most important, the Swiss Farmers League.¹⁶¹

The pro-committee generally followed the intellectual arguments of the Federal Council. However, in the final effort to reach voters, the Federal Council used unusually clear language by stating that

¹⁵⁸ Compared to the post-World War II era, the national identity function of neutrality in 1920 was, however, less dominant. See Vögeli, *Völkerbund und Neutralität*, 65–68.

¹⁵⁹ The public debate in Swiss referendum campaigns is usually led by two opposing committees. The Swiss Government has only a limited capacity and right to defend its position with public funds.

¹⁶⁰ Independent Democratic (radical) party, Liberal Democratic (Protestant Conservative) party, anti-bolshevist Peasant’s party, Christian Social party and part of the divided Catholic Conservatives, according to Brooks, *Swiss Referendum on the League of Nations*, 478.

¹⁶¹ Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 49–50.

A decision of the people against the league would bring with it irreparable damage to the prosperity of Switzerland, to the unity of the country, and to the respect it enjoys abroad. It would involve the gravest danger to our commerce, our industry, and our agriculture. The League of Nations will gradually unite all the states of the world. ...Switzerland cannot refuse her coöperation when humanity undertakes by a broadly devised plan to bring justice and peace to the world.¹⁶²

According to Carlo Moos, the supportive arguments could be characterized by two keywords, “dawn” (*Aufbruch*) and “essence of Switzerland” (*Wesen der Schweiz*). The “yes” campaign was guided by the optimistic belief that the League would bring peace, a new world order, and economic advantages. Despite its imperfect nature, the League was described as having the potential to fulfill its mission.¹⁶³ This optimism and the expression of hope were reflected in a message from the Federal Council stating that the League would be “the supersession of the idea hitherto dominant, of state egoism—each for himself—by the new idea of international solidarity—all for each.”¹⁶⁴ Most important, there was hope that the new world order would be based on the rule of international law, which is a traditional cornerstone of Swiss foreign policy, influenced by the legalistic tradition of neutrality. “The League must become the centre of the whole of international life so far as that can be envisaged from the standpoint of right.”¹⁶⁵

The second line of argumentation, “the essence of Switzerland,” was based on the belief that the country, with its rich multi-ethnic, democratic and federal experience, could serve as an international example and that it had the historic duty and mission to do so. Switzerland was described as a mini-League of Nations, “a micro-cosmos of international relations,” and proponents of accession argued that the League could be seen as the further development of the basic ideas of Swiss state-building.¹⁶⁶

¹⁶² Quoted in Brooks, *Swiss Referendum on the League of Nations*, 478.

¹⁶³ Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 74–75.

¹⁶⁴ Swiss Federal Council, *Message from the Federal Council*, 15.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 22–23. The German word *Recht* can be translated as “right” or “law.”

¹⁶⁶ Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 80.

These idealistic arguments were in the foreground; nevertheless, economic arguments are always of special importance in Swiss referendum campaigns. The League was no exception. Representatives of trade, industry and agriculture pointed to the dependence of the Swiss economy on exports. They stressed that membership in the League would be necessary to avoid economic isolation.¹⁶⁷ Although the Covenant did not provide many direct regulations concerning the world economy, except for international labor legislation, there was a widespread feeling that such a collective security organization could not maintain peace in the long term without organizing international economic life.¹⁶⁸

The pro-committee successfully tailored the campaign to specific target audiences. The main focus was on the conservative Catholic cantons and the rural population. There was an appeal to the Catholic population that it was a Christian duty to express solidarity for an organization that would bring peace to the world. Even more important was Ernst Laur, the leader of the Swiss Farmers League, who translated the rational arguments into positive emotional ones, which were well received by the rural population. In figurative language, he insisted on the economic advantages of League membership and declared that Switzerland, “the oldest league of nations on earth,” should lead the international efforts to create “peace on earth.”¹⁶⁹

The “yes” committee understood that neutrality would play a crucial role. The main argument went along the lines of the governmental rhetoric. The campaign described neutrality and solidarity as equal and complementary policies. At the same time, the League supporters pointed to the decline of neutrality as a security provider, mainly because economic neutrality was impossible during World War I.¹⁷⁰ Finally, the campaign, and especially the political left, placed into question the usefulness of neutrality in general. In sum, the campaign held that neutrality should be seen as a means

¹⁶⁷ Vögeli, *Völkerbund und Neutralität*, 19–20.

¹⁶⁸ Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 83. However, the evidence for this argument is weak.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 56–60. Translation by the author.

¹⁷⁰ Vögeli, *Völkerbund und Neutralität*, 21.

to an end. History could no longer give guidance when the international environment had fundamentally changed. Therefore, neutrality had to adjust itself to the new international environment, which meant differential neutrality.¹⁷¹

The “yes” campaign, for good reasons, did not pinpoint the theoretical fallacies of differential neutrality. Even among League supporters, the practicality of economic sanctions was questioned. There was nonetheless an unspoken consensus among both supporters and opponents of Swiss membership in the League that, as the Swiss experience with the Entente’s blockade in World War I had shown, economic neutrality was, in practice, difficult or impossible to maintain.¹⁷² However, there were only a few League supporters, mainly Socialists, who proposed a radical change in policy and the abandonment of neutrality.¹⁷³

In sum, the pro-committee had a broad base of supporters and successfully transmitted the well-prepared arguments of the Federal Council to the critical target audiences. International and economic arguments were adroitly mixed with the historic role of Switzerland. Neutrality was not the most important aspect of the debate because the basic question as to whether neutrality was compatible with collective security had already been solved in advance by the diplomatic efforts of the Federal Council.

5. The “No” Campaign

The contra-committee could not organize itself in a similar cohesive manner. The opponents were scattered among the Bolshevik hardliners of the Socialists, the divided Catholic Conservatives in the German-speaking cantons, the small group of right-wing nationalists, and part of the army’s senior leadership, spearheaded by former World War I general Ulrich Wille.¹⁷⁴

¹⁷¹ Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 82–83.

¹⁷² Vögeli, *Völkerbund und Neutralität*, 21ff.

¹⁷³ Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 83.

¹⁷⁴ Brooks, *Swiss Referendum on the League of Nations*, 478.

Carlo Moos organizes the opposing arguments along two lines. The first one can be titled “defense,” and the second “Finis Helvetiae.”¹⁷⁵ In a defensive battle against new ideas, the opponents argued that the League was only an idealistic construct, which had grown out of a “peace psychosis,” and that the implementation of the Covenant of the League would be impossible.¹⁷⁶ At the other end of this political spectrum, the Socialists saw the League “as a new form of imperialism and colonialism and an instrument of capital.”¹⁷⁷

Neglecting the collective security idea, opponents continuously called the League of Nations the “League of Versailles” and depicted it as an instrument of the balance of power managed by the victors of World War I, especially France. This argument was nurtured by the cultural sympathy for Germany in the German-speaking parts of Switzerland and by the failure of the United States to participate in the League.¹⁷⁸ Many German-speaking Swiss felt that it was unfair not to accept Germany into the League.¹⁷⁹

The opponents of Swiss accession to the League used the national historical narrative, which claimed that neutrality, independence and sovereignty were the pillars of Swiss identity, by arguing that Article XVI of the Covenant would undermine all three.¹⁸⁰ The pragmatic version of the argument acknowledged a change in the international system but concluded that Switzerland would have to give up some sovereignty anyway, regardless of whether the country were to stay outside the League. Therefore, “wait and see” would be the best strategy.¹⁸¹

The more emotional and fundamental version of the argument claimed that League membership was an existential question for the Swiss future, an “all or nothing” decision. Here, neutrality was the most important word. It was because of neutrality that

¹⁷⁵ Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 74.

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 66,84.

¹⁷⁷ *Ibid.* Translation by the author.

¹⁷⁸ Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 62–65.

¹⁷⁹ Vögeli, *Völkerbund und Neutralität*, 88.

¹⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 92–98.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 90.

Switzerland existed and had survived previous European struggles. Therefore, any change in neutrality policy would inevitably lead to “Finis Helvetiae.”¹⁸² The differential neutrality in the London Declaration was described as an “artificial construct” that could not be maintained in reality.¹⁸³ Differential neutrality, particularly participation in economic sanctions, would “be a despicable kind of ‘hunger warfare,’ certain to lead to military reprisals by the aggrieved state and probably to the invasion of Switzerland and the seizure of Geneva as the capital of the league.”¹⁸⁴

The “no” campaign insisted that neutrality was absolutely necessary for the cohesion of the three Swiss cultures and the Swiss national identity. The enormous internal tensions, especially between the French- and German-speaking Swiss during World War I, were used as the most prominent evidence.¹⁸⁵

Solidarity was not part of the vocabulary of the League’s opponents. To the contrary, they stipulated that solidarity was only a cover for returning to international political ambitions or serving as a “fig leaf” for bandwagoning with the great powers. Staying outside of the League would only enhance Switzerland’s “moral power.”¹⁸⁶

Finally, from an analytical military point of view, the League was not perceived as a major problem. However, a small part of the military leadership saw the Geneva seat as a threat to military neutrality. The Federal Council defused this argument by obtaining a guarantee from the League that there would be no preparations for military action conducted on Swiss territory, including the Geneva area.¹⁸⁷

In sum, the opponents of League membership did not believe in a system of collective security. Consequently, they denied the possibility and the necessity to differentiate between the laws of neutrality and neutrality policy, and they saw no

¹⁸² Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 90, 96.

¹⁸³ *Ibid.*, 91.

¹⁸⁴ Brooks, *Swiss Referendum on the League of Nations*, 479.

¹⁸⁵ Vögeli, *Völkerbund und Neutralität*, 66–69.

¹⁸⁶ Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 94–95.

¹⁸⁷ Vögeli, *Völkerbund und Neutralität*, 83.

rationality behind the concept of differential neutrality. Instead, they diabolized the new organization as a major threat to the country's very existence and proposed a defensive policy based on traditional Swiss values. At the end, the weak and dispersed "no" campaign was not able to convince a majority of the population that there was no hope for a new world order or that the changed international system would not require an adjusted foreign policy.¹⁸⁸ Furthermore, the opponents could not fully exploit the neutrality argument because military neutrality was never put into question and because differential neutrality remained a concept on paper for the time being.

6. Summary

This first part of the chapter showed that external factors, namely euphoria after the armistice, an altered geopolitical balance, and the creation of a collective security organization, called for a major decision in Swiss foreign policy. The question was whether to join the League or not. These international factors fell on fertile domestic soil. Civil society organizations, politicized by the social upheavals of that time, pushed the Federal Council into an active and supportive role. The result was a thoughtful neutrality conception that was ostensibly compatible with collective security and backed up by international guarantees.

The importance of the concept of differential neutrality for the successful outcome of the referendum cannot be underestimated. Carlo Moos is right in stating that the London Declaration "played an important and maybe decisive role."¹⁸⁹ The Federal Council knew that, despite the international decline of neutrality during the war, the security and identity functions of Swiss neutrality were revitalized by World War I, and that it would have been impossible to put Switzerland's military neutrality into question.¹⁹⁰

Based on this sound foundation, the referendum campaign debated questions about the character and effectiveness of the League, the historical role and duty of

¹⁸⁸ Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 145–146.

¹⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 155. Translation by the author.

¹⁹⁰ Vögeli, *Völkerbund und Neutralität*, 66–68.

Switzerland, the potential economic gains, the practicality of differential neutrality, and the impact of collective security on national cohesion and identity.

In contrast to the UN membership debate in 1945, Switzerland joined the League not because it had no other choice but because it had one. Viktor Vögelin concludes that the Swiss public decided for the sake of “an open foreign policy based on clear principles,” which supported “domestic political stability,” and less for economic or idealistic reasons.¹⁹¹ Carlo Moos summarizes that “a positive general environment, which supported openness, and firm leadership,” made the slim majority possible.¹⁹²

The decision to join the first modern collective security organization was based on theory, not on experience. How would theory meet practice?

C. DIFFERENTIAL NEUTRALITY FROM 1920 TO 1938

1. Introduction

This short section analyzes how the League itself, as well as Switzerland’s membership and its concept of differential neutrality, were implemented. The high expectations, optimism, and idealism of the new collective security organization were quickly challenged by the harsh reality of the interwar period.

However, before practice can be discussed, a quick theoretical overview is necessary. In 1927, Malbone W. Graham analyzed the effects of the Covenant on the theory and practice of neutrality and pointed to two issues: the question whether war was still legally possible and the question of the nature of sanctions. Graham concluded that the League did not totally ban war. There were at least three legal possibilities to conduct war, and consequently, there would be cases in which traditional neutrality was applicable.¹⁹³

¹⁹¹ Vögeli, *Völkerbund und Neutralität*, 99–100. Translation by the author.

¹⁹² Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 160. Translation by the author. For the decisive role of the Federal Council see also Stupan, *Comment la Suisse a adhéré au Pacte de la Société des Nations*, 156.

¹⁹³ These were wars authorized under the Covenant, wars among non-members of the League, and wars among members when the League procedures have failed. For details see Graham, *The Effect of the League of Nations Covenant*, 370–371.

Regarding sanctions, there were three important viewpoints. The first, according to Graham, was “born out of the psychology of war.” This was the original Wilsonian idea that every nation that broke the Covenant was automatically at war with the rest of the world or at least with all members of the League. The second view, which grew out of the immediate postwar period, and which was Switzerland’s temporary view, believed that sanctions “– rupture of diplomatic relations, non-intercourse, economic blockade and military pressure – would be ... compatible with the maintenance of neutrality.” The final and fundamental new view, which emerged in the second half of the 1920s, linked sanctions with preventive, or punitive, interventions “whenever the peace of the world is jeopardized.”¹⁹⁴

After the foundation of the League, the organization itself and the handling of war and neutrality quickly veered away from the initial concepts.

2. The League of Nations

The life of the League is characterized by two phases. In the first phase, until the second half of the 1920s, the organization grew in strength and scope. In the second phase, the League quickly became irrelevant because of its inability to manage the deteriorating international situation after the start of the world depression in 1929. The League had most of its success in “the execution of the peace treaties,” or in modern terms, in post-conflict activities.¹⁹⁵ Despite these initial successes, the League lacked from the outset the universality and rigidity necessary to fulfill its core task: to maintain peace by pre-conflict action.

In 1926, when Germany joined, the League had 54 member states. In the following years, more states left the League than new ones joined, and after 1937, the League constantly lost members.

The decision of the United States Senate not to give its advise and to consent to ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, and therefore, not to join the League, was a

¹⁹⁴ Graham, *The Effect of the League of Nations Covenant*, 371–374.

¹⁹⁵ William E. Rappard, “The Evolution of the League of Nations,” *The American Political Science Review* 21, no. 4 (November 1927): 823, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1947594> (accessed April 16, 2009).

serious blow to the overall concept. William Rappard wrote that “Without America, the League remains an association of nations that one may join or leave at one’s discretion, whose corporate solidarity is feeble and whose uncertain collective will may be disregarded with impunity, at least by any of its principal members.”¹⁹⁶ Hence, “from the very beginning the League was forced to recognize an international reality beyond its control and to accept the neutrality of its own members with regards to wars between non-member states.”¹⁹⁷ The 1921 Greco-Turkish war and the 1933 Chaco war were examples.

Furthermore, by October 1921, the Assembly of the League “de facto, neutralized the elements of compulsion and automatism of Article XVI of the Covenant by leaving the decision as to the adoption of sanctions to the discretion of the various member-states.”¹⁹⁸

In the view of Efraim Karsh, and this is consistent with the previously cited argument of Graham regarding the theory of intervention, the League failed to become a universal collective security organization and degenerated into an instrument of great power politics. Karsh summarizes “that the League was never an international but only a multinational body; [and] that it was not motivated by a sincere desire to direct international relations in a universal spirit, but rather served as the tool of the Great Powers in the furtherance of their interests.”¹⁹⁹ In the mid-1930s, in the face of the desire by leading revisionist powers to alter the system of the Paris suburban treaties, it seemed that most of the arguments of the Swiss League opponents had become reality.

3. Switzerland’s Role in the League of Nations

Switzerland’s role in the League was characterized by two poles: on one hand, new international membership duties, and on the other, the safeguarding of its

¹⁹⁶ Rappard, *The Evolution of the League of Nations*, 797.

¹⁹⁷ Karsh, *International Co-Operation and Neutrality*, 58.

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 59. However, this view is contested by some legal experts.

¹⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

neutrality.²⁰⁰ Regarding its duties, Switzerland had three lines of action. First, it supported efforts that the League become a truly universal organization. Second, it supported all activities that led to the strengthening of international law.²⁰¹ Third, the country expressed its solidarity by offering good offices to the League. Swiss diplomats were active in the League's mediation activities in the border conflict of Upper Silesia, the Saar plebiscite in 1935, and the free city of Danzig.²⁰²

A major advantage for Switzerland was the Geneva seat of the League, which brought prestige to the country and facilitated bilateral contacts. Switzerland could rely on the support of friendly countries, a fact that helped in policy areas where Switzerland was less cooperative. However, these symbolic gestures of solidarity could not hide the fact that the Swiss government, in response to public and parliamentary opinion, increasingly adopted a defensive role in the League.²⁰³

4. Switzerland's Differential Neutrality

Max Huber, the main author of the excellent message of the Federal Council to the Federal Assembly regarding Swiss accession to the League,²⁰⁴ invented the idea of separating the economic and political sphere of neutrality from the legal and military sphere. This was the basis of the concept of differential neutrality.

Differential neutrality not only distinguished between military neutrality and economic sanctions, but also between neutrality in the case of a collective security action

²⁰⁰ For a detailed discussion of this basic strategy and the possible destructive role of the European small states in the League see Morgenthau, *The Resurrection of Neutrality in Europe*.

²⁰¹ Gunter, *Switzerland and the United Nations*, 134.

²⁰² Riklin, *Neutralität am Ende?*, 17.

²⁰³ Ross, *Neutrality and International Sanctions*, 96–97. There are different perceptions about Switzerland's role in the League and the extent to which the country was well embedded in the organization. This is important because it is related to the basic hypothesis that active participation in collective security organizations increases the international reputation of a country and indirectly enhances its security. Unfortunately, the judgment of many authors is colored by international relations theory or by patriotism.

²⁰⁴ According to Hans J. Morgenthau, the message "is the classical presentation of the political foundations of the League of Nations, in political wisdom and realistic penetration never equalled by succeeding interpretations of the Covenant." Morgenthau, *The Resurrection of Neutrality in Europe*, 481.

of the League and other cases of war. The core of military neutrality was recognized in the 1920 London Declaration by the Council of the League of Nations:

[Switzerland] is prepared to make every sacrifice to defend her own territory under every circumstance, even during operations undertaken by the League of Nations, but will not be obliged to take part in any military action or to allow the passage of foreign troops or the preparation of military operations within her territory.²⁰⁵

The government consistently implemented this policy. In 1921, it refused to permit the transit of French troops to supervise an eventual plebiscite in Vilnius. Similarly, in 1935, Italian troops could not cross Swiss territory for a League task, to supervise the Saar plebiscite.²⁰⁶ While Switzerland maintained a firm line with the League regarding its military neutrality, it was never challenged by economic sanctions. It was not until 1935 and the Italian invasion of Ethiopia that differential neutrality had its first real test, and the next section is the story of its failure.

D. THE RETURN TO TRADITIONAL NEUTRALITY IN 1938

1. Introduction

I believe that, even viewed in the perspective of centuries, the last ten years will be characterized by the future historian as an epoch of extraordinarily numerous and radical changes.

—William E. Rappard, August 8, 1927.²⁰⁷

The litmus test for the League and differential neutrality was the Italian-Abyssinian war in 1935–1936. On October 2, 1935, Italy invaded Abyssinia. On October 9, by a majority of 50 of 53 delegations, the League’s Assembly decided to implement economic sanctions against Italy.²⁰⁸

²⁰⁵ World Peace Foundation, *A League of Nations*, 60.

²⁰⁶ Zahler, *Switzerland and the League of Nations*, 754.

²⁰⁷ Rappard, *The Evolution of the League of Nations*, 792.

²⁰⁸ For a detailed study of the Italo-Abyssinian Crisis in regard to Swiss and Swedish neutrality see Ross, *Neutrality and International Sanctions*, 49.

Switzerland declared its military neutrality consistent with the London Declaration. However, “its attempts to balance its neutrality with a demonstration of international solidarity, ...resulted in an amalgamated Swiss response encompassing only partial adherence to each of its sets of responsibilities.”²⁰⁹ Thus, the Swiss government made it clear that, for domestic reasons, it would be impossible to fully implement the sanctions. Further, to the surprise of many League members, and in line with The Hague Conventions of 1907, Switzerland imposed an arms embargo on Ethiopia.²¹⁰ For its economic policy, it applied the concept of *courant normale*, which meant that the bilateral amount of trade with Italy and Ethiopia was fixed at the level of the previous year.²¹¹

The protocols of the League negotiations regarding the sanctions against Italy revealed Switzerland’s difficulty in justifying its non-commitment policy. In 1935, the Federal Council stated that sanctions against Italy would be impossible, because of economic and domestic political reasons. In plain language, for a confederation, it was infeasible to interrupt the Kingdom of Italy’s close economic and social relations with the Italian-speaking populations in the cantons neighboring Italy.²¹² Later on, the Federal Council used weak legal arguments concerning the law of neutrality to justify its economic policy. When several countries, afraid of setting a precedent, challenged the Swiss view and argued that the Swiss behavior was unacceptable and not within the terms of the London Declaration, the Federal Council declared that as a sovereign country, Switzerland would not be bound by any law or body, when it had to take decisions to protect its vital national interests.²¹³

²⁰⁹ Ross, *Neutrality and International Sanctions*, 87.

²¹⁰ Merkatz, “Die Neutralität der Schweiz und die Durchführung der Sanktionen,” *Heidelberg Journal of International Law* 6 (1936): 389, http://www.hjil.de/06_1936/6_1936_1_b_387_2_398_1.pdf (accessed November 19, 2009).

²¹¹ Ross, *Neutrality and International Sanctions*, 104.

²¹² Merkatz, *Die Neutralität der Schweiz und die Durchführung der Sanktionen*, 388–389.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, 392ff.

The economic sanctions were largely ineffective, mainly because of two non-members, Germany and the United States.²¹⁴ An internal report concluded that twenty-five percent of the League's members did not put the sanctions into practice.²¹⁵ In June 1936 the League gave up and gradually lifted the sanctions against Italy. Italy nonetheless left the League in 1937.

The consequences of the Abyssinia disaster were immediate. It "led to the sudden resurrection of traditional neutrality to an even greater extent than before World War I" by all former neutral European states.²¹⁶ On July 1, 1936, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland issued the "Declaration of the Seven" and de facto cancelled their obligations under Article XVI of the Covenant.²¹⁷ In January 1938, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland "declared that in their opinion the provisions of Article 16 had no longer any binding force."²¹⁸ Within a year, all former neutral states declared their return to traditional neutrality.

In April 1938, amid the Nazi German annexation of Austria, the Federal Council declared to the League Council that: "At the present day, the distinction between military and economic sanctions would prove illusory so far as Switzerland was concerned. If she resorted to economic pressure, she would be in grave danger of being treated exactly as if she had taken military action."²¹⁹ On May 14, 1938, the League Council responded:

The Council of the League of Nations ... takes note that Switzerland, invoking her perpetual neutrality, had expressed the intention not to participate any longer in any manner in the putting into operation of the provisions of the Covenant relating to sanctions and declares that she will not be invited to do so.²²⁰

²¹⁴ Argirakos, *Neutralität und Europäische Union*, 171.

²¹⁵ Cited in Taubenfeld, *International Actions and Neutrality*, 382.

²¹⁶ Karsh, *International Co-Operation and Neutrality*, 59.

²¹⁷ *Ibid.*

²¹⁸ Morgenthau, *The Resurrection of Neutrality in Europe*, 474.

²¹⁹ Cited in Gunter, *Switzerland and the United Nations*, 135.

²²⁰ Cited in *Ibid.*, 135.

This was the death certificate of Switzerland's differential neutrality and marked, according to Hans Morgenthau, "the collapse of the basic principle for which the League stands."²²¹

2. External Factors

The decline of the League in the view of the Swiss did not start in 1936, but much earlier. The Federal Council and the supporters of the League knew how important in the long term the universality of the organization would be. In 1919, the Federal Council concluded that:

We count with greater assurance, however, on the development of the present League at no distant date into a universal League. If this does not happen, it seems almost inevitable that the forces of dissolution will sooner or later begin to work within it itself.²²²

The rejection of the League by the United States was a severe blow to the credibility of the League supporters, who had asked, with an eye on the United States, how Switzerland, "the great exponent of the democratic and republican principle, especially in Europe,"²²³ would be judged "if, at a great crisis in history, out of faintness of heart or skepticism or self-seeking, we had forborne to champion a cause, which from the wider outlook, is the cause of Humanity, and from the narrower, the further development of our own political thought."²²⁴ After such idealistic and heroic words, the disillusion by reality was great. In the view of many, the absence of the United States was the end of the League's universality from a moral viewpoint. From a geopolitical perspective, the League's universality collapsed when Germany and Japan (both in 1933) and finally Italy (1937) withdrew.

²²¹ Hans J. Morgenthau, "The End of Switzerland's 'Differential' Neutrality," *The American Journal of International Law* 32, no. 3 (July 1938): 562, <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/2191175> (accessed April 25, 2009).

²²² Swiss Federal Council, *Message from the Federal Council*, 99.

²²³ *Ibid.*, 100.

²²⁴ *Ibid.*, 102.

These events were paralleled by a global transformation of the concept of neutrality. Driven by the neutrality legislation of the United States from 1935 to 1937, “the ‘new’ neutrality was characterized by the insistence, not on the neutral rights, but on neutral duties.” Furthermore, the international handling of the Spanish Civil War invented a new “twilight zone between belligerency and neutrality.”²²⁵

The perceived failure of the League went hand in hand with the deteriorating international security situation. In 1931, with “Japan’s invasion of Manchuria the illusion of ‘collective security’ broke down in Asia, South America and Africa” and the failed sanctions against Italy, the Locarno Pact, and Germany’s reoccupation of the Rhineland in March 1936 sealed the end of collective security in Europe.²²⁶

In addition, European protectionism in response to the Great Depression had severe negative impacts on Switzerland’s liberal free-trade economy, and the country went through a long economic downturn in the 1930s.²²⁷

Finally, the emergence of Fascism, and especially Germany’s annexation of Austria in March 1938, created intense domestic pressure for a return to traditional neutrality.²²⁸ With the sanctions debate in mind, it is important to recall that Mussolini declared in 1921 that the Italian-speaking parts of Switzerland should belong to Italy, and that in 1934 this became an official aim of Italian foreign policy.²²⁹

3. Internal Factors

With typical Swiss caution, the Federal Council had by 1919 formulated a clear idea for a fall-back plan. The Council’s message stated that Switzerland “would, therefore, if ... the League of Nations should be unable to maintain itself, be able to

²²⁵ Josef L. Kunz, “Neutrality and the European War 1939–1940,” *Michigan Law Review* 39, no. 5 (March 1941): 728, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1283317> (accessed April 20, 2009). Each side in the Spanish Civil War was unofficially supported by many states. In Switzerland, the government faced the problem of a large amount of private involvement in the form of mercenaries or money.

²²⁶ Kunz, “Neutrality and the European War 1939–1940,” 723–724.

²²⁷ Ross, *Neutrality and International Sanctions*, 89–90.

²²⁸ Morgenthau, *The Resurrection of Neutrality in Europe*, 474.

²²⁹ Ross, *Neutrality and International Sanctions*, 90–91.

return again to her traditional attitude,”²³⁰ which would be traditional, integral neutrality. With the same thought in mind, the opponents of Swiss membership in the League referendum in 1919 did not disappear after their defeat. Instead, in 1921, they founded the “Public League for Swiss Independence” with the aim of codifying integral neutrality in the Swiss Constitution.²³¹

In conjunction with this domestic pressure, as noted previously, Switzerland, together with other small European states, actively tried to dilute the obligations of Article XVI of the Covenant.²³² It can be deduced from the debate in 1920 that neither the Swiss government nor the public wholeheartedly accepted or understood Article XVI as the core of a collective security system. After the experiences with the sanctions against Italy, Switzerland aimed for a de facto traditional neutrality without having to leave the League.

Finally, the sanctions against Italy in 1935 showed that the idea of differential neutrality was impossible to implement. Italy was not only an emerging and totalitarian Great Power; it was also one of Switzerland’s most important trade partners.²³³ In this light, it is not surprising that, in a U-turn from its vote in 1920, the Italian-speaking canton of Ticino became one of the strongest opponents of the League and its sanctions.

4. Domestic Debate

The basic arguments against the League need not be repeated. In 1936, the starting position was settled. In the words of Hans Morgenthau, the sanctions against Italy “showed the small European states that the risk resulting from the system of collective security was not compensated for by any strengthening of their own security.”²³⁴ Walter Zahler summarized the dilemma as follows: “To distinguish between situations in which

²³⁰ Swiss Federal Council, *Message from the Federal Council*, 43–44.

²³¹ Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 29.

²³² See also Morgenthau, *The Resurrection of Neutrality in Europe*, 480.

²³³ Switzerland was in 1934 Italy’s fourth largest trade partner, see Ross, *Neutrality and International Sanctions*, 88–89.

²³⁴ Morgenthau, *The Resurrection of Neutrality in Europe*, 481.

one should be neutral and situations in which one should not be neutral is the negation of neutrality. A state cannot be partially neutral.”²³⁵

In quick steps, the Federal Council returned to traditional neutrality. Federal Councilor Giuseppe Motta publicly launched the idea in the summer of 1937. This was mirrored by the announcement of a popular initiative stating that “the well-tested unrestricted neutrality is to be reestablished, excluding Switzerland’s participation in any international compulsory measures.”²³⁶ In contrast to 1920, in 1935 the French—and Italian-speaking populations—were united with the German-Swiss population in their opposition to differential neutrality.²³⁷ In its declaration to the League in April 1938, the Federal Council stated that the return to traditional neutrality was “supported by the massive determination of the Federal Assembly and the Swiss population.”²³⁸

However, this was not entirely true. Since the Soviet Union had joined the League in 1934, the Swiss Socialists and Communists supported differential neutrality with the argument that the return to traditional neutrality would only strengthen the Fascist Axis Powers.²³⁹ Furthermore, there was a minority that had open sympathies for Italy and its actions. According to John Roos, Switzerland acted much in favor of Italy after 1936, and it was only because of pressure from the population that the government took a more neutral position.²⁴⁰

5. Summary

When William Rappard stated in 1927 that the last decade had been one of fundamental change, he probably had no idea of how much more the international system

²³⁵ Zahler, *Switzerland and the League of Nations*, 757.

²³⁶ Morgenthau, *The Resurrection of Neutrality in Europe*, 474.

²³⁷ Ross, *Neutrality and International Sanctions*, 109–110.

²³⁸ Schweizer Bundesrat, *Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Neutralität der Schweiz im Völkerbund*, (Bern: Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv, 1938), 849, <http://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc.jsp?ID=10033636> (accessed October 31, 2009). Translation by the author.

²³⁹ Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 29.

²⁴⁰ Ross, *Neutrality and International Sanctions*, 111.

would change in the years leading up to World War II. The world economic crisis, Fascism, nationalism and irredentism shaped the international agenda in the interwar period. The result was an increasingly dysfunctional and helpless League of Nations.

Soon after the successful referendum in 1920, the fragile Swiss majority for a differential neutrality in favor of collective security collapsed together with idealistic, optimistic visions and the pacifist movements. When Switzerland was called upon to express its international solidarity, it reacted as it had done for centuries. In other words, “national self-interest largely conditioned” its behavior.²⁴¹ Facing a united domestic front, the government had no choice other than to return to traditional neutrality.

In addition, differential neutrality was a classic case of the basic dilemma between theory and practice, between words and deeds. Hans Morgenthau was correct in stating that “Ingeniously contrived legal clauses, as far as they do not reflect real political decisions, can at best create the illusion of solving a political problem.” Swiss differential neutrality was exactly such a legalistic construct that failed with the first test.²⁴²

There are two key legacies from the failed League of Nations experiment and Switzerland’s return to traditional neutrality. First, collective security was now perceived as a failed concept for organizing the international system, and even more important, participation in a collective security organization seemed to pose greater risks to Switzerland than non-participation.

Second, the failure of differential neutrality was not attributed to the imperfections of the League, but to the impossibility of implementing the concept itself. This led to the fundamental rejection of any future ideas of differential neutrality. The return to integral neutrality and the lack of any alternative rhetoric, coupled with the experience of World War II, prevented the revival of differential neutrality in the debate about UN membership.²⁴³

²⁴¹ Ross, *Neutrality and International Sanctions*, 213.

²⁴² Morgenthau, *The End of Switzerland's 'Differential' Neutrality*, 560.

²⁴³ Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 175. See also the next chapter of this thesis.

E. CONCLUSION

This chapter analyzed how the Swiss people, in a historically unprecedented decision, abandoned their traditional neutrality and joined the League of Nations. This result was only possible because a visionary leadership could mobilize a politicized society with an adroit argumentation that matched the *Zeitgeist*, and that provided a solution to the “neutrality—collective security dilemma” in form of the newly invented concept of differential neutrality. The quick closure of this historic window of opportunity and, consequently, the sudden return to old positions offered evidence of the singularity of the League decision.

If the referendum of 1920 provided evidence that the Swiss people are in principle willing to sacrifice their integral neutrality, the situation in 1938 furnished proof that they are only willing to do so if there is a truly universal, unified, and strong collective security organization in place. Because the initial experiment of collective security failed, it became much more difficult to convince the public of the usefulness of the concept. The next chapter of this thesis suggests that the successful 2002 Swiss referendum on participation in the United Nations cannot serve as evidence that this view has changed significantly.

The intense debate about the future character of Swiss neutrality in relation to a collective security system had deep implications for the understanding of neutrality throughout the twentieth century. In 1920, the Federal Council and the supporters of Swiss accession to the League convinced the public that a compromise or compatibility between neutrality and collective security was possible, at least in theory. In doing so, they moved the concept of neutrality away from the legal and military core of the laws of neutrality, to the formulation of a neutrality policy and the creation of the concept of differential neutrality. Despite the failure of the concept of differential neutrality in the interwar period, the League discourse created the foundation for a flexible and Janus-like neutrality concept and enhanced the toolbox of Swiss foreign policy. However, this legacy was only revitalized after the end of the Cold War, and by avoiding the discredited name of differential neutrality. In the meantime, the failure of differential neutrality and the experiences in World War II led to a dogmatic, inflexible neutrality concept.

Finally, the findings of this chapter only partially support three basic hypotheses of this study. First, the League of Nations case study did not provide clear evidence for the hypothesis that the country joined a collective security system with the intention to compensate for the decline of the national security function of neutrality by emphasizing solidarity. In 1920, for the Swiss public, the security function of neutrality was uncontested. It appears that it was a sincere idealistic hope and belief in a new system that mobilized a majority of the Swiss people to support accession to the League. The League experience was probably the historic origin of seeing international solidarity and the security function of neutrality as complementary.

Second, the chapter reviewed some evidence that the national identity function of neutrality was an important factor in the League of Nations era.²⁴⁴ The symbolic value of neutrality for Switzerland's cohesion was stressed throughout the interwar period and reinforced by the ideological and physical threats to Switzerland during World War I, the interwar period, and during and after World War II. This is why in the case of Switzerland, the concepts of sovereignty, independence and neutrality are almost interchangeable. The failure of differential neutrality is also strong evidence for the idea that economic interests have a decisive impact on Swiss foreign policy decisions.

Third, the hypothesis that Switzerland joined the League because the security function of neutrality appeared to be in relative decline was only partially supported by the evidence reviewed in this chapter. There is strong evidence that the peace after World War I and the resulting peace euphoria were the most important factors for a successful League referendum. However, it seems that perceived threats and objective geopolitical constellations are not always in congruence and that they have different impacts on the security function of neutrality.

²⁴⁴ Because the "national identity" terminology is to a large extent a product of the 1930s, it is difficult to discuss the national identity function of neutrality in earlier periods of history. See Zimmer, *Boundary Mechanisms and Symbolic Resources*, 183ff. The chapter showed, however, that neutrality was already in 1918 linked to the Swiss concept of nationhood. Furthermore, differential neutrality provides solid evidence for the belief in a Swiss "special role."

The following chapter discusses Switzerland's relationship with the UN. Among other factors, Switzerland's initial decision not to join the new attempt to establish a functioning universal collective security organization was much influenced by the "unsatisfactory experience as a member of the League of Nations."²⁴⁵

²⁴⁵ Gunter, *Switzerland and the United Nations*, 131.

IV. SWISS NEUTRALITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS

A. INTRODUCTION

Switzerland joined the United Nations (UN) in 2002 as the 190th member state. It was fifty-seven years after this collective security organization was founded, and sixty-four years after Switzerland had returned to its traditional permanent neutrality by severing its solidarity obligations to the League of Nations. This chapter examines the domestic and international factors that help to explain Swiss accession to the UN. In doing so, it emphasizes the critical role of Swiss neutrality. The chapter focuses on two referendums, the public's rejection of joining the UN in 1986 and its consent to membership in 2002.

The Swiss–UN relationship is unique, because Switzerland was the only neutral country to stay outside the organization during the entire Cold War. A comparison of the referendums is revealing, because the “yes” vote in 2002 contrasted sharply with the massive “no” vote in 1986. The interpretation of neutrality was a major issue in both campaigns and influenced to a large extent the results. Surprisingly, public support for neutrality has remained at a consistently high level throughout the decades.²⁴⁶ Therefore, the logical conclusion is that the Swiss have changed their idea of neutrality. What, then, explains the U-turn in public opinion regarding UN membership and Swiss neutrality? To what extent was it due to external factors, such as the end of the Cold War? To what extent was it due to internal factors, such as changes in domestic politics? The answers to these questions clarify how the concept and the public perception of Swiss neutrality have evolved.

This chapter suggests that Switzerland did not join the UN until 2002 because the government was unable until then to convince the population that the self-imposed post-World War II axiom of an inflexible neutrality doctrine, which was incompatible with collective security, had slowly changed during the Cold War. The official rhetoric of

²⁴⁶ In 1989, 89 percent of the Swiss supported neutrality, in 2009, 93 percent. See Tresch and others, *Sicherheit 2009*, 122.

“neutrality and solidarity,” with a flexible neutrality policy in practice, had no impact until the fundamental changes of 1989–1991 and their consequences on Switzerland removed the mental blockade. In contrast to the League of Nations, and maybe because of the League experience, it took more than half a century to reconstruct the traditional concept of neutrality by filling it with a “new” yet old meaning—differential neutrality. This change and the successful referendum in 2002 were possible because of the relative decline of neutrality as a security provider, the revitalization of collective security in the 1990s, and, in conjunction with a general fear of isolation, a new “openness” to international cooperation. The fusion of neutrality and solidarity in the same concept, however, remains fragile in practice, because of the paramount function of neutrality in Swiss national identity. For the same reason, and because of the ineffectual character of the UN, Switzerland’s membership in the organization cannot be interpreted as a historic shift from neutrality to collective security.

Every attempt to structure the history of Swiss neutrality and its relationship to collective security organizations is to some extent arbitrary.²⁴⁷ Several factors, including world events, changes in neutrality policy, the transformation of the UN, and increasingly, the European integration movement, interacted and overlapped; and this makes it difficult to define distinct historical periods. This chapter’s analysis of the Swiss-UN relationship is nonetheless organized in four parts. The first discusses the period from 1945 to 1948, when neutrality hit a low mark. The second part discusses a phase that lasted until the mid-1960s, when neutrality regained some status during the Cold War. Two sections then analyze the referendums in 1986 and 2002 and the time period leading to these events.

B. SWISS NEUTRALITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS, 1945–1948

The events from 1945 to 1948 were crucial for Switzerland’s absence from the UN until 2002. The two referendums can only be understood with the background of four

²⁴⁷ For two examples in the literature, see Kreis, *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart*, 5; Reinhold Hohengartner, *Schweizerische Neutralität und Vereinte Nationen, 1945–1981: Die Problematik des schweizerischen UNO-Beitrittes im Spannungsfeld zwischen Bundesrat und Parlament* (Wien: VWGÖ, 1993).

decades of steady rapprochement to the UN and a gradual change in Switzerland's dogmatic neutrality concept, which, and this is the point of this section, was rooted in the immediate post-war years.

From an international political perspective, after World War II, neutrality was a dead letter. Belligerents on both sides had disregarded and badly violated, in the European theatre, the neutrality of Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Norway.²⁴⁸ The remaining neutral countries, mainly Ireland, Sweden, and Switzerland, "maintained neutrality but at the price of considerable material and political concessions to the belligerents, and most often compromising themselves in their dealings with Nazi Germany."²⁴⁹ From a narrower legal perspective, the law of neutrality in World War II completely failed. While Switzerland insisted on its traditional permanent neutrality, protected by international law, most of the other neutral countries drifted to a position of non-belligerency. The most prominent examples were the United States (until December 1941), Spain and Turkey.²⁵⁰

In 1945, Switzerland was more isolated than ever. The Allies claimed that Switzerland's neutrality had been immoral, selfish and egoistic and had only supported the Axis powers. This contrasted sharply with the Swiss public's view that they had suffered during the war and had resisted Nazi Germany in order to keep the country and its strategic territory independent.²⁵¹ The United States immediately put significant pressure on the country by blocking its financial accounts and by requesting that all German assets in Switzerland be used for reparation payments.

Because Switzerland had refused to declare war on Germany, in 1945 it "had neither the right nor the desire to attend the San Francisco gathering of anti-Axis

²⁴⁸ Argirakos, *Neutralität und Europäische Union*, 331.

²⁴⁹ Mikael af Malmberg, *Neutrality and State-Building in Sweden* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 136. Switzerland's controversial role in World War II is not discussed in this thesis. For a detailed and critical account see Mario Koenig and Bettina Zeugin, *Final Report of the Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland - Second World War* (Zürich: Pendo, 2002).

²⁵⁰ Argirakos, *Neutralität und Europäische Union*, 182–185.

²⁵¹ Bonjour, *Geschichte der Schweizerischen Neutralität*, 206–207.

belligerents, all the more since the hostilities were still in progress.”²⁵² The Federal Council, however, in April 1945 tasked a group of Swiss foreign policy experts to analyze the consequences of the San Francisco conference. The debate echoed the theoretical considerations during the League of Nations period.²⁵³ The experts concluded that the UN did not represent a true collective security system because not all members had the same standing and rights.²⁵⁴ Former advocates of the League of Nations, such as William Rappard, took an especially critical, and to some extent, defiant position. In 1946, he summarized his view, which was widely supported, by writing that the UN, in contrast to what is written in the Charter, “is not based on the principle of the ‘sovereign equality’ of its members” but is “a true international aristocracy” of the Big Five. The Swiss continued to have the will “to be subjected to no foreign masters, to take orders from no authority in which one is not represented.”²⁵⁵ Despite these counter-arguments, the commission in 1945 recommended Swiss accession to the new organization, if, and this is the key caveat, Switzerland could remain permanently neutral. This recommendation reflected the political realities and the almost unanimous support for permanent neutrality in the population.²⁵⁶

Thus, the Federal Council explored the possibility of gaining again a special status as a neutral state, similar to that defined in the League of Nations London declaration. But, the protocols from San Francisco left no doubt that the victorious Powers, and especially France and Belgium, saw permanent neutrality as incompatible with the UN Charter.²⁵⁷ This pronounced anti-neutral view persisted in the early years of the UN. In 1946, the first Secretary General, Trygve Lie, stated concerning Switzerland that

²⁵² Gunter, *Switzerland and the United Nations*, 136.

²⁵³ For details, see Hohengartner, *Schweizerische Neutralität und Vereinte Nationen*, 8–32.

²⁵⁴ This is also supported by Karsh, *Neutrality and Small States*, 115ff; and Yost, *NATO Transformed*, 17. See also Chapter II.

²⁵⁵ Rappard, *The United Nations and Switzerland*, 64, 66.

²⁵⁶ In 1946, 95 percent of the Swiss public supported neutrality. Hohengartner, *Schweizerische Neutralität und Vereinte Nationen*, 32, 35–37.

²⁵⁷ France tried to add the phrase “Sans qu’un état puisse, pour s’y soustraire, invoquer un statut de neutralité.” to the Chapter II of the Charter but this was seen as unnecessary because Article 2 was already clear enough. Taubenfeld, *International Actions and Neutrality*, 385.

“Neutrality is a word I cannot find in the Charter.”²⁵⁸ The Federal Council decided, because of this negative environment, that instead of seeking membership, Switzerland would monitor the development of the UN, accede to the technical UN sub-organizations, and facilitate the establishment and operation of UN offices in Switzerland, especially in Geneva.²⁵⁹

The academic literature agrees that this policy decision, referred to as a doctrine of “neutrality and solidarity,” dominated the Swiss–UN relationship during the Cold War. According to Daniel Möckli, this decision was driven by the absence of external coercion and the internal unwillingness to question neutrality as the *Leitmotif* of foreign policy.²⁶⁰ Carlo Moos argues that the failure of the proposal for Switzerland to join the UN in the 1986 referendum can be explained by the unassertive and isolationistic policy of the Federal Council in 1946.²⁶¹ Georg Kreis adds that Federal Councilor Max Petitpierre, Foreign Minister in 1946, supported a “maximalistic prospect of neutrality” and “invented a verbal celebration of the idea of neutrality, as it was never practiced before.”²⁶² Furthermore, the formula “neutrality and solidarity” invented the artificial differentiation between “technical” and “political” fields of cooperation with collective security organizations. This idea and the belief in a “special role” for Switzerland guided Swiss thinking for decades.²⁶³

In 1946, the Swiss government implemented the new policy in an effort to escape international isolation. In April 1946, after the official dissolution of the League, Switzerland handed over the League’s Geneva offices to the UN. The city became later

²⁵⁸ Lie quoted in Kreis, *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart*, 40.

²⁵⁹ Enzelsberger, *Die Schweiz und die UNO*, 28.

²⁶⁰ Daniel Möckli provides a very detailed study of this question. Möckli, *Neutralität, Solidarität, Sonderfall*, 283–284.

²⁶¹ Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 13. There is an academic discussion about whether 1945–1947 constituted a window of opportunity similar to that in 1920 to change Swiss foreign policy and whether the Federal Council would have been able to lead Switzerland into the United Nations. For a short overview of this, to some extent counterfactual, discussion, see Kreis, *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart*, 46–47. For a detailed literature review see Möckli, *Neutralität, Solidarität, Sonderfall*, 15–33.

²⁶² Kreis, *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart*, 40–41. Translation by the author.

²⁶³ *Ibid.*, 43.

the European seat and the humanitarian or “technical” hub for the organization. The Federal Council ensured a “tacit protection of Swiss security and neutrality apropos to the Geneva office” and “emphasized that under no circumstances would United Nations military operations be directed from Swiss territory.”²⁶⁴ Furthermore, Switzerland opened a liaison office at the UN headquarters in New York and managed in 1948 to institutionalize the status of a Permanent Observer.²⁶⁵ In addition, after a parliamentary debate, Switzerland became a member of the International Court of Justice. The country joined also several sub-agencies of the UN.²⁶⁶ Moreover, in 1946, the Washington agreement solved the German financial assets problem and normalized the relationship with the United States.²⁶⁷ Finally, after twenty-nine years of ideological hostilities, from 1917 to 1946, Switzerland entered into diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. This was a crucial step for future relations with the UN and for the credibility of Swiss neutrality.²⁶⁸

As early as in 1946, William Rappard wrote: “the Charter in fact implies no real danger to the national independence of any one of its signatories. To put it more bluntly, the freedom of the many is guaranteed by the disunity of the few, at the cost, it is true, of the security of all.”²⁶⁹ At the end of the year, the bipolar world was casting its shadows and the accuracy of Rappard’s insight would soon become evident.

C. SWISS NEUTRALITY AND THE UNITED NATIONS, 1948–1965

Several international crises, the consolidation of the Cold War, and the transformation of the UN marked the time period from 1949 to 1965. It was a time when the neutral countries and the UN recognized the limits of the new collective security system. The major powers resorted again to the time-tested tool of alliances, which was

²⁶⁴ Gunter, *Switzerland and the United Nations*, 138–139.

²⁶⁵ Later Switzerland was joined by many other observers, such as Austria, the People’s Republic of China, the Holy See, the ICRC, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany and others. *Ibid.*, 140–141.

²⁶⁶ Hohengartner, *Schweizerische Neutralität und Vereinte Nationen*, 53ff.

²⁶⁷ Möckli, *Neutralität, Solidarität, Sonderfall*, 159ff.

²⁶⁸ Bonjour, *Geschichte der Schweizerischen Neutralität*, 209–210.

²⁶⁹ Rappard, *The United Nations and Switzerland*, 68.

evidence of diminishing trust in collective security. In a complementary development, the notion of neutrality regained some of its international reputation because of the emerging bipolar system and the paralysis of the United Nations Security Council. These developments buttressed Switzerland's dogmatic neutrality policy. At the same time, however, they allowed a gradual consolidation of Switzerland's relationship with the UN, which culminated in a change of governmental policy in 1965.

As mentioned, the discord in the Security Council between the Soviet Union and the Western powers, as well as the realities of an emerging bipolar system, overrode the great powers' moral reservations concerning neutrality. Numerous references to neutrality in the Geneva Conventions in 1949, the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) after the Korean War in 1953, the imposed Austrian neutrality based on the Swiss example in 1955, the neutralization of Laos in 1965, and finally the UN membership of all neutral countries but Switzerland reflected this change.²⁷⁰

At the same time, the UN increased its universality, both in terms of membership and scope of activities. The original character of the UN changed significantly with the membership of decolonized third world countries and former enemies, such as Japan and Italy. Furthermore, the UN expanded its thematic scope and initiated a series of new programs and sub-organizations. Finally, the organization circumvented to some extent the stalemate in the Security Council and started to play a productive peacekeeping role in several conflicts.²⁷¹

An intense domestic neutrality debate accompanied the Korean War and Switzerland's contribution in the NNSC. A few members of parliament questioned the country's neutrality more than at any other time during the Cold War.²⁷² Furthermore, the advent of nuclear weapons initiated a military discussion of whether armed neutrality was

²⁷⁰ See the chapter "The Cold War and Reevaluation of Neutrality" in Hohengartner, *Schweizerische Neutralität und Vereinte Nationen*, 74ff. Translation of the title by the author. For Laos see Subedi, *Neutrality in a Changing World*, 249.

²⁷¹ Schweizer Bundesrat, *Bericht über das Verhältnis der Schweiz zu den Vereinten Nationen und ihren Spezialorganisationen für die Jahre 1972–1976* (Bern: Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv, 1977), 816, <http://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc.jsp?ID=10047078> (accessed April 18, 2009).

²⁷² Kreis, *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart*, 59.

still feasible. In addition, the Federal Council clarified that the neutrality of the state did not require the ideological neutrality of the citizens, thereby, sending a strong signal that Switzerland, in terms of politics, ideology, and economy, belonged to the West.²⁷³

The Korea crisis started also a slow process of Swiss participation in UN peace keeping activities. The concept of “active neutrality” began to spread.²⁷⁴ The Federal Council justified the Swiss NNSC engagement by stating that “Neutrality cannot be purely passive; on the contrary, it must be put at the service of peace,” and that Swiss participation was “a moral obligation.”²⁷⁵ Further examples were Switzerland’s financial, logistical, and limited personnel support for the UN missions in Suez (1956), Congo (1960) and Cyprus (1964).²⁷⁶

Austria’s accession to the UN in 1955 irritated Switzerland. How could a permanently neutral country have joined a collective security organization? The official answer was that Switzerland was an entirely different case.²⁷⁷ This not only reinforced the “special role” argument, but also supplied evidence that in a climate of commitment to a unique neutrality doctrine a different view was not possible. The experiences of the neutral countries within the UN, however, were closely monitored. The fact that neither Sweden nor Austria had a significant neutrality problem (to the contrary, both countries provided a UN Secretary General) certainly influenced Swiss public opinion in the long term.

Despite these developments, for the Swiss public, the government, and most of the elite, neutrality remained carved in stone. The ideological and inflexible approach to the concept, and the idea of Switzerland’s special role in the international system, were supported by the relative success of neutrality in this period, especially in comparison to

²⁷³ Kreis, *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart*, 63.

²⁷⁴ The term *active neutrality* was repeatedly used, especially after 1965, to make a distinction between an unbiased, isolationistic, passive neutrality, and a neutrality that allowed international solidarity. One could argue that the term replaced to some extent the phrase *differential neutrality*. *Ibid.*, 132.

²⁷⁵ Federal Council quoted in Gunter, *Switzerland and the United Nations*, 144.

²⁷⁶ For details see Hohengartner, *Schweizerische Neutralität und Vereinte Nationen*, 100ff.

²⁷⁷ Kreis, *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart*, 68–73.

Switzerland's position immediately after World War II. Therefore, the early Cold War saw a widening gap between words and deeds in Switzerland's neutrality policy, and, if viewed from a different angle, the extension of "an isolationistic neutrality conception" with "a non-isolationistic solidarity slogan," at least in the domestic perception.²⁷⁸

It was not until 1965 that the UN membership debate resumed with a parliamentary appeal. The Federal Council answered that UN membership would be "expedient." One year later, however, the Foreign Minister, Willy Spühler, declared, in a decisive turn in the official policy, that UN membership would be compatible with permanent neutrality. According to Reinhold Hohengartner, three factors led to this new approach. First, Switzerland's cooperation with the UN did not negatively impact its neutrality. Second, the same was true for the other neutral member countries. Third, in his judgment during the second half of the 1960s the "special role" argument lost some appeal.²⁷⁹ Georg Kreis attributed this policy shift to general changes in society in the mid 1960s and to a desire for reform in response to the general "malaise" in foreign policy.²⁸⁰

This policy change in 1965 led not only to the referendum in 1986, as outlined in the next section, but served as the argumentative starting point for the success in 2002.

D. THE 1986 UNITED NATIONS REFERENDUM

1. Introduction

Four developments influenced and characterized the political debate from 1965 to 1986. First, the continuing trend toward a universal UN led in Switzerland to an increasing sense of isolation. The number of UN member states rose from 117 in 1965 to 159 in 1984. The accession of East and West Germany in 1973 was psychologically important because it completed the transformation of the UN from a coalition of victors to a truly universal organization.²⁸¹ At the same time, it devalued Switzerland's Permanent Observer status. In 1966, the Foreign Minister "recognized a tendency from

²⁷⁸ Kreis, *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart*, 14,42. Translation by the author.

²⁷⁹ Hohengartner, *Schweizerische Neutralität und Vereinte Nationen*, 127,138.

²⁸⁰ Kreis, *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart*, 131,134.

²⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 142.

bilateralism outside of the United Nations to multilateral relations in the framework of the United Nations.”²⁸² In 1969, 1971, and 1977, the Federal Council outlined the evolution of the Swiss–UN relationship in three reports to the parliament.²⁸³ In the first two reports, the Federal Council still saw, based on the “special role” argument, advantages for Switzerland in remaining outside of the UN. In 1977, however, the report referred several times to the diminishing international understanding for Switzerland’s “special role” and the country’s increasing difficulties in its efforts to actively influence the work of the UN.²⁸⁴

Second, mandatory economic and political sanctions, as in the case of the Rhodesia crisis, challenged the concept of integral neutrality in practice. The Federal Council stated in 1967 that the crisis had shown that economic sanctions were still possible, despite the fact that the pertinent articles of the Charter had not been used for two decades.²⁸⁵ The Foreign Minister, Willy Spühler, stated that “politically, although not legally, Switzerland faces the same problems in the Rhodesian situation as a neutral state that is a member of the United Nations.”²⁸⁶ When the UN, from 1967 to 1981, in several steps, imposed financial, economic, and diplomatic sanctions on Rhodesia, the organization increased its pressure on Switzerland by monitoring and reporting the country’s compliance. Switzerland only partially supported the sanctions, referring to its neutrality policy and the principle of *courant normale*. The Swiss government “repeatedly emphasized the autonomous nature of its action,” initially justified by neutrality, and later, in a remarkable but not acknowledged shift, by the argument of non-membership.²⁸⁷ John Ross’ study shows that during the Rhodesian crisis “the [Swiss] government’s views of sanctions were coming in a sense full circle, approaching its

²⁸² Kreis, *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart*, 137. Translation by the author.

²⁸³ For a very detailed analysis of the reports, including the parliamentary debate in the two chambers see Hohengartner, *Schweizerische Neutralität und Vereinte Nationen*, 149–220.

²⁸⁴ The belief that the country should have a possibility, if not a right, to influence an organization, of which it was not a member, is characteristic for Switzerland’s self-perception and still visible in its relationship with the European Union. *Ibid.*, 156, 176, 203–204.

²⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 145.

²⁸⁶ Spühler quoted in Ross, *Neutrality and International Sanctions*, 159.

²⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, 161, 166.

attitude of 1919–20, that neutrality was not an absolute barrier to participation in a sanctions operation.”²⁸⁸ In 1973, a governmental commission stated that traditional Swiss neutrality “would allow to some extent Switzerland’s participation in certain mandatory sanctions of a non-military nature.”²⁸⁹

Third, Switzerland continued to develop closer ties with the UN. By 1977, it was a member of most of the United Nations technical and humanitarian sub-organizations and a major financial contributor.²⁹⁰

Finally, these developments were not followed up by a real national debate about Switzerland’s neutrality conception and its relationship with the UN. The parliament criticized all three governmental UN reports for inconsistencies between their contents, which had a positive attitude to UN membership, and their conclusions, which stated that membership “could momentarily not be proposed,” (1969) that the report should not “prejudice the question of membership,” but that “membership could be envisaged in a not too distant future,” (1971) and that membership would be “desired” (1977).²⁹¹ The parliament, however, acted no differently and argued that the Swiss public was not ready for UN membership. Indeed, this unwillingness to enter into a public discussion is strikingly supported by a media study. It shows that from 1971 to 1985, neutrality was a non-topic in the leading Swiss newspapers.²⁹²

Even after the Federal Council had expressed its desire for Switzerland to join the UN in 1977, it took nine years—a period of unusual length—until the referendum was held. In 1981, the Federal Council submitted to the Federal Assembly a proposal for the accession of Switzerland to the UN. In 1984, the Assembly approved the proposal by a

²⁸⁸ Ross, *Neutrality and International Sanctions*, 196.

²⁸⁹ Hohengartner, *Schweizerische Neutralität und Vereinte Nationen*, 193. Translation by the author.

²⁹⁰ Schweizer Bundesrat, *Bericht über das Verhältnis der Schweiz zu den Vereinten Nationen*, 920.

²⁹¹ Hohengartner, *Schweizerische Neutralität und Vereinte Nationen*, 157,178,198,208. Translation by the author.

²⁹² See the results of this study in graphic form in Kreis, *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart*, 251.

vote of 138 to 94.²⁹³ Finally, in 1986, the public overwhelmingly rejected the proposal in a referendum, with 75.7 percent voting “no” and with all 26 cantons voting against membership. The voter turnout was 50.7 percent.²⁹⁴

2. External Factors

From 1977 to 1986, no major international developments challenged the three Cold War axioms of Swiss foreign policy: neutrality, anti-communism, and economic integration without political integration in Europe.²⁹⁵ Positive developments such as détente and arms control talks were nullified by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.²⁹⁶ Daniel Möckli stated that Soviet operations in Afghanistan, the intermediate-range missile controversy, the increased rivalry between the superpowers, and the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative created “extremely unfavorable international prefixes” for the 1986 referendum.²⁹⁷

The UN itself further consolidated universal membership with the accession of twelve mainly small states between 1977 and 1986. The Security Council, however, was still in a Cold War mode, and, with hindsight, acted rather lethargically during this period. The consequence was general mistrust in the efficiency and bureaucracy of the organization.²⁹⁸ When the referendum was held in March 1986, one month after

²⁹³ Daniel Möckli, “Vor der neuen UNO-Abstimmung: Drei Erkenntnisse aus der Niederlage von 1986,” *Bulletin 2000 zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik* 7 (2000): 71, <http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=30&fileid=885CA138-B6BD-C9DD-2B46-5E64034C5946&lng=de> (accessed April 16, 2009).

²⁹⁴ Schweizer Bundesrat, *Bundesratsbeschluss über das Ergebnis der Volksabstimmung vom 16. März 1986* (Bern: Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv, 1986), <http://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc.jsp?ID=10049996> (accessed April 18, 2009).

²⁹⁵ Goetschel, Bernath and Schwarz, *Swiss Foreign Policy*, 14.

²⁹⁶ The federal council decided after the Afghanistan invasion to delay the UN referendum, see Thomas Bernauer and Sandra Lavenex, “Abschied vom Sonderfall,” *Vereinte Nationen : Zeitschrift für die Vereinten Nationen und ihre Sonderorganisationen* 48, no. 3 (2000): 90, http://www.dgvn.de/fileadmin/user_upload/PUBLIKATIONEN/Zeitschrift_VN/VN_2000/VN200003.pdf (accessed May 8, 2009).

²⁹⁷ Möckli, *Vor der neuen UNO-Abstimmung*, 80–81. Translation by the author.

²⁹⁸ For example, in 1985, the United States suspended UN payments. See *Ibid.*, 81.

Gorbachev declared the policies of *Perestroika* and *Glasnost*, and one month before the Chernobyl disaster, the world was still in a stable bipolar environment; and almost no one predicted the end of the Cold War.

Therefore, no single external factor can explain why the referendum was held in 1986 and not at another point in time. One can conclude that neither external pressure, nor massive changes in the international system required a review of Swiss foreign policy in regard to collective security, or required the Swiss to rethink or question their neutrality. On the other hand, there is much evidence that without the gradual change in the character of the UN, Swiss membership would have been out of question. In addition, the relative weakness of the collective security concept during the Cold War, the good experiences of other neutral countries as UN members, and diffuse signals about a possible Swiss isolation, paved the road to the referendum.

3. Internal Factors

Was the exact date defined by domestic factors? The evidence tends to support an answer of “no.” There were no significant shifts in domestic politics, no domestic crises, no changes in public opinion, and no adjusted neutrality discourse in the years prior to 1986. Instead, one can argue that the continuous collective security experience of the UN and the gradual reinterpretation of Switzerland’s neutrality in light of foreign policy practice led the Federal Council to conclude that the time was right for a public debate.

From 1977 to 1986, domestic politics were traditionally stable and all major parties were represented in the government. One can identify only with hindsight the emergence of green and far right parties in the late 1970s, and the growth of a so called post-materialistic society. The fact that in 1986 a small group gathered enough public support for a national vote to abolish the Swiss army indicated this change. It was a strong signal that long term taboos were increasingly attacked and publicly debated.²⁹⁹

²⁹⁹ The group “Switzerland without an Army” collected the necessary 100,000 signatures in the fall of 1986 for a public ballot about the abolishment of the army. The proposal was rejected in 1989 with 64.4 percent “no” votes.

These trends made UN membership and a unbiased discussion of Swiss neutrality more likely; however, they came too late for the referendum in 1986.

Public opinion polls during the Cold War confirmed the Federal Council's judgment that the Swiss had no strong feelings for the UN. In 1947, 57 percent of the Swiss supported UN membership only if the country's neutrality could be guaranteed. Later polls from 1967 to 1977 showed that only 32 percent to 45 percent would support this idea.³⁰⁰ From 1977 to 1986, these numbers did not significantly change.³⁰¹

Despite this negative attitude of the population, it is striking that the Federal Council never seriously launched a discussion on UN membership prior to 1981. Three factors, all of them specific inherent problems of the Swiss political system, may explain this behavior. First, in a direct democracy with a part-time parliament and a consensus based government, the executive's political will is often not strong enough to attack highly controversial issues. Second, Swiss domestic policy influences, to a large extent, foreign policy, and almost "any foreign policy question can lead to a major domestic political conflict."³⁰² Finally, and most important, the study by Georg Kreis provides evidence that the character of the neutrality discourse during the Cold War, mainly the repeated political celebration of traditional neutrality and the disconnection between the neutrality discussion and the actual neutrality policy in practice, did not allow a verbal return to differential neutrality.³⁰³ Because the neutrality concept was untouchable, the Federal Council was locked in its own 1946 argument that UN membership was incompatible with Swiss neutrality.³⁰⁴ This basic dilemma, the gap between deeds in foreign policy and words in domestic policy, was not solved prior to the 1986 referendum.

In sum, as with the external factors, no clear single domestic factor led directly to the 1986 referendum. It seems that the point in time was to some extent arbitrary. It is

³⁰⁰ Kreis, *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart*, 243.

³⁰¹ See the statistic in Bernauer and Lavenex, *Abschied vom Sonderfall*, 93.

³⁰² Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 162–163. Translation by the author.

³⁰³ Kreis, *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart*, 346–349.

³⁰⁴ For this argument see Möckli, *Vor der neuen UNO-Abstimmung*, 56ff.

certainly true that personal initiative and beliefs of individual members of the Federal Council, and members of Parliament, were important. A decisive role by a single person, however, cannot be detected.³⁰⁵ Furthermore, there is not much evidence for the argument that the 1986 referendum was intentionally launched to provoke a failure, in order to pave the way for a more successful second referendum.³⁰⁶

The widespread reluctance of the Swiss elite to support the cause of UN membership was reflected in a lukewarm “yes” campaign, which ultimately led to the failure of the referendum.

4. The “Yes” Campaign

In 1985, the supporting committee was founded under the lead of a former Federal Councilor and consisted of politicians from all major parties. It had only limited financial resources and could not attract charismatic personalities.³⁰⁷ In contrast to the opponents of the referendum, the supporters had a difficult start. First, they had to rely on a weak product. A parliamentarian, Helmut Hubacher, explained later that “there was no courage, no steam, no pressure, no bravery, no perspective, and no optimism” in the political process leading to the referendum proposal.³⁰⁸ Second, they had the burden of proof in their efforts to explain to the population why Switzerland should now join the UN after everything had gone rather well for four decades.³⁰⁹

The main arguments emphasized the utility of UN membership for Switzerland and the usefulness of the organization in general. Supporters of membership argued that a more proactive Swiss foreign policy was needed to overcome the economic integration

³⁰⁵ As always, it is difficult to measure the impact of individual persons. Although the existing body of literature offers hints as to the important role of several foreign ministers, especially Max Petitpierre and Willy Spühler, there is little specific research available. The fact that the Swiss executive is represented by a body of seven ministers does not facilitate such a task.

³⁰⁶ Statistically, there is some evidence that “second attempt” referendums have a better chance of gaining approval. However, just the fact that a question is asked twice does not necessarily influence the answer. For a list of Swiss referendums see Institut für Politikwissenschaft der Universität Bern, *Swissvotes: Abstimmungsverzeichnis*.

³⁰⁷ For details see Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 101–102.

³⁰⁸ Hubacher quoted in *Ibid.*, 46. Translation by the author.

³⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, 104.

versus political isolation dilemma.³¹⁰ In their view, UN membership would not only improve the international reputation of the country but also strengthen the UN as a whole. As a member, they argued, Switzerland could actively influence UN decisions and contribute with its longstanding humanitarian and democratic experience.

The pro-committee and the Federal Council took an ambivalent position on the neutrality question. On one hand, they declared that neutrality was not a problem. This argument was supported by long legal and technical abstracts that proved the compatibility of UN membership with Swiss permanent neutrality. On the other hand, the Federal Council explained carefully that certain developments in the international environment made it difficult to follow a traditional neutrality policy.³¹¹ The logical gap between these two explanations was, of course, not addressed. Furthermore, these rational and legalistic arguments ignored the fact that for the Swiss people, neutrality is primarily an emotional construct, which is foremost part of national identity, and only secondarily a security policy concept.³¹²

The Federal Council avoided reference to the League of Nations and the terminology of “differential neutrality.”³¹³ More importantly, despite the fact that neutrality was declared to be a minor problem for UN membership, the parliament added two articles into the referendum text that stressed the importance of neutrality. The first article required the Federal Council to prepare a “ceremonial declaration” and a note to all other UN members stating that Switzerland would remain permanently neutral. The second article stipulated that the Federal Council would highlight Swiss neutrality in its

³¹⁰ Hubacher quoted in Moos, 46. Translation by the author. 110.

³¹¹ For an example see Schweizer Bundesrat, *Botschaft über den Beitritt der Schweiz zur Organisation der Vereinten Nationen (UNO)* (Bern: Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv, 1981), 542–551, <http://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc.jsp?ID=10048583> (accessed April 18, 2009).

³¹² Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 44–45.

³¹³ *Ibid.*, 114.

accession request to the UN.³¹⁴ With such an emphasis on neutrality, opponents had an easy time asserting that neutrality seemed to be a major problem.

In sum, the UN membership supporters could not influence the masses with a weak campaign committee and a reactive and passive Federal Council. The campaign was fought with rational and honest, but legalistic and intellectual, arguments. The pro committee was unable to exploit emotional arguments, such as fear of isolation, because it did not address the consequences of further non-membership. Even this strategy, however, would have had little success, because at that time, more than 71 percent of the Swiss saw no contradiction between expressing solidarity with the international community and staying outside of the UN.³¹⁵

5. The “No” Campaign

In 1981, four years earlier than the UN supporters took organizational action, a broad committee of politicians and personalities across the political spectrum organized the “no” campaign. The stronghold of the committee was, however, in the conservative center and the political right. The co-presidents were not only well known politicians but also successful and wealthy entrepreneurs.³¹⁶

The “no” arguments concentrated on two themes. First, the UN was discredited as an ineffective and inefficient organization of the Cold War, dominated by the Security Council and a majority made up of Third World and communist countries. The “no” campaign used the League of Nations as an example of how such collective security systems have failed.³¹⁷ Second, the opponents of membership forecast the loss of neutrality and the consequent loss of national sovereignty and independence. This argument appealed to the mythological character of neutrality and to traditional fears of

³¹⁴ Schweizerische Bundesversammlung, *Bundesbeschluss über den Beitritt der Schweiz zur Organisation der Vereinten Nationen* (Bern: Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv, 1984), <http://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc.jsp?ID=10049505> (accessed April 18, 2009).

³¹⁵ Enzelsberger, *Die Schweiz und die UNO*, 30.

³¹⁶ Otto Fischer was president of the Swiss Trade and Crafts Organization and Christoph Blocher was the CEO of the EMS chemical company.

³¹⁷ Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 158.

losing Swiss sovereignty.³¹⁸ The UN membership opponents stressed the security function of neutrality, and also succeeded in linking the national identity function to the question of UN membership.

Furthermore, the opponents used a language that foreshadowed a new populist political style. They worked with simple key words, symbols, vague fears and emotions. As a result, no real dialogue or debate about the subject took place, because the rational pro-arguments and the emotional contra-arguments were disconnected.³¹⁹ The simple campaign message stated that UN accession would mean less neutrality, less independence, and less security with increased costs and more civil servants.³²⁰ The new style was also reflected in arguments not related to the UN. For example, opponents of UN membership asserted that there was a widening gap between the elite in Berne and the Swiss people. Consequently, the Federal Council was accused of being out of touch with the population. This was a powerful argument in a country where authorities are always seen with suspicion.³²¹

6. Summary

The 1986 referendum failed, to some extent, because four decades of celebrating the victory of neutrality in World War II created an environment of isolationistic self-satisfaction. In addition, a lack of leadership, in the form of a weak, defensive and reactive Federal Council, provided insufficient political leverage for the pro-committee.³²² The desire to preserve neutrality, however, was not the sole reason for the negative outcome. The lack of trust in the United Nations, financial considerations, and a general mistrust in the political establishment were also important.³²³ Finally, the lack of

³¹⁸ Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 121ff.

³¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 164.

³²⁰ *Ibid.*, 119, 121. It is striking how these basic arguments of the populist right that emerged out of the UN debate, have remained unchanged through the present, regardless of the type of the foreign policy referendum. In the case of the European Union only xenophobia is added.

³²¹ *Ibid.*, 165.

³²² *Ibid.*, 160.

³²³ Kreis, *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart*, 158.

support from the wealthy, the absence of a broad alliance of the political elite, and the inability of the pro-committee to counter the populist campaign of the opponents, were additional reasons for the “no.”

It was mentioned that no single external or internal factor triggered the UN referendum in 1986. Instead, four decades of transformation of the UN, increasingly intense Swiss relations with the organization, and a gradual change in the practical function of neutrality convinced the Federal Council that the question of UN membership could be reviewed. It is not surprising that the referendum campaign could not achieve within a few months the same mental progress in the Swiss public.

Neutrality played a decisive role in the UN discussions throughout the Cold War and the referendum debate. For various reasons, the Federal Council did not dare to question traditional neutrality.³²⁴ The consequence was that in 1986 neutrality still held mythical status in the national psyche. The government’s slow and silent change of its neutrality policy, from traditional neutrality to differential neutrality, was neither explained to the public, nor officially debated. The referendum debate provided evidence that in 1986 Swiss neutrality was attributed several meanings. For the supporters of UN membership, the concept was, once again, compatible with collective security. For the opponents, the concept still stood for the “special role” of Switzerland, and served as a guarantor of its independence.

In accordance with a Swiss domestic political rule of thumb, the UN question was a dead subject for at least a decade.

E. THE 2002 INITIATIVE AND ACCESSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS

1. Introduction

With the international changes at the end of the century, parliamentary support for UN membership reemerged in 1990, 1995, and 1997. The Federal Council answered positively to these requests, but said that the time was not “ready” for a new referendum.

³²⁴ Moos, for example, argued that the Federal Council avoided the neutrality discussion because it would have required a review of Switzerland’s role in World War II. See Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 169.

In 1998, finally, the government stated unconditionally that “a permanently neutral country has its place in the United Nations,” and the Federal Council declared in a report on the UN its desire for Switzerland to join the organization as soon as possible.³²⁵

In early 2000, an initiative³²⁶ committee for the accession of Switzerland to the UN, formed in 1998, handed over 124,772 signatures to the Federal Chancellery.³²⁷ The initiative sought to add article 24, “Switzerland joins the United Nations,” to the constitution.³²⁸ In 2001, after the parliamentary debate, the Federal Assembly recommended to the people and the cantons to accept the proposal with a vote of 189 to 44.³²⁹ In the 2002 ballot, the initiative passed with 54.6 percent “yes” votes and with 12 of 23 cantonal votes.³³⁰ The voter turnout was 57.4 percent, the highest in a decade.

According to Georg Kreis, five important steps led to a further transformation in Switzerland’s relationship to the United Nations and its neutrality policy, and consequently, to the successful initiative: the end of the Cold War from 1990 to 1993, Swiss accession to the Bretton Woods organizations in 1992, the blue-helmet referendum in 1994, the UN jubilee in 1994, and the revision of the military law in 2001.³³¹ Thomas Bernauer stated that “the change in Central and Eastern Europe, the Gulf War, the

³²⁵ Federal Council quoted in Kreis, *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart*, 176–177. Translation by the author. For the debate of whether the initiative was “ordered“ by the Federal Council, see *Ibid.*

³²⁶ A popular initiative is a specific popular right in the Swiss direct democracy. An initiative requires 100,000 valid signatures of Swiss citizens in order to propose a change to the Swiss constitution.

³²⁷ Schweizerische Bundeskanzlei, *Eidgenössische Volksinitiative für den Beitritt der Schweiz zur Organisation der Vereinten Nationen (UNO)* (Bern: Schweizerische Bundeskanzlei, 2000), 2453, <http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2000/2453.pdf> (accessed April 18, 2009).

³²⁸ Schweizer Bundesrat, *Botschaft über die Volksinitiative “Für den Beitritt der Schweiz zur Organisation der Vereinten Nationen (UNO)”* (Bern: Schweizerische Bundeskanzlei, 2000), 1186, <http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2001/1183.pdf> (accessed April 18, 2009). Translation by the author.

³²⁹ In 100 years, the Federal Council supported only five initiatives. Michel Hottelier, “L’adhésion de la Suisse à l’Organisation des Nations Unies : Aspects constitutionnels,” *Revue Française de Droit Constitutionnel* 51, no. 3 (2002): 496, http://www.cairn.info/article.php?ID_REVUE=RFDC&ID_NUM_PUBLIE=RFDC_051&ID_ARTICLE=RFDC_051_0485 (accessed 05/08/2009). For details of the parliamentary debate, see Kreis, *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart*, 178–179.

³³⁰ Schweizer Bundesrat, *Bundesratsbeschluss über das Ergebnis der Volksabstimmung vom 03. März 2002* (Bern: Schweizerische Bundeskanzlei, 2002), 3690, <http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2002/3690.pdf> (accessed April 18, 2009).

³³¹ Kreis, *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart*, 159ff.

Kosovo conflict, the wider and deeper European Union and the World War II Nazi gold controversy” led to the Swiss elite’s belief that security and welfare could only be guaranteed through closer international cooperation.³³² Whatever one adds to this list (for example, the terror attacks of 2001), one thing is evident: the period between the two UN ballots was one of fundamental change. The impact of these external and internal factors is discussed below.

2. External Factors

The end of the Cold War and the bipolar system had two consequences. First, a major obstacle to an effective collective security system was removed. Second, the practical value of neutrality further declined, not the least in the face of the unification of Europe. The continued relevance of the latter point, however, depends on the future character of the international system. In the 1990s, three developments seemed possible: the emergence of a global hegemony, a reinforced system of collective security and international integration, or a new system of a global balance of power. Chapter II has shown that, in theory, the first two possibilities would seriously challenge the concept of neutrality.

The new prospects for collective security were felt immediately. The 1990 Security Council decision regarding the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing Gulf War symbolized the new utility and unity of the UN.³³³ Furthermore, since 1990, thirty small and newly sovereign states had joined the organization, thereby further strengthening its universality. Aside from the Holy See, Switzerland remained the last country with an observer status.³³⁴

³³² Bernauer and Lavenex, *Abschied vom Sonderfall*, 89. Translation by the author.

³³³ *Ibid.*, 91

³³⁴ It was, in fact, the only country, because the Holy See represents the Catholic Church and not simply the Vatican state.

This increased geographical and ideological isolation of Switzerland was further strengthened by the European Union (EU) membership of neutral Austria, Finland, and Sweden in 1995 and the introduction of the euro in neighboring countries in 1999.³³⁵

The limited practical value of neutrality was also felt. The war in ex-Yugoslavia culminating in the Kosovo crisis in 1999 showed dramatically that neutrality did not protect Switzerland from a massive influx of refugees. Neutrality also did not protect Switzerland from transnational terrorism. In response to the terror attack on the United States in September 2001, the Swiss President, Kaspar Villiger, made clear “that there has never been and never will be neutrality where terrorism and criminal acts are concerned.”³³⁶ Finally, the fact that the UN General Assembly officially recognized Turkmenistan’s neutrality in 1996 can be interpreted as evidence that the meaning of neutrality has become largely irrelevant.³³⁷

In sum, the external factors had at least three consequences. First, the changes in the international system altered the balance between neutrality and collective security in theory and practice in favor of the UN. Second, the sanctions regime in the 1990–1991 Gulf crisis and the return of inter- and intra-state wars to the European continent in the form of the struggles in the Balkans were immediate tests for Switzerland’s international role and its neutrality policy. Third, direct external political pressure on Switzerland, increased international interdependence, and a highly visible isolation of the country led to a broad domestic discussion, as outlined in the next section, and challenged longstanding values.

³³⁵ The monetary union and the euro as a financial currency came into effect in 1999. Paper money and coins were introduced in 2002.

³³⁶ This reflects the European tendency to see terrorism foremost as a criminal problem. However, when the notion changed to “war on terror,” for the Swiss, neutrality became again an issue. Villiger quoted in UN General Assembly, *General Assembly Fifty-Seventh Session, 1st Plenary Meeting*, (New York: Official Documents System of the United Nations, 2002), 11, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/583/32/PDF/N0258332.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed March 5, 2009).

³³⁷ UN General Assembly, *Resolution 50/80: Permanent Neutrality of Turkmenistan*, (New York: Official Documents System of the United Nations, 1996), <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N96/761/23/PDF/N9676123.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed March 5, 2009).

3. Internal Factors

The government of Switzerland reacted quickly to this diplomatic revolution.³³⁸ A series of governmental reports redefined the official policy of the country. The 1990 security policy report with the title “Swiss Security Policy in Times of Changes” was followed by another report in 1999 titled “Security through Cooperation.” These titles summarize well their content and are evidence of the decline of the security function of neutrality. In 1993, a foreign policy report defined five new foreign policy aims and replaced neutrality with solidarity as the major foreign policy instrument. Although some scholars in 2001 argued critically that the relationship between security policy and neutrality, as outlined in the reports, was “ambivalent and contradictory,” it was an important intermediate step that led to the further transformation of neutrality.³³⁹

In a persistent pattern since 1945, the changes in neutrality policy were not declared as such. When the UN imposed sanctions on Iraq in 1990, Switzerland autonomously followed this action, and, thereby, for the first time in its history with collective security organizations, fully applied a differential neutrality.³⁴⁰ The Federal Council and the Foreign Ministry declared these sanctions entirely in line with “the continuous Swiss neutrality policy,” and added that the policy of *courant normale* was out of the question because this would be a “decision of fear, of cowardice.”³⁴¹

During the Kosovo crisis in 1998–1999, the situation was different from that with Iraq and Kuwait in 1990–1991 and the Swiss government showed an “inconsistent” position regarding economic sanctions, transit rights, and arms embargos. The absence of

³³⁸ “Quickly” in Switzerland is measured in years. Consensus building among all major political parties, a part time parliament, and 26 cantons takes time.

³³⁹ See for example Heiko Borchert, “Switzerland and Europe’s Security Architecture: The Rocky Road from Isolation to Cooperation,” in *Small States and Alliances*, eds. Erich Reiter and Heinz Gärtner (New York: Physica-Verlag, 2001), 170.

³⁴⁰ In contrast to 1990, Switzerland did not fully implement the League’s sanctions on Italy in 1938. In both cases, however, Switzerland retained the right to decide autonomously on participation in the sanctions imposed by a collective security organization. See Chapter III for details.

³⁴¹ Cited in Kreis, *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart*. Translation by the author.

a UN mandate for NATO's air campaign and the unilateral economic sanctions of the EU brought a new dimension and new challenges to differential neutrality.³⁴²

Switzerland further approached the UN system, and in 2000, Thomas Bernauer wrote about a "90 percent membership."³⁴³ The three newly created Geneva centers, the increased Swiss involvement in human rights and against war crimes, plus its massive foreign aid were clear signals of the implementation of the solidarity strategy.³⁴⁴ In addition, the fifty-year jubilee of the UN in 1994 was used for an important governmental public relations campaign.³⁴⁵

The public approved this new openness to the United Nations at the ballot box although the results were mixed. The Swiss refused to contribute a blue helmet battalion to the UN in 1994. In contrast, in 2001, in a revision of the military law, the population agreed to let Swiss peacekeeping forces carry arms for self-defense. This was an important signal that a slim majority supported more "openness."³⁴⁶ The participation of the Swiss Army in KFOR since 1999 and the change from a UNPROFOR type of peacekeeping to a NATO type of peace support operations influenced this change of opinion. In 1992 the public approved membership in the Bretton Woods institutions but refused to join the European Economic Area (EEA). Hence, based on the principle of economic integration without political integration, the Bilateral Agreements with the EU passed in 2000. This referendum stood for the consensus that only close cooperation with the EU could ensure the future economic prosperity of Switzerland.

The population was not only politicized by the pace of major foreign policy decisions but it had to live through several crises that challenged traditional perceptions. The first crisis was the Nazi gold debate.³⁴⁷ In 1996, certain groups in the United States accused Switzerland and its banks, using the rhetoric of 1945, of profiting from dormant

³⁴² Kreis, *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart*. 226–228. Translation by the author.

³⁴³ Bernauer and Lavenex, *Abschied vom Sonderfall*, 89.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 91–92.

³⁴⁵ Kreis, *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart*, 172ff.

³⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 175–177.

³⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 234ff.

accounts of Holocaust victims. The discussion until 2002 challenged the Swiss perception of its role in World War II and put the moral aspect of Swiss neutrality into question and into a new perspective. Georg Kreis makes a significant observation by stating that the calm public reaction to the final report in 2002 showed that neutrality had lost some of its general importance.³⁴⁸ Another crisis was the so called “Swissair Grounding” in 2001. It was an example of how a national symbol broke down, and it showed the limits of an autonomous airline within the advance of global capitalism and the unification of the European continent. Although the literature does not discuss this aspect, the author can confirm from personal experience that this crisis significantly challenged the self-perception of the Swiss. It contributed to the insight that the “special role” Switzerland was not that special anymore.

In sum, in contrast to 1986, a series of internal and external factors led to a dynamic change and adjustment of Swiss foreign policy. The population was not only directly affected by those events but also expressed its opinion on the country’s future foreign policy course in several referendums. The 2002 UN ballot needs to be evaluated with this dynamic background in mind.

4. The “Yes” Campaign

In contrast with the situation in 1986, the pro-committee could rely on broad support from the Swiss elite. One hundred thirty seven of 155 organizations supported the initiative, including all major political parties with the exception of the Swiss People’s Party and the tiny Evangelic People’s Party.³⁴⁹ More importantly, the country’s economic elite now fully supported the campaign.³⁵⁰

The main arguments of the pro-campaign were similar to those used in 1986. But, there were some differences. First, the argument that full membership would be a logical final step that would not change the Swiss-UN relationship beyond the fact that the

³⁴⁸ Kreis, *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart*, 239.

³⁴⁹ Enzelsberger, *Die Schweiz und die UNO*, 36.

³⁵⁰ For details, see Ueli Forster, “Stabilität ist Voraussetzung für Erfolg,” *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* 26 (February 1, 2002): 15.

country would now have a say was now more convincing. Second, there was a new emphasis on the fact that the UN created security. This argument was supported by military actions in the Balkans and elsewhere. Third, the argument that the UN had changed was more credible. Fourth, the terrorism argument was a new and convincing proof that worldwide interdependence did not stop at the Swiss border.³⁵¹ Fifth, due to the support of the wealthy, economic arguments were more important than in 1986, and the implied message was that further isolation would hurt the Swiss economy.³⁵²

Neutrality was again an important part of the argumentation, although not decisive for the outcome of the ballot. In the official ballot brochure, the Federal Council printed the draft letter to the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, with the Swiss accession request. The letter declared, in well chosen words, that the Federal Council and the Federal Assembly had been tasked by the Swiss people and the cantons to protect the confederation and its neutral status.³⁵³ A second sentence was copied from the 1996 UN General Assembly declaration regarding the permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan. It stated further that “The United Nations recognizes that the neutrality of a Member State does not affect the fulfillment of its obligations under the Charter and contributes to the achievement of the purposes of the United Nations.”³⁵⁴ The parliamentary debate was evidence that the practical implications of neutrality were no longer in the forefront. Instead, neutrality was openly declared as a national mythos and Switzerland could carry this mythos into the UN, as other nations did with theirs.³⁵⁵

³⁵¹ Schweizer Bundesrat, *Volksabstimmung vom 3. März 2002: Erläuterungen des Bundesrates* (Bern: Schweizerische Bundeskanzlei, 2002), http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/va/20020303/explic/uno1_24D.pdf (accessed April 18, 2009).

³⁵² Michèle Roth, “Volksmehr und Ständemehr,” *Vereinte Nationen: Zeitschrift für die Vereinten Nationen und ihre Sonderorganisationen* 50, no. 3 (2002): 122, http://www.dgvn.de/fileadmin/user_upload/PUBLIKATIONEN/Zeitschrift_VN/VN_2002/VN_3_2002.pdf (accessed May 8, 2009).

³⁵³ Schweizer Bundesrat, *Volksabstimmung vom 3. März 2002: Erläuterungen des Bundesrates*.

³⁵⁴ UN General Assembly, *General Assembly Fifty-Sixth Session, Application of the Swiss Confederation for Admission to Membership in the United Nations*, (New York: Official Documents System of the United Nations, 2002), <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/487/22/PDF/N0248722.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed March 5, 2009). See also UN General Assembly, *Resolution 50/80: Permanent Neutrality of Turkmenistan*.

³⁵⁵ Kreis, *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart*, 179.

Although the pro-campaign was to a large extent positive and rational, the post-ballot analysis shows a different picture. The main reasons for the “yes” vote were “fear of political isolation,” and the judgment that a Switzerland that “stands aside is no longer feasible.” Furthermore, the “yes” voters were concerned about the image of Switzerland.³⁵⁶ It is not difficult to conclude that these voters had been influenced by the external and internal events described in the previous sections.

5. The “No” Campaign

The contra-committee was predominantly the same as in 1986. It was composed of the AUNS³⁵⁷ and personalities of the Swiss People’s Party. The campaign was again fought in the style of the new tradition of the populist right.

Neutrality was the main argument for opposing UN accession and the main campaign poster showed an ax destroying the word neutrality.³⁵⁸ The arguments were the same as in 1986, although many of them were weakened by the new geopolitical situation and the new strength of the UN.³⁵⁹ In contrast to 1986, the pro-committee was far better prepared to counter the neutrality argument. Its members pointed to the fact that for a decade Switzerland had used differential neutrality in cases where the world was united against a belligerent. In contrast to 1986, when the burden of proof was on the proponents of UN membership, the opposition now faced this challenge.

³⁵⁶ Hans Hirter and Wolf Linder, “Analyse der eidgenössischen Abstimmungen vom 3. März 2002,” *VOX Analysen der eidgenössischen Urnengänge* (Bern: Institut für Politikwissenschaften, Universität Bern, 2002), <http://www.politrends.ch/abstimmungen/abstimmungsanalysen/vox-analysen/020303d.html> (accessed April 16, 2009). Translation by the author.

³⁵⁷ The “Campaign for an independent and neutral Switzerland – Aktion für eine unabhängige und neutrale Schweiz” was founded out of the 1986 UN referendum committee and is the backbone of the populist right-wing Swiss People’s Party. Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 121.

³⁵⁸ Kreis, *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart*, 181.

³⁵⁹ For a detailed list of arguments see Roth, *Volksmehr und Ständemehr*, 122–123.

A new argument portrayed UN membership as a first step to NATO and EU membership. But, this argument did not work well. The public support for Swiss membership in NATO's Partnership for Peace, Swiss participation in NATO-led peace support operations, and the bilateral agreements with the EU showed that the population was able to differentiate between the different degrees of integration into the UN, NATO and the EU.

6. Summary

The referendum was successful because, in comparison to 1986, the campaigns had essentially swapped starting positions in 2002. The supporters of UN membership could rely on a broad alliance and were assisted by a pro-active and united Federal Council. Because the "yes" committee was better prepared to counter the emotional neutrality argument, it could diffuse the claim that UN accession threatened national identity and sovereignty.

In addition, opponents failed to transform the UN question into an elite versus population debate. As a consequence, the outcome showed the traditional cleavages between rural and urban areas and between the German and French speaking parts of Switzerland.³⁶⁰ This pattern was similar to the League of Nations ballot in 1920 and furnished evidence that all political forces have to be united in order to outvote the traditional, isolationistic German speaking cantons.³⁶¹

While the campaign can explain the close victory, it cannot explain why even one third of the AUNS members who voted against UN membership in 1986 were in favor of the UN in 2002.³⁶² In public polls, support for the UN in the 1980s was between 30 percent and 40 percent, climbing steeply to 50 percent in 1991 and dropping back to 40 percent in the mid-1990s before finally rising up to 60 percent in 1999.³⁶³

³⁶⁰ Roth, *Volksmehr und Ständemehr*, 123.

³⁶¹ There is no space to discuss the complex underlying political cleavages in Swiss politics.

³⁶² *Ibid.*, 123.

³⁶³ Bernauer and Lavenex, *Abschied vom Sonderfall*, 93.

While in 1986, 54 percent of the Swiss saw neutrality as a major obstacle to UN membership, this view was only shared by 28 percent in 2002.³⁶⁴ This is more or less the difference that led to a “yes” majority.

This chapter suggests that the 30 percent shift across the public, viewing neutrality as compatible with collective security, was influenced by the outlined external and internal changes. A decade of a pragmatic neutrality policy in conjunction with the demystification of the concept allowed this change of perception. Additional reasons for the successful referendum were a general belief that change was good and a relaxed handling of Switzerland’s “special role” image.³⁶⁵

F. CONCLUSION

Carlo Moos mentioned in his comparative study that the different outcomes of the 1920 League of Nations referendum and the 1986 UN referendum cannot be explained by analyzing the pro and contra arguments, because they were not fundamentally different. Instead, the character of the campaigns, the personalities involved and the historic context led to the different outcomes.³⁶⁶ This thesis draws a similar conclusion for the 1986 and 2002 referendums.

The 2002 initiative passed because a united political and economic elite supported it. Moreover, a good quarter of the population gradually changed its mind in the decade following the end of the Cold War. Although a causal link is difficult to prove, it is safe to argue that events such as 9/11, the collapse of Swissair, and the Kosovo war showed the limits of Swiss autonomy, not only for the academic elite, but also to a large portion of the Swiss people. In 1986, isolation was only a theoretical argument, but by 2002 it had turned into a real concern that provided additional “yes” votes.

Neutrality was a central argument in both campaigns. Because a decline of popular support for neutrality cannot be observed, only a change in the population’s

³⁶⁴ Hirter and Linder, *Analyse der eidgenössischen Abstimmungen vom 3. März 2002*.

³⁶⁵ Kreis, *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart*, 184–186.

³⁶⁶ Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 10.

understanding of neutrality can explain the difference between 1986 and 2002. This thesis argues that when the security function of neutrality declined, the second function—solidarity—was used to reconstruct the myth of neutrality. The chapter showed, however, that because of governmental policy and rhetoric after 1946, it took half a century, and external changes and pressures after the end of the Cold War, to convince the Swiss people that the solidarity part of neutrality would be consistent with membership in the UN. The fact that the UN officially declared neutrality compatible with collective security facilitated this process.

A basic debate about Swiss neutrality and its replacement by solidarity was often recommended by the academic world.³⁶⁷ However, neither the Federal Council nor the political elite was willing to question a political ideal that had a 90 percent acceptance in the population. Even a verbal return to differential neutrality was impossible. Only external events and day-by-day experiences changed the public perception of neutrality to a degree that it resembled differential neutrality without so naming it. Swiss UN membership is, therefore, once again, an expression of the pragmatic compatibility of neutrality and solidarity.

Swiss membership in the UN in 2002 supports the hypothesis that the country is only willing to join a collective security organization if there are hopes that the system works in practice. There is little evidence, however, of a sincere belief that the collective security arrangements of the UN would significantly increase Swiss security.

This chapter provided mixed evidence for the idea that the absence of an external threat was the main trigger for the decline of the security function of neutrality and led, therefore, to the positive outcomes of the referendum. Although this claim sounds logical because of the end of the Cold War, it is difficult to discover causal links between the public perception of neutrality, external threats and the need to join a collective security organization by analyzing the two referendums.

Finally, the national identity function of neutrality was reinforced during the Cold War. One can argue, however, that neutrality as a whole has lost some value in reference

³⁶⁷ For the replacement argument, see Moos, *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO*, 176.

to the two other national identity pillars, federalism and direct democracy. Furthermore, one can observe that the debate about neutrality shifted away from the UN and security policy to the question of further European integration.³⁶⁸

³⁶⁸ Although the decreased importance of neutrality was shown in this chapter, there was no possibility to discuss the other factors. See also Chapter V.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

V. CONCLUSION

A. DISCONTINUITIES AND CONTINUITIES FROM 1920 TO 2002

This thesis examined two collective security systems and almost one hundred years of Swiss neutrality. The twentieth century saw an unprecedented level of economic, social, technological, ideological, and geopolitical change from the fundamentals of the international system from 1618 until 1918. Therefore, each of the five analyzed events—Switzerland’s decision to join the League of Nations in 1920, the return to traditional neutrality in 1938, the refusal to join the United Nations (UN) in 1945, the repetition of this refusal in 1986, and the positive UN referendum in 2002—occurred in a unique international and domestic setting. Hence, absolute conclusions about historical continuities are always simplifications and should be considered with caution. Indeed, one can see many differences in the external and internal factors that influenced the Swiss relationship with the League and the UN, as well as the different referendum campaigns. On the other hand, this work identified some long term trends in the relationship between Swiss neutrality and collective security that will probably continue to influence Switzerland’s international behavior. The rhetorical celebration of stability and continuity, which is part of the constant self-assurance of Swiss national identity, should, however, not be confused with continuity of Swiss policy in reality.

Two external factors—the changes in the international system, and the character of the League and the UN—determined the Swiss position on collective security. Joseph Kruzel summarized the relationship of the international system and neutrality:

Over the past two centuries neutrality has thus adapted and survived through three very different types of international systems—the classical balance of power system before World War I, the collective security effort of the interwar years, and the bipolar system of the post—World War II era. Of these three systems, only the first was theoretically receptive to the posture of neutrality.³⁶⁹

³⁶⁹ Kruzel and Haltzel, *Between the Blocs*, 297.

The fourth type, the post-Cold War system, did not change this argument. In other words, the creation of the League after World War I was a major break with the past. In 1920, the Swiss were exposed to a completely new attempt to organize the international realm, while in 1946, the UN represented only another variation of the same idea. Efraim Karsh explained these different starting positions of the two organizations and their impact on neutrality as follows: “While the participation of the small neutrals in the League was a result of their high hopes for the principle of collective security, their membership in the UN reflects a keen recognition of the operative inapplicability of the concept.”³⁷⁰ Even if viewed from a more idealistic position, it was only in the 1920s, in 1945–1946, and again in the 1990s, that there were prospects that a universal collective security organization could work. This study showed that Switzerland reacted twice, although in 2002 with a time lag, to these historic external opportunities by joining the League and the UN. Chapter IV argued that the Swiss did not use the historic window in 1945–1946 mainly for domestic reasons. Furthermore, in 1986, the stable international environment did not support a significant change in Swiss policy.

This work showed that neutrality and collective security were, in contrast to conventional wisdom, not mutually exclusive concepts. Chapters III and IV reviewed evidence that neither the League nor the UN could fully resist neutrality in the long term. John Ross summarized this argument:

There has been in fact a striking historical parallel between the League and UN systems: both appeared to eliminate the traditional régime of neutrality by undermining its basic premises, yet in subsequent practice, they have allowed for a reassertion of neutrality.³⁷¹

Hence, there was never enough international pressure, or commitment, to force Switzerland to abandon its neutrality, or to ban the concept of neutrality from international law and the international system.

In addition to neutrality and the external factors listed above, three internal factors—the institutional character of the Swiss political system, the domestic perception of the

³⁷⁰ Karsh, *Neutrality and Small States*, 116.

³⁷¹ Ross, *Neutrality and International Sanctions*, ix.

international role of Switzerland, and the dynamics of the referendum campaigns—further determined the Swiss position towards collective security. The basic characteristics of the Swiss political system, as outlined in Chapter II, remained essentially unchanged since 1874.³⁷² The consensus-based Swiss political system reacted patiently, prudently, and conservatively to external changes. The domestic political discourse contrasted with a pragmatic, realistic foreign policy. Long term trends, such as the increased role of the people and the parliament in foreign policy, and the new populist political style of the conservative right, only reinforced this mechanism. These factors explain Switzerland's reluctance to adjust the traditional maxims of foreign policy, such as neutrality and independence. The country's unusually long journey to UN membership was evidence of these exceptional domestic factors. In contrast, as showed in Chapter III, the quick decision to join the League of Nations was an extraordinary and singular event in modern Swiss history.

Furthermore, this thesis reviewed ample evidence for the solid Swiss belief in a special role and an international mission for their country. No serious domestic political movements challenged this role perception. Any external criticism was regarded as unfair and answered by a self-induced isolation. Chapter IV described how this mechanism influenced the Swiss UN membership decision in 1946. In addition, the idea of a special role contributed substantially to Switzerland's active foreign policy and its repeated expressions of international solidarity.

Finally, the dynamics of referendum campaigns in general, and those on foreign policy decisions in particular, made the results at the ballot box to some degree unpredictable and random. Chapters III and IV described the major continuity in the arguments of the referendums for and against Swiss participation in a collective security organization. The political style, however, had significantly changed in the 1980s with the emergence of the populist right, which persisted in the 2002 referendum. These chapters showed, therefore, that the content and the style of the debate were not able to explain the different outcomes. More important were the amount of governmental effort,

³⁷² In 1874, the original Swiss federal constitution of 1848 was entirely revised.

the level of leadership, and the general commitment. It is evident from the analysis of the 1920, 1986 and 2002 referendums that only firm and broad support by the Swiss elite allowed significant changes in foreign policy. In addition, this study presented some evidence that the public was more guided by visible signs of international isolation, and the general trust or mistrust in the government, than by the specific contents of the referendum debates. It seems, and this judgment is supported by the outcomes of the 1920 and 2002 referendums, that only a politicized public was receptive to changes in foreign policy, and consequently more supportive of membership in a collective security organization.

Neutrality was the single most important factor that determined the Swiss relationship with the League and the UN. The concept, however, was a moving target for analysis, because it not only significantly influenced Swiss foreign policy, but was also exposed to all the external and internal factors discussed in this study. The role of neutrality for Swiss national identity, the changing functions of neutrality, and the gap between words and deeds (national neutrality rhetoric and neutrality in practice) were the three aspects that explained most of Switzerland's behavior.

Switzerland's belief in neutrality and the repeated rhetorical celebration of the concept were the major continuities in the last two centuries of Swiss foreign policy. Neutrality was at no point seriously challenged and the question of neutrality *or* collective security was asked only in academic circles. Instead, in 1920, 1946, 1986 and 2002, the Swiss sought an official acceptance of neutrality by the collective security organization. Membership became a real option only if Swiss neutrality was officially or unofficially accepted in some form. Furthermore, the acceptance of differential neutrality by a majority of the public was a necessary condition for a successful referendum. Although neutrality was not the single decisive factor in the referendum outcomes, the thesis showed that membership in a collective security organization with an abandonment of neutrality would have been impossible.³⁷³

³⁷³ This seems at least to be the official consensus of the Swiss elite. Because the question was never asked, however, it is difficult to prove this point.

David Brackett wrote in 1997 that “A new neutrality policy, which could be accurately termed *circumstantial neutrality*, will allow Switzerland the latitude to participate internationally where it can make a difference, selecting its issues and international relations à la carte.”³⁷⁴ This statement accurately describes Swiss neutrality. This policy, however, was not new; it was conducted in practice since 1920, sometimes with more and sometimes with less flexibility. In doing so, Switzerland followed a foreign policy course that can largely be explained by national interests. Chapter III showed that the invention of differential neutrality provided the instrument and the rationale for such a policy in a time of collective security systems. Furthermore, the degree of Switzerland’s differential neutrality was approximately proportional to the strengths of collective security in the international system. This thesis argued that it was the League experience from 1920 to 1945 that convinced the Swiss of an ostensible paradox. On one side, neutrality could coexist with collective security; on the other side, neutrality guaranteed Switzerland’s independence and security more effectively than an imperfect collective security organization. Since then, neutrality and solidarity have been linked in foreign policy practice.

Chapter IV showed how the experiences in 1938 and the impact of World War II reinforced the general consensus after 1946, neither to discuss the return to differential neutrality, nor to question the status of neutrality in official rhetoric. As a consequence, the gap between the public perception of neutrality and the realities of foreign policy gradually increased. It took four decades to reconstruct the term traditional neutrality in such a way that it encompassed differential neutrality. When in 2002 the public recognized differential neutrality again as a possible option, UN membership was accepted. Chapter IV showed, however, that this change of opinion was not due so much to the merit of the case presented by the government, as to the changed international security environment in the 1990s.

One has to conclude that the Swiss did not embrace the logic of collective security, despite the two successful referendums in 1920 and 2002. The country

³⁷⁴ Brackett, *International Relations à la Carte*.

supported collective security efforts only if there was no other choice. As soon as the collective security organization showed weaknesses, or when the gap between the neutrality discourse and the collective security activities became too evident, the Swiss returned to a narrow interpretation of neutrality.

This thesis followed the changes in the three neutrality functions—security, solidarity, and identity. The security function of neutrality sharply declined in the Cold War and even more in the 1990s. This, however, was not because of the UN, or because of the incompatibilities of neutrality with collective security, but rather because of the long peace in Europe, the successful European integration movement, and the absence of major interstate wars. Furthermore, there were signs that the public differentiated between the *potential* security function of neutrality and the *current* security function. Indeed, the public probably perceives neutrality as “a safety belt in the case of collective security failures.”³⁷⁵ Furthermore, one can make the argument that the Swiss, perhaps in contrast to the modern security establishment and the academic world, make a quantitative and qualitative distinction between current threats, such as terrorism, and existential threats, such as a possible invasion by a neighboring country. There is a little discussed psychological difference between declaring neutrality as “irrelevant,” or seeing the concept as “temporarily not necessary.”

In sum, this study could not fully confirm the initial hypothesis that Switzerland joined the League and the UN at times when the security function of neutrality appeared to be in relative decline. It is true that the absence of a direct external threat made the pursuit of differential neutrality more feasible, and therefore, membership in a collective security organization more likely. It is; however, wrong to assume that the Swiss joined a collective security organization in order to compensate for decreased security provided by neutrality. Furthermore, the public perception of the security function of neutrality did not necessarily mirror the real value of neutrality as a security strategy.³⁷⁶ In addition, neutrality was perceived as a concept against interstate wars. It seems that the Swiss

³⁷⁵ Goetschel, *Neutrality, a really Dead Concept?*, 115.

³⁷⁶ Neutrality has of course the basic problem that its ultimate success or failure can only be verified during times of war.

public is not prepared to abandon the idea that inter-state war threats could arise. Moreover, it does not accept new threats (such as terrorism) as equal in significance. These factors have to be taken into account when analyzing the modern role of the security function of neutrality.

The Swiss have constantly emphasized the solidarity function of neutrality. As outlined in Chapter II, solidarity is an inherent part of neutrality. Its purpose is to convince the international community of the sincerity of the commitment to neutrality. It compensates for the moral deficiencies of neutrality, and it strengthens the rule of law in the international realm. The missionary belief in the country's role as an international example was another reason for the constant high public support for the solidarity function. The link between neutrality and national identity prevented political attempts to challenge this belief. This thesis argued that Switzerland joined the League and the UN to express solidarity and thereby strengthen its neutrality and position in the international system. Chapters III and IV outlined the major Swiss efforts to escape international isolation by expressing solidarity in multilateral and bilateral forums. The abstinence from the UN, however, was the best evidence that the strategy was not "solidarity or neutrality" but "solidarity with neutrality." The Swiss refused to join the UN as long as they believed that the organization would not accept this idea. Nevertheless, solidarity was expressed in different forms and the country became a major UN contributor. In addition, this study proposes that the provision of good offices is too narrow a definition of the solidarity function. Solidarity as a part of neutrality should be seen in a broader context. In sum, solidarity is linked to neutrality in theory and practice. Even if it is true that solidarity compensated for the decline of the security function of neutrality, this thesis showed that one needs to be careful to interpret these Swiss efforts as a genuine sign of support for the solidarity principle of a collective security organization.

The national identity function of Swiss neutrality was the most challenging one to analyze. It was evident that neutrality played a major role for Swiss national identity and was intertwined with the other identity pillars—independence, direct democracy, and federalism. This study showed that the national identity function massively influenced the public neutrality discourse, and furthermore, that the domestic discussion was often

disconnected from neutrality policy in practice. Most authors claimed that the national identity function of neutrality originated in World War II. The concept became ingrained in Swiss minds due to the totemic role of neutrality in domestic rhetoric during the Cold War. Chapter III provided some evidence, however, that the neutrality discourse in the interwar period was not that different from the post-World War II debate. Neutrality was always seen as something more than just a simple security policy instrument. In any case, whether the national identity function was called as such or whether this function was publicly highly supported or not, the outcome was similar. The national identity function prevented neutrality from being neglected or abandoned. Indeed, it increased the influence of domestic politics in foreign policy, and it allowed the temporal disconnection of the neutrality discourse from international reality. However, the national identity function did not necessarily prevent Switzerland from joining a collective security organization. The strong influence of national identity aspects on Swiss policy makes questionable the underlying hope of certain observers that Switzerland will become a “normal” state in Europe, once neutrality is reduced to its technical security policy core and thereby becomes insignificant in theory and practice.

B. SWISS NEUTRALITY, TODAY AND TOMORROW

Neutrality and collective security are complementary concepts; the more there is of the one, the less there is of the other.

—Hersch Lauterpacht, 1936³⁷⁷

Lauterpacht’s statement was the basic assumption of this work. In contrast to other writers, this thesis investigated the hypothesis that neutrality is not dead because collective security is far from being operational in the Wilsonian sense. From a wider historical perspective, the ambivalent relationship between neutrality and the collective security organizations of the twentieth century is only a symptom of a larger evolution of the international system. Neutrality was born out of the decline of the Holy Roman Empire and the new imperative of the sovereign national state after the Peace of Westphalia amid the rise of the five great powers in Europe. Therefore, only the end of

³⁷⁷ Lauterpacht quoted in Morgenthau, *The Resurrection of Neutrality in Europe*, 478.

this state sovereignty will finally remove neutrality from the landscape. Thus, neutrality remains a possible strategy for small states in Europe as long as there is not a new empire, or a United States of Europe, or a powerful collective security organization that holds the global monopoly of legitimate violence, or finally, world peace.

This conclusion ends by providing some thoughts about the current status of Swiss neutrality, taking into account developments since 2002. Furthermore, it outlines the influencing factors for future collective security referendums. Finally, it offers some ideas for further work on Swiss neutrality and collective security.

It seems that since 2002 the Swiss have reacted traditionally to the long-standing reality of unilaterally declared wars, a further weakening of the UN, a decline in respect for international law, a decreased value of state sovereignty, a world financial crisis, and an increased external pressure of the great powers on Switzerland. There are clear signals from the public that sovereignty, independence, and neutrality are highly valued and that in times of crisis the population searches for mental stability in the traditional past. The consequences are an isolationistic tendency and a revival of traditional neutrality policy. The basic struggle between domestic neutrality rhetoric and foreign policy practice continues. The current understanding of neutrality, in the form of differential neutrality, is bound to relative peace. Swiss solidarity with collective security will decrease as soon as there is again a need for the security function of neutrality. While collective security is now compatible with neutrality, collective defense is not. There is no way to overcome this dilemma, and there is little hope that the political elite will initiate the deconstruction of neutrality in the future. Therefore, the Swiss government is once again challenged to find a way out of this isolation. Only the future will tell if the end of this process will be comparable to post-World War II, or to the 1930s, or not comparable at all.

In addition, there are recent claims that Switzerland is overstrained with the fast changing international environment and the massive external pressure especially in the realms of economics and society. One may challenge this assumption, but it is true that historically the country has not received external pressure well, and always defined itself against the risk of external pressure. Today, the major external factor for Switzerland is not the United States or the United Nations; it is the European Union. If the European

Union wishes to incorporate Switzerland, or to impose its norms upon the country, it better not do it with the methods of a great power or an empire. The EU would, thereby, put Swiss domestic stability at risk. In 1815, the great powers realized that this would not be in the interest of Europe. In this sense, for the freedom and benefit of all, and once more in history, Switzerland has to be granted some sort of special status.

Although it is difficult to generalize about Swiss collective security referendums, this study concluded that several preconditions support a positive outcome. First, only fundamental and highly visible changes in the international environment mobilize Swiss citizens, and provide the leverage for major changes in foreign policy. Second, only a united Swiss elite and strong governmental leadership can successfully exploit such an historic window of opportunity. Third, a direct attack on neutrality, or a negation of its role for national identity, or an attempt to undermine neutrality in favor of solidarity, is a recipe for failure. Rational discussion about the compatibility of neutrality with collective security ignores the national identity function of the concept, and furthermore, ignores the fact that neutrality can still serve as a flexible instrument in international relations. Fourth, it remains unclear and questionable whether massive external pressure, immediate security threats, or an economic decline would have the potential to trigger public opinion in favor of collective security or a military alliance.

This thesis could not address in detail several factors that are relevant for a deeper understanding of Swiss neutrality, Swiss foreign policy, the interactions between external and internal factors, and the outcomes of referendums. First, the EU increasingly acts as a unique type of collective security organization. It is no coincidence that the Swiss neutrality debate shifted recently from the UN to the EU. In addition to the League and the UN, a similar analysis of the case of the EU would be helpful. Second, this study showed that the national identity role of neutrality was difficult to quantify in magnitude and over time. A better understanding of the concept of national identity and the relationships among independence, federalism, direct democracy and neutrality would be important in order to justify or explain the variable ranking of these four pillars and the relative decline of neutrality at certain historical junctures. Third, this work probably did not place enough emphasis on the influence of economic factors. While the economic

aspects of neutrality and the dilemmas associated with sanctions are well known, there is a lack of understanding about the degree to which people are willing to sacrifice economic prosperity in exchange for independence, sovereignty, and neutrality. Finally, explanations of how external and internal factors affect public opinion, especially during referendums, are still insufficient. In this context, a study about the relationships among external objective threats to a country, the threats perceived by the people, and the rise or decline of the security function of neutrality could offer valuable insights. These are some of the reasons why neutrality continues to deserve academic attention.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

LIST OF REFERENCES

- Argirakos, Dimitrios. *Neutralität und Europäische Union im 21. Jahrhundert*.
Düsseldorfer Rechtswissenschaftliche Schriften 33. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2005.
- Bairoch, Paul. "La Suisse dans le contexte international aux XIXe et XXe siècles." In *La Suisse dans l'économie mondiale (15e–20e s.)*, edited by Paul Bairoch and Martin Körner, 102–140. Zürich: Chronos Verlag, 1990.
- Bernauer, Thomas and Sandra Lavenex. "Abschied vom Sonderfall." *Vereinte Nationen : Zeitschrift für die Vereinten Nationen und ihre Sonderorganisationen* 48, no. 3 (2000): 89–94, http://www.dgvn.de/fileadmin/user_upload/PUBLIKATIONEN/Zeitschrift_VN/VN_2000/VN200003.pdf (accessed May 8, 2009).
- Bonjour, Edgar. *Geschichte der Schweizerischen Neutralität: Kurzfassung*. Basel: Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1978.
- Borchert, Heiko. "Switzerland and Europe's Security Architecture: The Rocky Road from Isolation to Cooperation." In *Small States and Alliances*, edited by Erich Reiter and Heinz Gärtner, 161–182. New York: Physica-Verlag, 2001.
- Brackett, David S. "International Relations à la Carte: A New Swiss Neutrality in Europe." *WCFIA Working Paper 4*, (1997), Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, http://www.wcfia.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/WCFIA_97-04.pdf (accessed January 23, 2009).
- Brooks, Robert C. "Swiss Referendum on the League of Nations." *The American Political Science Review* 14, no. 3 (August 1920): 477–480, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1946268> (accessed April 16, 2009).
- Carafano, James D. "The Death of Neutrality: U.S. and European Convergence in Fighting the War on Terrorism." *Heritage Lectures* no. 956 (2006), http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/upload/hl_956.pdf (accessed May 25, 2009).
- Choices for the 21st Century Education Program. *Wilson's vision and the League of Nations debate*. Providence: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute of International Studies, Brown University, 2004.
- Devine, Karen. "Stretching the IR Theoretical Spectrum on Irish Neutrality: A Critical Social Constructivist Framework." *International Political Science Review* 29, no. 4 (September 2008): 461–488 (accessed January 23, 2009).
- . "The Myth of 'the Myth of Irish Neutrality': Deconstructing Concepts of Irish Neutrality using International Relations Theories." *Irish Studies in International Affairs* 17, (2006): 115–139, <http://www.ria.ie/cgi-bin/ria/papers/100572.pdf> (accessed January 23, 2009).
- Doherty, Roisin. *Ireland, Neutrality and European Security Integration*. Burlington: Ashgate Pub Ltd, 2002.

- Enzelsberger, Ernst F. "Die Schweiz und die UNO." In *Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2001*, edited by Erich Reiter, 25–37. Hamburg: Mittler & Sohn, 2001, http://www.bmlv.gv.at/pdf_pool/publikationen/03_jb01_50_enz.pdf (accessed April 25, 2009).
- Forster, Ueli. "Stabilität ist Voraussetzung für Erfolg." *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* 26, (February 1, 2002): 15.
- Gabriel, Jürg Martin. *Die Gegenläufigkeit von Neutralität und Humanitären Interventionen*. Beiträge 26. Zürich: ETH, Forschungsstelle für Internationale Beziehungen, 1999, <http://e-collection.ethbib.ethz.ch/view/eth:23457> (accessed February 6, 2009).
- . *Swiss Neutrality and the "American Century": Two Conflicting Worldviews*. Beiträge 14. Zürich: ETH, Forschungsstelle für Internationale Beziehungen, 1998, <http://e-collection.ethbib.ethz.ch/view/eth:22581> (accessed February 6, 2009).
- Gabriel, Jürg Martin and Jon A. Fanzun. *The Asymmetries of Swiss Foreign Policy*. Beiträge 42. Zürich: ETH, Forschungsstelle für Internationale Beziehungen, 2003, <http://e-collection.ethbib.ethz.ch/view/eth:26298> (accessed February 6, 2009).
- George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. BCSIA Studies in International Security. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005.
- Ginneken van, Anique H. M. *Historical dictionary of the League of Nations*. Lanham: Scarecrow Press, 2006.
- Goetschel, Laurent. "Neutrality, a really Dead Concept?" *Cooperation and Conflict* 34, no. 2 (June 1999): 115–139, <http://cac.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/34/2/115> (accessed February 6, 2009).
- Goetschel, Laurent, Magdalena Bernath, and Daniel Schwarz. *Swiss Foreign Policy : Foundations and Possibilities*. New York: Routledge, 2005.
- Graham, Malbone Watson, Jr. "The Effect of the League of Nations Covenant on the Theory and Practice of Neutrality." *California Law Review* 15, no. 5 (July 1927): 357–377, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3475072> (accessed February 6, 2009).
- Grotius, Hugo. *De Jure Belli Ac Pacis Libri Tres; Volume Two, the Translation, Book III*. Translated by Francis W. Kelsey. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925.
- Gunter, Michael M. "Switzerland and the United Nations." *International Organization* 30, no. 1 (Winter 1976): 129–152, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706251> (accessed February 6, 2009).
- Haltiner, Karl W., Andreas Wenger, Silvia Würmli, and Urs Wenger. *Sicherheit 2007: Aussen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitische Meinungsbildung im Trend*. Zürich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik der ETH Zürich und Militärakademie an der ETH Zürich, 2007, <http://se1.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=47&fileid=A0903CF1-2FE2-5538-A2E3-3820E4F046A5&lng=de> (accessed May 8, 2009).

- Hirter, Hans and Wolf Linder. "Analyse der eidgenössischen Abstimmungen vom 3. März 2002". *VOX Analysen der eidgenössischen Urnengänge*. Bern: Institut für Politikwissenschaften, Universität Bern, 2002. <http://www.polittrends.ch/abstimmungen/abstimmungsanalysen/vox-analysen/020303d.html> (accessed April 16, 2009).
- Hohengartner, Reinhold. *Schweizerische Neutralität und Vereinte Nationen, 1945–1981: Die Problematik des schweizerischen UNO-Beitrittes im Spannungsfeld zwischen Bundesrat und Parlament*. Wien: VWGÖ, 1993.
- Hottelier, Michel. "L'adhésion de la Suisse à l'Organisation des Nations Unies : Aspects constitutionnels." *Revue Française de Droit Constitutionnel* 51, no. 3 (2002): 485–501, http://www.cairn.info/article.php?ID_REVUE=RFDC&ID_NUM_PUBLIE=RFDC_051&ID_ARTICLE=RFDC_051_0485 (accessed May 8, 2009).
- Institut für Politikwissenschaft der Universität Bern. "Swissvotes: Abstimmungsverzeichnis." *Universität Bern*. <http://www.swissvotes.ch/> (accessed April 24, 2009).
- Interdepartementale Arbeitsgruppe. *Neutralitätspraxis der Schweiz - Aktuelle Aspekte*. Bern: EDA, 2000, <http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/doc/publi.Par.0009.File.tmp/Neutralitaetspraxis%20der%20Schweiz%20-%20aktuelle%20Aspekte.pdf> (accessed February 7, 2009).
- Kant, Immanuel. *Zum ewigen Frieden*. Königsberg: Institut für Kommunikationsforschung und Phonetik, Universität Bonn, 1795, <http://www.ikp.uni-bonn.de/kant/aa08/341.html> (accessed February 22, 2009).
- Karsh, Efraim. "International Co-Operation and Neutrality." *Journal of Peace Research* 25, no. 1 (March 1988): 57–67, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/423981> (accessed April 16, 2009).
- . *Neutrality and Small States*. New York: Routledge, 1988.
- Koenig, Mario and Bettina Zeugin. *Final Report of the Independent Commission of Experts Switzerland - Second World War*. Zürich: Pendo, 2002.
- Komarnicki, T. "The Problem of Neutrality Under the United Nations Charter." *Transactions of the Grotius Society* 38 (1952): 77–91, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/743159> (accessed February 6, 2009).
- Kreis, Georg. *Kleine Neutralitätsgeschichte der Gegenwart: Ein Inventar zum neutralitätspolitischen Diskurs in der Schweiz seit 1943*. Bern: Haupt, 2004.
- Kruzal, Joseph and Michael H. Haltzel. *Between the Blocs: Problems and Prospects for Europe's Neutral and Nonaligned States*. Woodrow Wilson Center Series. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Cambridge University Press, 1989.

- Kunz, Josef L. "Neutrality and the European War 1939–1940." *Michigan Law Review* 39, no. 5 (March 1941): 719–754, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1283317> (accessed April 20, 2009).
- Lantis, Jeffrey S. and Matthew F. Queen. "Negotiating Neutrality: The Double-Edged Diplomacy of Austrian Accession to the European Union." *Cooperation and Conflict* 33, no. 2 (June 1998): 152–182 (accessed April 16, 2009).
- Malmborg, Mikael af. *Neutrality and State-Building in Sweden*. New York: Palgrave, 2001.
- Merkatz. "Die Neutralität der Schweiz und die Durchführung der Sanktionen." *Heidelberg Journal of International Law* 6, (1936): 387–398, http://www.hjil.de/06_1936/6_1936_1_b_387_2_398_1.pdf (accessed November 19, 2009).
- Möckli, Daniel, *Neutralität, Solidarität, Sonderfall: Die Konzeptionierung der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik der Nachkriegszeit, 1943–1947*. Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung 55, edited by Kurt R. Spillmann and Andreas Wenger. Zürich: FSK ETH Zürich, 2000.
- . "Vor der neuen UNO-Abstimmung: Drei Erkenntnisse aus der Niederlage von 1986." *Bulletin 2000 zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik* 7, (2000): 53–87, <http://se2.isn.ch/serviceengine/FileContent?serviceID=30&fileid=885CA138-B6BD-C9DD-2B46-5E64034C5946&lng=de> (accessed April 16, 2009).
- Moos, Carlo. *Ja zum Völkerbund - Nein zur UNO: Die Volksabstimmungen von 1920 und 1986 in der Schweiz*. Zürich: Chronos, 2001.
- Morgenthau, Hans J. "International Affairs: The Resurrection of Neutrality in Europe." *The American Political Science Review* 33, no. 3 (June 1939): 473–486, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1948801> (accessed April 16, 2009).
- . "The End of Switzerland's 'Differential' Neutrality." *The American Journal of International Law* 32, no. 3 (July 1938): 558–562, <http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/2191175> (accessed April 25, 2009).
- Mouritzen, Hans. "Choosing Sides in the European Iraq Conflict: A Test of New Geopolitical Theory." *European Security* 15, no. 2 (2006): 137, <http://www.informaworld.com/10.1080/09662830600903686> (accessed January 31, 2010).
- Munro, Emily, ed. *Challenges to Neutral & Non-Aligned Countries in Europe and Beyond*. Geneva: Geneva Center for Security Policy, 2005, http://www.gcsp.ch/e/publications/Issues_Institutions/Europe/Con_Proceedings/Neutrality%20Report.pdf (accessed February 7, 2009).
- Neuhold, Hanspeter. *The European Neutrals in the 1990s: New Challenges and Opportunities*. Austrian Institute for International Affairs Series. Boulder: Westview Press, 1992.

- Neumann, Iver B. and Sieglinde Gstöhl. *Lilliputians in Gulliver's World? Small States in International Relations*. Working Paper. Reykjavik: Center for Small State Studies, 2004, <http://stofnanir.hi.is/ams/sites/files/ams/Lilliputians%20Endanlegt%202004.pdf> (accessed February 6, 2009).
- Nonhoff, Stephan. *In der Neutralität verhungern?*. Münster: Agenda Verlag, 1995.
- Ojanen, Hanna. *Neutrality and Non-Alignment in Europe Today*. Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2003, http://www.upi-fiia.fi/assets/publications/UPI_Report_06_2003.pdf (accessed February 7, 2009).
- Rappard, William E. *Collective Security in Swiss Experience, 1291–1948*. London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1948.
- . “The United Nations and Switzerland.” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 246, (July 1946): 64–71, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1025133> (accessed April 20, 2009).
- . “The Evolution of the League of Nations.” *The American Political Science Review* 21, no. 4 (November 1927): 792–826, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1947594> (accessed April 16, 2009).
- Raymond, Gregory A. “Neutrality Norms and the Balance of Power.” *Cooperation and Conflict* 32, no. 2 (June 1997): 123–146 (accessed April 20, 2009).
- Rickli, Jean-Marc. “European Small States' Military Policies After the Cold War: From Territorial to Niche Strategies.” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 21, no. 3 (2008): 307–325.
- . “Neutrality: From a Small State's Power Instrument to a Powerful Identity Provider.” *Unpublished Article*, Oxford: 2008.
- Riklin, Alois. “Neutralität am Ende? 500 Jahre Neutralität der Schweiz.” *Humboldt-Nachrichten* no. 30 (2008): 13–22, http://www.humboldt.hu/HN30/HN30-13-22-Neutralitaet_am_ende_500_Jahre_Neutralitaet_der_Schweiz.pdf (accessed October 17, 2009).
- Roithner, Thomas. “Neutralität und europäische Sicherheitspolitik. Die Militarisierung der Union, die Verfassung und die Chancen für eine europäische Zivilmacht.” *Politik und Zeitgeschehen* 17, (2007): 36, <http://www.voegb.at/bildungsangebote/skripten/pzg/PZG-17.pdf> (accessed February 10, 2009).
- Ross, John F. L. *Neutrality and International Sanctions : Sweden, Switzerland, and Collective Security*. New York: Praeger, 1989.
- Roth, Michèle. “Volksmehr und Ständemehr.” *Vereinte Nationen: Zeitschrift für die Vereinten Nationen und ihre Sonderorganisationen* 50, no. 3 (2002): 122–123, http://www.dgyn.de/fileadmin/user_upload/PUBLIKATIONEN/Zeitschrift_VN/VN_2002/VN_3_2002.pdf (accessed May 8, 2009).
- Roxburgh, R. F. “Changes in the Conception of Neutrality.” *Journal of Comparative Legislation and International Law* 1, no. 1 (1919): 17–24, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/752715> (accessed April 16, 2009).

- Schweizer Bundesrat. *Die Neutralität auf dem Prüfstand im Irak-Konflikt*. Bern: EDA, 2005, <http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2005/6997.pdf> (accessed February 7, 2009).
- . *Bundesratsbeschluss über das Ergebnis der Volksabstimmung vom 03. März 2002*. Bern: Schweizerische Bundeskanzlei, 2002, <http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2002/3690.pdf> (accessed April 18, 2009).
- . *Volksabstimmung vom 3. März 2002: Erläuterungen des Bundesrates*. Bern: Schweizerische Bundeskanzlei, 2002, http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/va/20020303/explic/uno1_24D.pdf (accessed April 18, 2009).
- . *Botschaft über die Volksinitiative “Für den Beitritt der Schweiz zur Organisation der Vereinten Nationen (UNO)”*. Bern: Schweizerische Bundeskanzlei, 2000, <http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2001/1183.pdf> (accessed April 18, 2009).
- . *Bericht zur Neutralität*. Bern: EDA, 1993, <http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/doc/publi.Par.0005.File.tmp/Bericht%20zur%20Neutralitaet%201993.pdf> (accessed February 7, 2009).
- . *Bundesratsbeschluss über das Ergebnis der Volksabstimmung vom 16. März 1986*. Bern: Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv, 1986, <http://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc.jsp?ID=10049996> (accessed April 18, 2009).
- . *Botschaft über den Beitritt der Schweiz zur Organisation der Vereinten Nationen (UNO)*. Bern: Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv, 1981, <http://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc.jsp?ID=10048583> (accessed April 18, 2009).
- . *Bericht über das Verhältnis der Schweiz zu den Vereinten Nationen und ihren Spezialorganisationen für die Jahre 1972–1976*. Bern: Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv, 1977, <http://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc.jsp?ID=10047078> (accessed April 18, 2009).
- . *Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über die Neutralität der Schweiz im Völkerbund*. Bern: Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv, 1938, <http://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc.jsp?ID=10033636> (accessed October 31, 2009).
- . *Bericht des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung über das Ergebnis der Volksabstimmung vom 16. Mai 1920 betreffend den Beitritt der Schweiz zum Völkerbunde*. Bern: Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv, 1920, <http://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc.jsp?ID=10027597> (accessed October 31, 2009).
- . *Zusatzbotschaft des Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung betreffend die Frage des Beitritts der Schweiz zum Völkerbund*. Bern: Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv, 1920, <http://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc.jsp?ID=10027441> (accessed October 31, 2009).

- Schweizerische Bundeskanzlei. *Eidgenössische Volksinitiative "für den Beitritt der Schweiz zur Organisation der Vereinten Nationen (UNO)"*. Bern: Schweizerische Bundeskanzlei, 2000, <http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/ff/2000/2453.pdf> (accessed April 18, 2009).
- Schweizerische Bundesversammlung. *Bundesbeschluss über den Beitritt der Schweiz zur Organisation der Vereinten Nationen*. Bern: Schweizerisches Bundesarchiv, 1984, <http://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/viewOrigDoc.jsp?ID=10049505> (accessed April 18, 2009).
- Stupan, Sergio. *Comment la Suisse a adhéré au Pacte de la Société des Nations*. Lausanne: Université de Lausanne, 1943.
- Subedi, Surya P. "Neutrality in a Changing World: European Neutral States and the European Community." *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 42, no. 2 (April 1993): 238–268, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/761099> (accessed February 6, 2009).
- Swiss Confederation. "The Swiss Federal Archives: Online-Documents." <http://www.amtsdruckschriften.bar.admin.ch/showHome.do> (accessed April 24, 2009).
- Swiss Federal Council. *Message from the Federal Council of Switzerland to the Federal Assembly of Switzerland Concerning the Question of the Accession of Switzerland to the League of Nations (4 August 1919) Together with the Annexes Thereto*. Cambridge: University Press, 1919.
- Swiss Parliament. "Curia Vista - Database of Parliamentary Proceedings." <http://www.parlament.ch/e/dokumentation/curia-vista/pages/default.aspx> (accessed April 24, 2009).
- Taubenfeld, Howard J. "International Actions and Neutrality." *The American Journal of International Law* 47, no. 3 (July 1953): 377–396, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2194679> (accessed April 16, 2009).
- Thomas, Elbert D. "Theory of Neutrality." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 186 (July 1936): 163–168, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1020622> (accessed January 23, 2009).
- Trachsler, Daniel. "Gute Dienste - Mythen, Fakten, Perspektiven." *Bulletin 2004 zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik* 11, (2004): 33–64, http://www.eda.admin.ch/etc/medialib/downloads/edazen/topics/peasec/peac.Par.0035.File.tmp/rp_Gute%20DiensteETH_de.pdf (accessed April 16, 2009).
- Tresch, Tibor S., Andreas Wenger, Silvia Würmli, Mark Pletscher, and Urs Wenger. *Sicherheit 2009: Aussen-, Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitische Meinungsbildung im Trend*. Zürich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik der ETH Zürich und Militärakademie an der ETH Zürich, 2009, http://www.css.ethz.ch/Sicherheit_2009.pdf (accessed January 30, 2010).

- UN General Assembly. *General Assembly Fifty-Seventh Session, 1st Plenary Meeting*. New York: Official Documents System of the United Nations, 2002, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/583/32/PDF/N0258332.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed March 5, 2009).
- . *General Assembly Fifty-Sixth Session, Application of the Swiss Confederation for Admission to Membership in the United Nations*. New York: Official Documents System of the United Nations, 2002, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/487/22/PDF/N0248722.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed March 5, 2009).
- . *Resolution 50/80: Permanent Neutrality of Turkmenistan*. New York: Official Documents System of the United Nations, 1996, <http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N96/761/23/PDF/N9676123.pdf?OpenElement> (accessed March 5, 2009).
- Verdross, Alfred. "Austria's Permanent Neutrality and the United Nations Organization." *The American Journal of International Law* 50, no. 1 (January 1956): 61–68, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2194585> (accessed February 6, 2009).
- Vögeli, Viktor. *Völkerbund und Neutralität: Grundzüge der Schweizerischen Auseinandersetzung von 1919/1920 (Teildruck)*. Zürich: Universität Zürich, 1949.
- Walters, Francis Paul. *A History of the League of Nations*. London: Oxford University Press, 1952.
- Wight, Martin. "The Idea of Neutrality." *London Calling*. October 11, 1965.
- World Peace Foundation. "A League of Nations." *A League of Nations III*, (1920): 1–366, <http://books.google.com/books?id=zNMBAAAAAYAAJ> (accessed November 7, 2009).
- Wright, Quincy. "The Present Status of Neutrality." *The American Journal of International Law* 34, no. 3 (July 1940): 391–415, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2192922> (accessed April 16, 2009).
- Yost, David S. *NATO Transformed : The Alliance's New Roles in International Security*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1998.
- Zahler, Walter R. "Switzerland and the League of Nations; A Chapter in Diplomatic History." *The American Political Science Review* 30, no. 4 (August 1936): 753–757, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1947951> (accessed April 16, 2009).
- Zimmer, Oliver. "Boundary Mechanisms and Symbolic Resources: Towards a Process-Oriented Approach to National Identity." *Nations and Nationalism* 9, no. 2 (April 2003): 173–193, <http://www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-bin/fulltext/118851163/PDFSTART> (accessed April 20, 2009).

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California